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PREFACE
The preface to a PhD-thesis is probably the most important part. Not only is itread, it is usually well read. In it one must therefore thank those than have tobe thanked and explain to those that have suffered from or wondered about
my activities in the last seven years what it was all about. And maybe some of you
can then be motivated to keep on reading.
I started thinking about technology and the labour market in my last years of
studying economics in Maastricht. At the time I was in Bonn, Germany, where the
institute I had just began an internship went belly up. It was at that time that I read a
little book on the introduction of Fordism in the automobile industry in the early 20'"
century. This was the clearest example of technical change affecting labour demand I
have seen so far and I started to wonder why technology had taken that particular
direction. In Maastricht I had been raised to believe that every human activity is to
some extent driven by economic motives. What economics might lie behind the
direction of technical change and its impact on the labour market?
That turned out to be a question that would occupy me for seven years and
this book is the result. When Joan Muysken asked me if I would consider doing a
PhD, I suggested to turn that question into a serious research topic. He liked it and
stimulated me to first write a proposal, then do the research and finally finish this
book. I thank him for believing in me throughout and for not showing the despair he
must have felt as deadlines passed and his beloved straight lines turned into erratic
curves.
As Joan is a labour economist, the supervising team was reinforced to cover
the technology angle. Dr. A.H. van Zon, Adriaan to friends, turned out to be the
perfect complement. Joan enjoys life and takes his economics seriously. Adriaan
cracks economic problems for the fun of it but at times carries the world on his
shoulder. "Life sucks and then you die" and he came pretty close to doing the latter. I
am truly thankful that he is still around to enjoy the many good things that I wish him.
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putting up with me. They were the clearest examples of how colleagues became good
friends.
Which brings me to the many good friends, new and old, who have contributed
to this thesis in various ways. Some have to be named: Bart, of course, thank you for
giving me shelter these last two years. And Ingeborg for the cover design, Gerry for
lending a hand, Manolis and Patrick for setting up and hosting my website, and Kurt
and Nico for helping me through the defence as my 'paranimfen'. To all others, who
helped me enjoy the last 7 years, you have all contributed in a real sense to the
completion of this work and I thank you all. An occasional game of Kolonisten, a beer
in Walhalla or elsewhere, a game of hockey, a ride down snowy slopes, a timely
postcard, an enjoyable concert or a good conversation over a cognac made my time
as an AIO/OIO not only bearable but outright pleasant. For that I also thank my
family: Maike, Jos, mom and dad, Sylvia and Tijs. The love I feel for you all is rarely
spoken but ever present and your support and encouragement has been essential to
my resolve to complete this task.
But as much as I love you all, I shall dedicate this book to Sara. She has
contributed to this thesis in all the above ways and many more. From helping me lay-
out the text and coming up with the winning cover design concept in the final stages,
to encouraging my starting this whole endeavour in the first place. She was my loving
partner, closest family, gourmet chef, patient shrink, strict writing coach and best
friend throughout.
Utrecht, January 2004
To Sara
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CHAPTER 1:
GENERAL OVERVIEW;
FACTS AND HYPOTHESES
The position of low skilled workers on the labour market has deterioratedsignificantly over the past three decades. Their employment rate and to alarger or lesser extent their wages dropped in OECD countries over the 80s
and 90s. This has been a major concern to economists and politicians in all
industrialised countries (OECD, 1994a). Starting from the standard supply and
demand framework, the deterioration cannot be explained by the observed supply
movements, as the relative supply of low skilled labour generally decreased. Hence
demand must have shifted significantly. A major puzzle now presents itself: what has
caused the apparent collapse in low skilled demand and what can explain the
different labour market responses throughout the OECD? Solving that puzzle is a
prerequisite for formulating policies to improve upon the present situation and
prevent further deterioration in the future.
This thesis will address that puzzle. It first develops a theoretical framework
that explains the shift in demand as well as the different ways this shift has
manifested itself in the OECD. Then policy implications are considered. This
introductory chapter provides the empirical background that inspired much of the
theoretical work presented later on. An additional advantage is that such facts are
very accessible. By combining facts and theory in an intuitive way this chapter can
serve both as an introduction to and as an overview of the entire thesis. Therefore it
is structured, as the main body of the thesis itself, in 3 parts.
Part I of the thesis develops a basic theoretical framework that yields two
hypotheses to explain the drop in relative demand. Both attribute the relative
demand shift to skill-biased technical change. The results are derived under the
assumptions of an exogenously given inelastic labour supply and labour market-
clearing wages. As in the OECD these assumptions are least violated in the US, this
chapter first presents the US facts and figures that are relevant in constructing and
evaluating the hypotheses of Part I.
In Part II of the thesis the theoretical framework is extended by introducing
unemployment. Unemployment is particularly relevant in the European countries.
Section 2 of this chapter therefore summarises the facts and figures that relate to
the European situation. In contrast to the US, they experienced high levels of
unemployment, but also had more stable relative wages. It is only natural to assume
that the two phenomena are linked and a trade-off exists. It will be argued, however,
that introducing unemployment is insufficient to explain the facts. Some additional
hypotheses, developed within the general theoretical framework, can be formulated
to explain the main EU-US differences.
Part III analyses both the implications of policy on and the policy implications
of the resulting theoretical framework. Policies aimed at income redistribution, the
labour market or innovation will interact in this framework. Moreover, different policy
stances could help to explain the observed differences in labour market trends. To
benchmark this part of the analysis, Section 3 will provide some facts on income,
labour market and technology policies in Europe and the US.
A pdf-version of this thesis, including the appendices that were not included in
the printed version, can be downloaded from www.marksanders.nl. These
appendices provide background information that is helpful but not essential for
understanding the main text.
i. i TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR;
THE CASE OF THE US
The United States have received the bulk of attention in both the empirical andtheoretical literature on the deterioration of the low skilled labour market
position. This focus is justified because developments in the US have been most
pronounced and dramatic in the OECD. Despite continued increases in the average
educational level of the American worker low skilled wages decreased - in relative but
even in absolute terms - as did their employment share (Card and DiNardo (2002)).
Figure 1.1 below shows the ratio of high over low skilled labour supply, measured by
fulltime equivalents in the labour force, and the ratio of hourly wages.
Figure 1.1: RELATIVE WAGES AND RELATIVE SUPPLY IN THE UNITED STATES
High over Low Skilled Labour, 1967-2000
1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Rel. Supply (LH/LI., left scale) Rel. Wage (wn/wu right scale)
Source: Card and DiNardo (2002). '
The graph shows that the relative supply of college-educated workers has increased.
According to these data, the relative supply of high skilled grew at an average 4.4
percent annually in the 70s and fell to some 2.6 percent annually in the 80s. The
graph indicates a further slowdown in the 90s to about 1.7 percent annually. On the
right axis the college to high school wage ratio (males) is plotted. Starting in the 70s
at about 1.4 it first shows a drop to about 1.3 followed by a steep rise from 1979
until 1987 with some stabilisation around 1.6 in the late 80s and 90s.
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) studied an even longer period and concluded
that relative demand and supply have gradually increased since the 40s. But supply
accelerated in the 70s. While demand picked up in the mid 80s and continued to rise
throughout the 80s, relative supply growth fell back to more moderate levels by the
start of the 80s. This caused the strong relative wage responses illustrated above.*
Beaudry and Green (2002) identified the underlying trends in the wage /eve/s.
For the entire period 1976-2000 they find a steady rise in the real wage level of the
college educated. The movement in the relative wage is predominantly determined by
a sharp drop in the real wages of (less than) high school educated over the early 80s,
followed by a stabilisation over the 90s. The evidence thus suggests that the demand
for low skilled workers has collapsed over this period.
The shift in relative demand poses a clear policy challenge since it severely
eroded the standard of living for already vulnerable groups in the US. To meet that
challenge it is crucial to understand what has caused the shift. A useful first step is to
consider the evidence in more detail. Firms demand labour to fill jobs. Therefore a
shift in aggregate demand can be the result of shifting from low to high skilled jobs in
many firms, from low to high skilled firms in many industries, from low to high skilled
industries in many sectors and finally from low to high skilled intensive sectors. It can
therefore be considered a shift in the skill distribution of labour demand. The exact
level at which the shift has occurred provides a first indication of possible
explanations. In Figure 1.2 the average change of low skilled labour intensity,
measured by the wage bill share, over the 80s is presented for 10 sectors in the US
economy. It can be verified that all sectors saw the wage bill share of low skilled
decline but some more than others.^
• See also Levy and Murnane (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound and Griliches
(1994), Machin (1995), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and
Machin and Van Reenen (1998) for further evidence on relative wage and employment developments.
* Note for example that the share of low skilled dropped fastest in business services (7) and advanced
manufacturing (3). The share of high skilled, on the other hand rose fastest in the mining and
construction industry (1), followed by transportation (4) and advanced manufacturing (3).
Figure 1.2: COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES LABOUR FORCE 3
Composition in 1983 (Bar); Growth Rate over 1983-1991 (Line)
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Source: NBER (1997), Census Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG).
A more detailed look at the numbers shows that large differences exist within these
sectors as well. It is not convenient to present Figure 1.2 for more detailed industrial
classifications. Shift-share analysis provides a more elegant way of separating
between and within industry shifts in skill intensity. In this procedure one simply
decomposes the aggregate drop in low skilled labour intensity in its within and
between sub-aggregates (industries) component."
^ Sector classification is Standard Industry Classification (SIC) first digit: 0 agriculture and fisheries: 1
mining and construction: 2 primary industry; 3 advanced industry; 4 transportation and energy; 5
retail; wholesale trade; 6 financial services; 7 recreational and business services; 8 health, education
and cultural services; 9 public administration.
* Shift-share analysis computes: cfs/\, = £dsa,sr )^+£sa,dsr i^ where d means a change over
period t, shu/t is the share of unskilled in the wage bill of sub-aggregate / at time t and sa* is the share
of sub-aggregate y in the aggregate wage bill. A bar over the variable indicates the average over the
period considered. The first term on the right hand side can be interpreted as the shifts caused by
between industry shifts in the wage bill, whereas the latter term captures the shifts w/th/n the industry.
Those shifts in their turn can be decomposed in either between firms or within firm shifts. See Sanders
and ter Weel (2000) for a survey of the evidence.
Table 1.1: DECOMPOSITION OF THE SHIFT IN THE EARNINGS SHARE
United States, 1983 and 1991
Source: CPS-MORG, 4-digit Standard Industry Classification.
Table 1.1 expresses these terms as a share of the aggregate shift for the US. It
shows that about 80% of the shift in aggregate skill intensity is due to within industry
shifts over the 80s.s Having located the shift in demand as a general within-
industries phenomenon even at the 3-digit level industry classification, one has
eliminated any explanation that predicts that some sectors or industries are affected
while others are not.6 The cause of the aggregate demand shift apparently lies in firm
characteristics that explain the w/t/i/n industry (between firm) variation. At the same
time it is also clear that many firms must have been affected simultaneously across
industries and sectors, to produce a significant aggregate shift.
An important trend in the US economy that started in the 70s, continued
through the 80s and 90s and that affected firms in all sectors and industries has
been the introduction and rapid diffusion of information and communication
technology (ICT).
Figure 1.3 illustrates that the percentage of workers using a personal
computer at work almost doubled within fifteen years for three skill groups in the US.
Diffusion followed a traditional S-shaped pattern and was rapid in the mid 80s,
levelling off in the early 90s for all skill groups.? It can also be observed in Figure 1.3
that high skilled workers clearly used the PC more intensively over the entire period.®
s These numbers correspond reasonably well with those found in for example Autor, Katz and Krueger
(1998). Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1996) decompose at the establishment level and find lower
within percentages. This is due to entry and exit from the sample, but also indicates that much of the
aggregate shifts is due to between firm or establishment shifts within narrowly defined industries,
s This for example eliminates the so-called trade hypothesis. That hypothesis claims that increased
trade with low skilled intensive non-OECD countries may have caused the American economy to shift
from low skilled import competing industries to high skilled export oriented industries over the 80s.
The evidence shows little support for that hypothesis. See Hellier and Chusseau (2002).
' Reliable data on the use of computers on the job exist only since 1984 (introduction of the PC) so
the full S-shape is not visible in the data. The drop in the diffusion speed in the early 90s and the fact
that in 1970 the use of computers was negligible implies that the S-shape must describe the diffusion
pattern. See also Greenstein (1994) for evidence on mainframe computers.
^ Low skilled workers do catch up since the late 80s.
Figure 1.3: THE DIFFUSION OF PERSONAL COMPUTERS
United States, 1984-1997
Ratio (C/HS) right
•Al l
Source: Card and DiNardo (2002) Table l.»
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Empirical research has shown that this positive correlation between the skill intensity
of demand and computer use does not only exist over time at the aggregate level but
also across sectors, industries and firms in panel and cross-section data.™ In
addition, the literature shows that other proxies for the use or production of new
goods and processes, in short innovation, are positively correlated to the skill
intensity of production." The observed correlation of skill intensity with such proxies
for technical change at sectoral, industry and down to the firm and establishment
level has led to the popular Sk/7/ 6/asecf Tecrin/ca/ Change Hypothes/s (SBTC-
hypothesis). This hypothesis claims that, due to the widespread introduction of
skilled labour using technologies, the skill intensity of labour demand has increased
at the firm or even job level. Many have found evidence that is consistent with this
9 A 3™ order polynomial was fitted to connect data points.
" See for example Bound and Johnson (1992). Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992)
Krueger (1993), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Katz (2002).
" Surveys of empirical literature, for example Johnson (1997), Machin and Van Reenen (1998),
Berman and Machin (2000) and Sanders and ter Weel (2000) consistently find these conclusions.
hypothesis and a consensus is forming on the pivotal role that new technology has
played in causing the observed relative demand shift in the US.12
This consensus, however, is built upon evidence that eliminates most
alternative hypotheses that have been considered and raises a new and more
fundamental question rather than providing the final answer. If technical change was
biased over the 80s, one may wonder why it was biased. Understanding this will shed
light on whether the resulting deterioration of the low skilled labour market position
is a permanent or transitory phenomenon, whether or not policy responses are in
order and if so, of what kind. The key is to determine to what extent the bias in
technical change was the result of behaviour that can be manipulated, rather than
beyond the reach of policy makers. To answer these questions, a closer look at the
sources and dynamics of biases in technical change is required.
1.1.1 PERMANENT BIAS BY DESIGN
Economists have long realised that technical change is the work of man, and does
not fall like "manna from heaven"." Many if not most of the innovations that
generate technical change today are conceived and developed by people in R&D
facilities, universities and firms. The empirical evidence to support this claim is
mounting and by now it is a generally accepted fact that technical change is the
result of deliberate action by. to some extent, economically motivated agents."
These agents may be induced to develop one technology over another, which implies
that biases in technical change are also the work of man. Very early in the debate,
Hicks (1932) coined the term "/nduced Was" to refer to this idea. If innovations are
biased against low skilled labour by design, than policy may try to affect agents'
decisions to develop or abandon certain projects. However, explaining the observed
bias as a deliberately designed feature of new technologies poses quite a challenge.
" See Sanders and ter Weel (2000) and Card and DiNardo (2002) for a critical review of the evidence.
" This was how Joan Robinson expressed her critique on the neoclassical theory of growth that
assumed technical change progressed at an exogenousiy given rate (See Kenney (2003)). Economists
have always realised that technology was man-made, but they were very late to incorporate this
obvious fact in mainstream theory. See Chapter 2 and for example Jones (1975) for an elaborate
survey of the early growth literature.
" See for example Romer (1990) and more recently Cameron (1998) and Temple (1999).
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In Hicks' conception, the observed drop in relative wages would, all else equal,
induce a bias towards low skilled labour.
There are ways around this paradox but they require a very precise
formulation. Acemoglu (1998, 2002) has shown that a supply-shock, such as the
accelerated increase in the supply of high skilled labour in the early 70s, can induce
biases that cause relative low skilled wages to fall below the pre-supply-shock levels
in the long run. The argument is that the increased availability of high skilled labour
induced innovators to direct their efforts towards high skilled labour using innovation
during the 80s.
Figure 1.4: THE INDUCED INNOVATION HYPOTHESIS
A simple demand and supply schedule as in Figure 1.4 can illustrate the mechanism.
The rightward shift in the vertical supply curve represents the increase in the relative
supply of high skilled labour. Starting at point -4, relative wages drop (-A-6) for the high
skilled in response to this shock. As technology responds, the demand schedule is
shifted up, increasing relative wages (B-C). The insert on the right depicts the
resulting change in relative wages over time. At this point it is important to note that,
because Acemoglu assumed technical change to be skill-specific and irreversible, he
concluded that induced biases in technical change permanently shifted demand
away from low skilled workers.
Further details follow in Chapters 3 and 4. Following Aghion (2001) this
hypothesis will be referred to as the strong market s/ze effect, as the size of the
market for high skilled complementary technologies induces this technological
response.
1.1.2 TEMPORARY BIAS BY NATURE
A second explanation presented in Part I also goes back in the literature at least to
Schumpeter (1934). It accepts the fact that technology is man-made but there are
some relevant aspects in the dynam/cs of technical change that were not considered
in the argument above.
Observe for example in Figure 1.3 that PCs are diffusing among low skilled
workers as well. And even though they still lag behind, the ratio of high to low skilled
penetration rates of computer use has been falling since the late 80s, indicating that
the low skilled workers are catching up. The development and introduction of user-
friendly interfaces has no doubt contributed a lot to this 'trickling down' of computer
use and it seems that ICT-related products and services are becoming less skill
intensive over time.
This is not a unique feature of ICT. There is little historical evidence to support
the claim that the skills-composition of the labour required to operate or produce a
new technology is stable over time. Indeed many case studies (e.g. Ehlen and
Marshall (1996)) show that innovations do not 'freeze up' after invention or
commercial introduction, but continue to evolve, both shaping and adapting to their
environment as they mature. In this case study literature some common dynamic
regularities emerged, which led economists to formulate the concept of a product //fe
cyc/e (PLQ.is
The existence of a product life cycle would imply that the use of new
technologies is correlated with high skilled labour intensity not because the
" Dean (1950). Hirsch (1965), Levitt (1965), Vernon (1966) and Cox (1967), among others. Chapter
2 will elaborate on the life cycle concept.
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technologies are intentionally biased but merely because they are new. Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1987) empirically validated this point that was first raised by Schultz
(1975) and features prominently in all product life cycle models. Audretsch (1987)
showed that on average the skill intensity of labour demand moves from high to low
as products age. Xiang (2002, p.l) recently found that: "trie average sk/7/ed-/abor
/ntens/ty of new goods exceeds that of o/d goods by over 40% and they account for
about 30% of the rise /n re/at/Ve /abour demand". The product life cycle provides an
interesting alternative explanation for the observed positive correlation between
innovation indicators and skill intensity. More importantly it predicts that the shift in
demand is temporary and is eventually reversed.
In Figure 1.5 the introduction of an innovation, biased or not, shifts the
demand curve outward initially but back as innovations mature.^ if a wave of
innovations hits the economy, as arguably was the case when ICT was introduced
economy wide in the 80s, then the aggregate effect is an initial outward shift that
increases relative wages.
Figure 1.5: THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
'* The maturation of an innovation is in itself a mixed process of unintended knowledge accumulation
through for example learning by doing and the intentional efforts to improve the product and
underlying production process. Chapter 2 provides more details.
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As the wave matures, the initial shock is followed by a gradual return towards the
initial position." One could refer to this as the //fe cyc/e exp/anat/on for skill-biased
technical change.^ A crucial point to be noted is the fact that relative wages increase
more in the short than in the long run. As the new technologies mature, the initial
natural skill bias is reversed. It can be argued that this maturing process is not
entirely automatic and exogenous. Chapters 2 and 3 provide more details on how
technology moves over the cycle.
1.1.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two competing explanations can easily be reconciled. The relative supply shock
in the US may have induced innovators to focus on skilled labour using innovations,
resulting in the ICT-revolution of the 80s. The newness of the related products and
services prevented these sectors from absorbing large numbers of low skilled
workers and aggravated the already built-in skill bias.
Moreover, in that period traditional industries were shedding low skilled
labour due to a severe recession. Consequently the position of low skilled workers in
the labour market deteriorated rapidly. Anderson (2001) presents evidence that over
the mid and late 90s the wave of ICT-related innovations matures and the relative
wage effects are partially reversed.
It should be noted that in particular the life cycle explanation has not been put
forward in this debate. Part I of this thesis fills a gap in the literature there. It will
position the arguments in the literature, extensively discuss the required modelling
tools and develop a mathematical model that is analysed and simulated to refine the
explanations offered above. The formal analysis will show that both the market size
effect and life cycle dynamics exist under a variety of specifications and that the
model can be calibrated to reproduce the US stylised facts presented above.
i ' Not necessarily all the way back to the original position though. Chapter 4 provides the argument in
more detail.
" This life cycle explanation is very close to what Aghion (2001) refers to as the major technical
change exp/anat/on.
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i.2 TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE LABOUR MARKET;
THE CASE OF THE EU
The American relative wage changes are not representative for the entire OECD. Inthis section the focus is on formulating hypotheses to explain the differences.
First consider the supply side. One can observe in Table 1.2 below that the increase
in the share of skilled labour in the labour force was quite comparable in Europe and
the US.
Table 1.2: RELATIVE LABOUR SUPPLY TRENDS IN THE OECD
Source: Colecchia and Papaconstantinou (1996), Table 1 . "
The numbers in Table 1.2 do not account for large differences in educational
systems, but more carefully designed studies using literacy scores also find that the
rise in the relative availability of skilled labour is comparable, even when taking such
differences into account.^ In most European countries, however, relative supply has
developed more gradually than in the US. The acceleration in the mid 70s in the US,
attributed by Acemoglu (2002a) to the Vietnam draft laws, obviously did not occur in
Europe.
Sanders and ter Weel (2000), however, conclude that in contrast to
developments in the United States and several other Anglo-Saxon countries, relative
" Sample periods and age groups differ between countries due to data availability constraints. The
original table contained 8 additional OECD countries. No large deviations from the general trend were
recorded there.
2° See for example Miihlau and Horgan (2001).
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wages remained stable or even fell in many Continental European economies.^* This
wage stability in spite of comparable relative supply shifts can mean two things.
European countries were not hit by the same demand shifting technology shocks that
the US has experienced or European labour markets responded differently to these
shocks. Part I will argue that the former is perhaps too easily dismissed, whereas
others have argued that the latter is perhaps too easily adopted.
On the demand side the downward trend in relative low skilled employment is
also concentrated within detailed industries in Europe.22 Moreover, the shifts in
employment seemed to have occurred within the same industries throughout the
OECD.23 Globalisation and rapid international technology diffusion are therefore
usually assumed to have shifted demand in both the US and Europe. In addition the
latter hypothesis is supported by the obvious (negative) correlation of wage stability
with a host of labour market flexibility indicators and, arguably as a consequence,
unemployment levels. That hypothesis, which Muhlau and Horgan (2001, p. 6) refer
to as the trade-off Aiypothes/s, is therefore by far the more popular one.^*
1.2.1 THE TRADE-OFF HYPOTHESIS
The trade-off hypothesis basically claims that European low skilled workers paid for
the relative wage stability with high unemployment. Simple cross-country regression
21 France and Germany experienced relative wage compression over the 80s . In the Nether lands,
Denmark, Italy and Scandinavia relative wages remained stable, whereas Belgium, Portugal, Spain
and Austria had some divergence. Only the United Kingdom and Ireland witnessed relative wage shif ts
comparable to those in the US. As Austral ia, New Zealand and Canada also exper ienced some
divergence the l i terature dist inguishes the Anglo-Saxon and Cont inental European countr ies. See for
example Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1996) . OECD (1996) . Machin and Van Reenen (1998) and
Freeman and Schet tkat (2000) .
22 See for example Colecchia and Papaconstant inou ( 1996 ) Table 3 for a decomposi t ion of
employment shif ts in 7 OECD countr ies (Australia. Canada, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the
United States). None of the computed within industry components falls below 8 5 % in manufactur ing. It
is worth not ing, however, that including services and the public sector reduces the within component
considerably for France and Italy (to 5 8 and 3 8 percent respectively) and not for the Anglo-Saxon
countr ies and Japan. As these are the only representat ives of main land Europe in the sample, this
might be a first indicat ion of more moderate demand shif ts in Continental European Countries.
" See Machin and Van Reenen (1998) and Colecchia and Papaconstant inou (1996) .
'« This hypothesis has also been referred to as the "Unif ied Theory" (Blank ( 1 9 9 7 , p. 14)), " the
Transatlant ic Consensus" (Atkinson (1999)) or " the Krugman Hypothesis" (Acemoglu 2 0 0 2 b , p.60). as
it was f irst fo rmula ted in 1 9 9 4 by Paul Krugman ( 1 9 9 4 , 1995 ) . The te rm trade-off hypothesis is used
here as it best catches the essence of the argument .
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of earnings inequality on a host of labour market flexibility indicators indeed suggests
there is such a trade-off.^ To illustrate the mechanism suggested here, the vertical
relative supply curve of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 has been replaced by an upward sloping
curve in Figure 1.6. An upward sloping relative supply curve can be the result of
workers' trade-off between supplying labour and consuming leisure.
Figure 1.6: THE TRADE-OFF HYPOTHESIS
Relative Employment
Response
Intuitively, as their relative wage rises, workers are more inclined to supply their
labour, causing relative supply to rise at any given composition of the working age
population. In this case unemployment is voluntary. Alternatively the upward sloping
supply curve may be the result of collective wage bargaining and unemployment is
involuntary.^
Note that in Figure 1.6 a quantity response (horizontal) reduces the necessary
relative wage adjustment (vertical). This quantity response is a change in relative
Howell and Hiibler (2001), Table 1.
*6 Here the causality runs the other way. In the bargain higher unemployment rates depress wage
claims. For a given relative supply of workers a higher relative unemployment rate reduces relative
wages. Lower relative employment rates thus lower effective supply at lower relative wages. See
Chapter 5 for further details.
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employment given the relative stocks of skilled and unskilled labour, either due to
changes in relative participation or to unemployment rates. The slopes of both
curves, given by the elasticity of relative demand and supply with respect to relative
wages, determine how the burden of adjustment is shared between wage and
quantity adjustments. Flat curves imply that any given demand shock generates large
quantity and small wage movements. The trade-off hypothesis now relies on
European curves, in particular the supply curve being flatter - i.e. more elastic - than
in the US. Inflexible labour market institutions in Europe are held responsible for this
combination of low wage flexibility and persistently high unemployment levels.
However, there is little evidence to support the claim that demand or supply
elasticities differ a lot across countries. The elasticity of relative demand is largely
determined by the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labour.
Freeman (1986) and Hamermesh (1993) for example concluded that this elasticity
probably lies between 1 and 2 in most of the countries in the empirical studies they
survey. Freeman and Schettkat (2000) find 1.5 in a joint Germany-US dataset. That
result is very similar to estimates by Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and
Murphy (1992) for the US at 1.7 and 1.4 respectively and by Beissinger and Moller
(1998) for Germany at 1.8. Hence there is no empirical or theoretical reason why this
elasticity should be assumed to differ a lot between advanced countries. "' '
On the supply side the evidence shows a little more international variation.
Still participation on the labour market has yielded estimated elasticities of supply
between 0 and 1, with the bulk around 0 . 1 . " For involuntary unemployment most
empirical studies, for example Blanchflower and Oswald (1990,1994b), Card (1995)
and Blanchard (1998), find an elasticity of between -0.01 and -0.2.28 Many of these
studies control for educational level and conclude that the elasticity of wages with
respect to unemployment is equal between skill groups and across countries.^
" See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey.
2* As voluntary unemployment is the complement of participation a minus sign appears. These
elasticities are usually obtained by regressing the wage level on a regional unemployment rate in a
labour force survey. The variation in the regional unemployment rates is used to estimate the
sensitivity of wages to unemployment. Note that the wage is now dependent variable, so the causality
is assumed to run the other way. These results suggest that employment (one minus the
unemployment rate) is more sensitive to changes in the wage level than participation.
2" Chapter 5 provides a more elaborate survey of the evidence.
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The evidence offered here is too weak to reject the popular and intuitively plausible
trade-off hypothesis, but the case for rejection is much stronger when one considers
that a key prediction also lacks support in the data.3° That prediction, i l lustrated in
the insert in Figure 1.6, is a rise in relative employment rates. To explain wage
stability in Europe while maintaining the hypothesis that a US size relative demand
shock has occurred, implies that relative participation and/or the unemployment
ratio must have risen faster in Europe than in the US. 3i The evidence on relative
labour force participation excludes the possibility that Europe absorbed a US-size
demand shock by voluntary u n e m p l o y m e n t s Figure 1.7 clearly il lustrates that the
unemployment ratio is lower in Europe and shows a remarkably similar pattern,
moving up over the late 70s and early 80s and down again towards the 90s.33
Figure 1.7: RATIO OF LOW OVER HIGH SKILLED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Source: Nickell and Bell (1996).
3f See Nickell and Bell (1995), Blank (1997), Howell, Duncan and Harrison (1998). Atkinson (1999),
Galbraith et al. (1999), Howell and Hubler (2001), Miihlau and Horgan (2001) and Howell (2002).
^' The unemployment ratio is defined as the ratio of low over high skilled unemployment rates.
3* The composition of the labour force closely followed that of the working age population as relative
participation rates dropped in the US and EU. The OECD (1994a) Table 1.4 shows that the
participation ratio rose faster in France than the US for the period 70-90 but by far less in Germany
and the UK over the period 80-90. In addition all changes in the ratio are less than one percent per
year. Generally speaking participation is around 90% in all countries except France, which is probably
partly due to statistical definition issues.
33 In levels Europe overtook the US in the early 80s. In the early 70s levels were about one half of
those in the US. By the mid 90s European levels are considerably higher for both skill groups.
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Both contradict the predictions of the trade-off hypothesis and this pattern suggests
that there is very little trade-off between re/at/Ve wages and re/at/Ve unemployment in
adjusting to technological shocks.
1.2.2 THE ADJUSTMENT AND LAGGED ADOPTION HYPOTHESES
Having dismissed the trade-off hypothesis there are few other explanations that
would reconcile the data with a standard demand and supply framework.^* One very
straightforward one, however, is that Europe has experienced a more moderate
relative demand shock. The evidence in Blanchard (1998), Howell and Hubler (2001)
and Miihlau and Horgan (2001) suggests that there is some merit in this explanation.
They conclude that while most of the OECD countries experienced comparable
relative supply shifts, Anglo-Saxon countries, the US in particular, experienced a
larger relative demand shift causing wage inequality to increase.^
A first explanation may lie in the more gradual relative supply increases in
many European countries. As relative wages reflect the tension between technology
driven relative demand shifts and education driven relative supply shifts, a less
erratic relative supply increase may allow technology to keep up in the race,
preventing large relative wage adjustments^ This hypothesis explains relative wage
stability in the transition to a new equilibrium, but is clearly at odds with the claim
that technical change is a global process. The moderate demand shift hypothesis
requires one to address why similar technologies affected relative demand in
different countries differently or alternatively why some countries developed and
adopted different technologies than others in spite of technology spillovers.
*• A popular hypothesis, put forward by Nickell and Bell (1996) , argued that the actual (as opposed to
the measured) skil l d istr ibut ion in Western Europe was much more compressed than in the US. in
part icular below the median. This impl ies that low skil led in Europe are not that low ski l led and can
perhaps adjust to new technology with t raining, while in the US unski l led are actually f i red, dr iving
down wages in their labour market segment. Al though compar isons of literacy and formal educat ion
levels clearly support this hypothesis. Howell and Hubler (2001) conclude that the impact is too
l imi ted to explain much of the di f ferences. In addi t ion such di f ferences should also have shown up in
the est imated elasticit ies of subst i tu t ion.
35 They conclude that , despi te higher rates of job creat ion for both skil l levels, the number of low
skil led jobs per worker dropped much faster in the Anglo-Saxon countr ies than in Europe relative to
high ski l led jobs per worker.
36 Tinbergen (1975) , p.79 referred to " the race between educat /on a n d tecr ino /ogy as the driving
force behind the distr ibut ion of income among skill groups.
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The latter is Acemoglu's (2002b) preferred alternative and could be labelled the
/nduced adoption hypothesis, as it closely resembles the induced innovations
hypothesis above. Acemoglu argues that European employers demanded less skill-
biased technologies as high and binding minimum wages for low skilled workers
ensured they would reap the full benefits of productivity gains in those jobs.^
The existence of a product life cycle, however, also implies that similar
technologies may affect different countries differently. Europe clearly experienced an
explosive diffusion of ICT-technology in the 80s and 90s but lagged some years
behind the US.^ Hence Europe did not choose to adopt or develop different
technologies; they adopted the same technologies in a later stage of their life cycle. If
new technologies mainly originate in the US and spill over with a lag, first to Anglo-
Saxon and then to other OECD-countries, than life cycle dynamics predict a pattern of
decreasing biases towards skilled labour. One might label this the /agged adopt/on
hypotries/s. If it holds, the same life cycle dynamics that magnify induced skill bias in
innovation in the US may moderate the transmission of such biases to Europe. For
this hypothesis to be valid, it is necessary to show that the EU is lagging in developing
new technologies and adopts them mainly from the US. In addition an intermediate
position of the Anglo-Saxon countries in this respect would strengthen the argument
considerably. The data on R&D investments, however, do not support this hypothesis
at first sight.
Figure 1.8 shows the gross expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP and
the US and the UK are clearly not ahead of the Continental European countries.
Nevertheless the OECD (2002b) and European Commission conclude that the EU is
lagging behind the US in developing new technologies. This suggests that a lot of
relevant details are hidden in these aggregate numbers. In an elaborate empirical
study on innovation and growth Cameron (1998) presents several.
3* As low skilled workers earn a fixed minimum wage all productivity gains reduce unit production
costs and increase profits. For high skilled an increase in productivity is partially or entirely lost on
wage increases as wages are renegotiated or competition over high skilled workers increases.
Obviously this mechanism can only work if employers retain unskilled workers when they have to pay a
wage above their marginal productivity. Employment is not on the labour demand curve.
3* In 1999 the share of high skilled ICT-workers in the EU were on average 1.6% against 2.4% in the
United States, see OECD (2002b). Mobile phone and Internet penetration also shows Germany and
France clearly lag the UK and US by about 4-5 years (although Scandinavian countries clearly lead the
mobile phone ranking). See OECD (2003b), Appendix Tables 8-3 and 8-4.
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Figure 1.8: GROSS EXPENDITURE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
in % of GDP, OECD 1981-1999
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Source: OECD (2002b) Science and Technology Indicators, Appendix Table 4-40.
Table 1.3 below for example illustrates that in the US, and to a lesser degree in the
UK, business R&D labs are clearly more active than their Continental competitors, at
least well into the 80s. It gives the R&D intensities for manufacturing only.
Table 1.3: R&D INTENSITIES IN MANUFACTURING
Source: OECD STAN database, UK Census of Production,
taken from Cameron (1998), p. 12 Table 5.
38 BERD is business R&D expenditure over value added in %.
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The main explanation for the different picture emerging from Table 1.3 lies in the
large share of government sponsored R&D in Germany and France, which is generally
directed towards more basic and less applied R&D. In light of the lagged adoption
hypothesis it is worth investigating whether government and basic R&D are typically
increasing the countries' absorptive rather than their creative capacity.
Also the sectoral composition of R&D expenditures is relevant. Business R&D
in France and Germany was concentrated in mature industries such as chemicals
and metal industry, whereas R&D in the US is much more concentrated in Computers
and Electronics.'"' The UK takes an intermediate position. Table 1.3 would then
suggest that, at least up to the mid 80s, Continental Europe was specialised in
adopting (and adapting) rather than creating new technologies."*
On the R&D output side the lagged adoption hypothesis receives even
stronger support. The Technology Balance of Payments in Table 1.4 strongly suggests
that there is a net eastbound transatlantic technology transfer."^ The strong increase
in payments in the US and the slight improvement of the receipts in the EU over the
90s indicate that the EU is, however, closing the gap as the ICT-revolution matures.
Again it is worth noting that the UK has closed that gap most successfully and has
turned its deficit into surplus by the end of the 90s.
Table 1.4: TECHNOLOGY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Source: OECD TBP Database, May 2001.
«° See Cameron (1998) for a full sectoral breakdown in his Table 5.
** Arguably basic knowledge, developed in European institutes and universities has been essential for
US business R&D to be successful. "Creative" thus refers to commercial, not scientific creativity.
** The Technology Balance of Payments includes payments for the transfer of techniques (patents,
licences etc.), designs (licensing and franchise), services with technical content and industrial R&D.
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Considering Figure 1.8 above, however, it can be argued that Europe has to maintain
a considerable level of gross R&D investment to be able to adopt the flow of
innovations from the US. If adoption, like innovation, is a costly activity, the lag may
be the result of rational waiting and can be linked to the fact that European firms
would wish to adopt technologies that are less skill intensive. That behaviour would
reconcile the induced adoption hypothesis of Acemoglu (2002b) with the above-
proposed lagged adoption hypothesis.
1.2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on the available evidence, this section has dismissed the trade-off hypothesis
and formulated alternative explanations that built on the induced innovation and
product life cycle hypotheses developed in Section 1.1. According to the lagged
adoption hypothesis, European wage stability, much like US wage divergence, can be
attributed to the dynamics and economics of technical change. The argument
proposed here is that Europe experienced a more moderate relative demand shock
because it selected less biased new US technologies and adopted them with a lag.
This implies a more moderate demand shock and less relative wage pressure, even
for given relative supply shifts.
Note that the trade-off hypothesis is rejected as an explanation for re/at/ve
wage stability in Europe. The observed relation between wage and unemployment
/eve/s and labour market institutions is fully compatible with these hypotheses. The
high levels of worker protection and institutional wage setting cause higher wage
levels and unemployment rates for all skill groups in Europe. As such, however, they
do not directly contribute to explaining relative wage trends, which leaves technical
change as the prime suspect. Still institutional features could affect the decision
what innovations to adopt at what stage of the cycle through their impact on relative
profitability. An assessment of this potential feedback into technical change requires
a more precise formulation of the labour market in the framework developed in Part I
below. Part II of this thesis is dedicated to the introduction and analysis of the
required extensions.
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i.3 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
The previous two sections made an attempt at explaining labour market trends inthe OECD without explicitly addressing the role of government. In Section 1 it was
argued that the US saw increasing wage inequality due to the rapid diffusion of a new
general purpose technology that was skill biased in response to the relative labour
supply shock in the 70s. Section 2 argued that Europe managed to maintain stable
relative wages, not by resisting wage pressure and accepting rising low skilled
unemployment, but because relative demand increased more or less in line with
supply. It did so in Europe because on the one hand biases spilling over from the US
were moderated through induced-lagged adoption. On the other hand relative supply
increased more gradually, possibly due to a more diligent educational policy, which
limited the initial relative wage drop and following induced biases."^
The role of government in the economy, however, is not limited to managing
relative supply through educational policies. It is part of the economy of a country
much like consumers and producers are. In fact government expenditures account
for as much as 50% of total GDP in the OECD area."" A large share of that
percentage, especially in Europe, is spent on transfers through social security and
subsidy schemes. Both the way in which these transfers are spent and the way in
which they are financed can, intentionally or unintentionally, interfere in the
transmission mechanisms sketched above. The government can affect the
interaction between technology and the labour market for example by levying taxes,
actively pursuing income policies, affecting labour market relations by providing
unemployment benefits and social security or setting legal minimum wages and
finally by directly granting subsidies to R&D. As government policies in all these areas
differ between the US and EU, a positive analysis of government interference may
contribute to a more complete explanation for observed differences in labour market
*> To keep the focus on the labour market, the issue of education will be left unexplored in this thesis,
which is not to say it is unimportant. The analysis that follows will suggest that educational policy,
rather than for example labour market or income policies are crucial tools in managing inequality in
the long run. Introducing education in the analysis is therefore high on the agenda for further
research.
"See OECD (1998).
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trends. Also, European and American administrators might have to pursue their goals
differently when taking the interactions between the labour market, technology and
their policy instruments into account. Part III of this thesis addresses these issues.
Before proceeding with that exercise, however, it is useful to benchmark the policies
that will be evaluated there. The following three subsections therefore summarise the
most relevant aspects of tax and income, labour market and science and technology
policies on both sides of the Atlantic. •
1.3.1 TAX AND INCOME POLICIES ;
The main thing that distinguishes the government from other agents in the economy
is its power to tax people. As taxes are involuntary transfers of income, the ones
bearing the tax will generally try to avoid taxation. Taxation thus alters behaviour.
Economists usually assume that the government can levy neutral taxes. In that way
all their policy proposals can be financed without distorting the efficient allocation of
resources.^ The bulk of government revenue, however, comes from distortionary
taxes.
The pie charts in Figure 1.9 show that labour taxes, corporate taxes and
consumption taxes are the key sources of revenue in both the US and EU."® Together
they make up over 80% of total government revenue that on average amounts to
some 35-40% of total GDP in the OECD.*? These taxes drive a wedge between pre-
and after tax prices, wages and returns and can therefore distort the allocation of
production factors. Consumption taxes are least harmful in this respect. The main
purpose of these taxes is to raise revenue although some consumption taxes are
explicitly intended to affect consumer behaviour.^
*s Another more sophisticated way of avoiding the financial consequences of policy advice is to argue
for taxes instead of subsidies or budget neutral adjustments to the existing tax and subsidy schemes.
*s Labour taxes include social security contributions by both employees and employers.
" See OECD (1995). The US ranks low in tax revenue over GDP at around 30%. The Netherlands,
Germany and France all rank high with percentages over 37%. Over the 1978-1992 period only France
(5% points) increased its tax revenue by more than the OECD average increase of 4.3 point. The US
had a moderate increase by 0.5 percentage point. Germany, the Netherlands and the UK all increased
below average with 1.7, 3.3 and 2.2 percentage points respectively.
*s Examples of the former are environmental taxes and excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol.
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Figure 1.9: THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES
Average (1979-1998) Shares in Total Government Revenues
Source: IMF /nternationa/ Government Statistics yearbook, various issues.
Consumption taxes reduce the after tax price a producer gets for his products. That
reduces the overall demand for his products, but as all other producers face the
same tax rates, there is no relative price effect."^ Consequently, the return on all
production factors involved is reduced in proportion to their contribution to the final
product and relative factor prices also remain unaffected. There are significant
differences between the US and EU in this respect. In the US the consumption tax
rates are about 5-7%, whereasEuropean countries typically charge a rate that is well
above 15%, with Germany and the UK being in the lower ranks with 15% and France
about average at around 20%.s°
Corporate income taxes reduce the after tax profits (in the non-economic
sense of the word, i.e. including the normal return on capital), which mainly increases
the cost of capital and reduces the after tax return to investors. All else equal this
reduces the supply of and demand for capital as producers shift towards other
production factors and investors consume the savings they had otherwise invested. It
«° See for example Moore (1995) for a proposal to replace all taxes by a sales tax in the US. He
presents various examples of distortions such a reform would eliminate.
*° This difference in tax rates explains the fact that in Europe between 20 and 30% of all tax revenue
is raised through consumption taxes while in the US it accounts for a mere 4% of the total budget and
also goes a long way in explaining the differences in overall tax pressure.
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has also been argued that the corporate tax discourages entrepreneurship, makes
firms favour debt over equity as a source of finance and causes inefficient relocation
of firms.si The distortions of the corporate tax are notoriously hard to measure and
frequent proposals for reform and outright abolition have been made. In addition
globalisation and tax competition cause the rates and revenues from corporate taxes
to fall. While corporate taxes still make up a significant share of total tax revenue in
the US and UK at around 10% it is a minor source of taxation that is eroding quickly
in the OECD. , • .
Finally, taxes on labour take the lion's share with on average over 50% of total
tax revenue.^ Personal income taxes and various other taxes and social security
contributions paid out of the wage, drive a wedge between the take-home pay and
gross wage costs. This wedge rose slightly from 59% to 63% in the European
Community over the 80s, whereas it has declined from 50% to about 38% in the
US." Like corporate taxes the income tax distorts factor markets as it increases the
relative price of labour. The key issue in this thesis is the labour market position of
low skilled labour. So the impact of these taxes is particularly relevant as marginal
tax wedges usually differ by income level. These different wedges between take-
home pay and labour costs therefore affect relative labour costs. To the extent that
they do, they may cause a short and a long-run response in relative labour demand.
To the extent that they do not, the wedge affects the after tax relative wages and
income distribution.^
Income taxes, in addition to raising revenue, therefore also reflect a country's
stance on income distribution. A key indicator of the policy stance on income
inequality is the progression in the income tax system. Progression implies that
si See Congressional Budget Office (1996), Cronin (1999). Hines (2001) and Norton (2003).
" Only in the UK did this share drop to a little over 40 % during the 80s.
" Data are for 1978-1991. see OECD (1994b) Table 9.1. These rates are overall marginal tax wedges,
including consumption taxes. Table 9.3 in the same publication shows that consumption tax rates
remained stable in the US while in the EC rates converged to a slightly rising average. This implies that
the tax wedge for personal income taxes and social security contributions fell by over 10% in the US. In
the EC it has remained stable or even rose.
" With perfectly inelastic relative labour supply the wedge only affects after tax wages. As workers will
accept any wage the full burden of the tax is borne by the worker. To the extent that supply is reduced
with higher taxes, employers share in the burden as total output and therefore profits fall.
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higher incomes pay more taxes.ss Due to the wide variety and frequent adjustments
in national income tax systems, however, it is hard to measure the progression of a
tax system in a single indicator. Statutory rates in the personal income taxes, for
example, typically show strong progression, particularly in Europe. This progression,
however, is largely undone by fixed ceilings in social security contributions.^ The
OECD (1995) provides a detailed international comparative analysis of trends in
marginal and average tax rates at various levels of income. Table 1.5 below gives an
overview of the trends.
Table 1.5: TRENDS IN PROGRESSION
CHANGE IN MARGINAL TAX RATES
<n % po/nts by income teyef: 1978-1995
Bib
ET
>•£:.>.•••..••••• , ' A t i t - i M —
21.7
-18.6
10.9
-4.5
8.9
7.5
0.7
18.5
4.2
1.1
-4.5
-5.8
2.5
4.8
-4.6
-5.4
3.0
7.0
10.0
-0.1
4.7
Source: OECD (1998), Table IV.3, p. 161.
There is no clear pattern while changes are significant. Most countries reformed their
tax systems quite dramatically over the 80s. In all countries these tax reforms aimed
at broadening the tax base (eliminating tax deductions etcetera) while improving
incentives for people to work. Due to national political and legal circumstances,
however, the reforms did not result in a strong universal trend towards increasing
average rates while decreasing marginal ones. If anything it can be concluded that
the reforms made most tax systems less progressive by increasing marginal rates for
^ Not only because they pay taxes over a larger tax base - their income - but also because they pay a
higher rate.
* See OECD (1995).
5' APW=Average Production Workers Wage.
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low income groups while cutting them in higher income brackets. No clear
differences emerge when comparing Europe to the US.^
The progressiveness of a tax system can also be measured and compared by
its results. If a tax system is very progressive, the after tax income distribution is
flatter than the before tax income distribution. Figure 1.10 below shows the
percentage reduction in the Gini-coefficient when comparing the pre- to post tax
income distribution's From these data it can be concluded that the EU on average
had the more progressive income tax system.
Figure 1.10: PROGRESSION OF THE TAX SYSTEM
Source: Arjona et al. (2001).
The general trend in progression is up: the UK and US increased progression and
converged on Germany and the Netherlands as they reduced it. Other European
countries such as Italy and the Nordic countries, however, saw progression increase
over time, widening the gap with the Anglo-Saxon countries. The regressive impact of
tax reforms was apparently more than compensated for by the reduction in tax
5" Apart from the already stated fact that in the US the overall tax burden and therefore tax rates at all
income levels are significantly lower than in Europe. This difference has widened slightly over the 80s,
as the US kept its tax burden stable while in Europe it rose in most countries. See OECD (1995).
^ See for example Arjona et al. (2001). For a clear explanation of the Gini-coefficient any standard
economics textbook will do. See for example Todaro (1997, p. 143).
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deductions and social security contributions. Overall Figure 1.10 shows that Europe
had the more progressive tax system throughout the period under consideration.^
Progression in itself will cause after tax relative wages to lie below before tax
relative labour costs. If relative supply is inelastic, the taxes are fully borne by the
employees and changes in the tax system will have no effect on relative profits.
Consequently one should not expect any impact on technical change and progression
is the ideal tool for pursuing income redistribution goals. If relative supply is anything
less than perfectly inelastic, however, progression will cause quantity adjustments
that affect relative profitability, causing a technology response. As progression makes
high skilled labour artificially more expensive, the technology response will be to
develop less skill intensive technologies. Moreover, progression in the tax system will
also limit the after tax relative wage shifts caused by the technical change it
provoked. The increasing low skilled wage will be taxed at higher rates: the
decreasing high skilled wage pays a lower one. Progression in the tax system
therefore remains a powerful tool to stabilise and manage the after tax income
distribution, especially if relative supply is quite inelastic. Given the absence of large
relative quantity adjustments through unemployment and participation in Europe and
the US, progression thus helps explain the observed different relative wage trends in
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 above. Part III will therefore address the impact of progression
and income redistribution on the interaction between technical change and the
labour market.
1.3.2 LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
In addition to tax and income policies, the government also plays a key role in the
labour market. High levels of social security, worker protection and centralised
bargaining structures all increase the bargaining power of the worker. It has often
been argued that this caused high wage costs and high structural unemployment
*• The UK is more in the European camp when tax progression is considered. By the same token
Germany, Italy and France might be classified 'Anglo-Saxon' when their position relative to the UK is
considered.
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levels, particularly in Europe." The OECD (1994) has analysed the labour market
problems of the 80s in an elaborate study and formulated a comprehensive package
of policy prescriptions in its Jobs Strategy. The core of that strategy has been
summarised in Box 1.1 below. In particular points 2, enhancing creation and
diffusion of new technology, and 9, the reform of social security schemes, show the
relevance of the issues raised here. The former clearly establishes a link to science
and technology policy discussed below, whereas the latter links income distribution
and labour market performance through benefits and the tax system.
Box i . i : THE KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OECD JOBS STRATEGY
1. Set macro-policies to make growth non-inflationary
2. Enhance creation and diffusion of new technology
3. Increase flexibility of working time
4. Nurture the entrepreneurial climate
. Make wage and labour costs more flexible to reflect local conditions
3. Reform employment security provisions
7. Strengthen active labour market policies
8. Improve skills and competences through education and training
J. Reform unemployment and benefit systems to achieve equity in the most efficient way
10. Enhance product market competition
The system of social security benefits cause three labour market distort ions." First,
benefits may cause a low employment trap by reducing the incentives to participate
and search for jobs. This reduces the effectiveness of unemployed in competing for
jobs and thereby increases wage pressure, particularly for low skilled jobs.
Second, the benefit system may cause a poverty trap. As benefits are lost as
income rises, the effective marginal tax rates are very high, again particularly at the
lower end of the wage distribution. Increasing hours worked or investing in education
or training therefore yield little additional disposable income, which reduces the
upward mobility of workers and job competition from the bottom up.
6i See OECD (2001). Structural unemployment stood at 6.8% in the OECD in 1990. While the US
outperformed the average by 1%, in Europe rates lie consistently higher with 9.3 % for France, 6.9%
for Germany, 7% for the Netherlands and 8.5% for the UK.
•» See OECD (1996).
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Finally the costs of the system put a heavy burden on the budget. As that burden is
largely financed out of labour taxes, the mechanism described here may reduce the
general demand for labour and cause firms to substitute towards other factors of
production." As the hypotheses link the labour market position of low skilled to
technology through relative wages and employment, however, the most relevant
aspect of the social security and unemployment benefit systems is their direct impact
on the fallback position of skilled and unskilled workers, the insiders in the labour
market.
Consider the unemployment and social benefit schemes in the US and Europe
during the 80s. The level of benefits alone cannot measure the generosity of the
benefit scheme. Entitlements, duration and the type of benefits received are clearly
important for evaluating the workers outside option. The OECD (1994b), Chart 8.1,
provides a summary measure for benefit entitlements from 1961-1991 and for many
countries in the OECD. This summary measure is an average of replacement rates at
various earnings levels, family situations and unemployment durations. Subject to a
host of qualifications the pattern that emerges is that Europe, and in particular
Western Europe had high levels in 1961 and increased its entitlements up to 1985.
Southern European countries started out at much lower levels but generally caught
up after joining the EU. The US on the other hand had low levels to begin with and
after a moderate increase over the 70s cut back on benefit levels during the 80s,
forcing in particular low skilled workers to accept wages that push them below the
poverty line.^
The types of benefit systems are hard to quantify. The reader is referred to the
case studies presented in OECD (1994b) for an excellent qualitative survey of social
security systems. Summarising the main results presented there one might conclude
that over the eighties both the US and the European systems have become stricter.
Job search is obligatory and it is monitored more strictly. Eligibility has been made
conditional on longer employment histories. Benefit levels are more directly related
to previously made contributions, while they also tend to decline faster over time. As
*3 Both substitution and biased innovation may cause a drop in the general demand for labour.
®* Of course that depends on where that poverty line is drawn. Working two jobs, 70 hours for a little
over 400 dollars to support a family of 3, which is no exception among single mothers in the US, puts
one below that line by any definition.
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the Jobs Strategy still calls for further reforms in these directions, however, it seems
that according to the OECD, those reforms were inadequate.^
Overall it can be concluded that Europe had the more generous benefit
system throughout the 70s and 80s and only started to seriously reform it in the mid
80s. The United Kingdom again finds itself in the middle between Europe and the US
that ranks second in austerity after Japan.
The unemployment levels in Europe are closely correlated to the generosity of
the benefit schemes and the OECD (1996) policy proposals suggest a causal
relationship. The benefit system provides the outside option to those employed and
also explains why real wage levels are generally higher in Europe. Moreover, relative
wages seem correlated with the relative benefit levels.^ Data for the 80s are hard to
come by, but in a recent study on wages and benefits the OECD (2002a) presents
benefit replacement rates at various levels of income. The ratio of the replacement
rate in Europe over that in the US is 1.6 at low levels of income, but much higher
ratios are found at higher income levels.^ in the US benefits therefore seem less
correlated with previous earnings than in Europe.
Consequently the outside option for US high skilled workers is much lower
relative to that of the low skilled than in Europe. This reduces upward relative wage
pressure, which seems to contradict the observed high relative wages in the US. But
consider the technology response. As replacement rates remain more stable over
income levels in Europe, the outside option is high relative to their wage level for low
and high skilled workers alike. In the US, on the other hand, that relative outside
option is low but much lower for high than for low skilled. Thus high skilled labour will
accept lower wages than they would otherwise have bargained for and innovation will
be biased, causing relative demand to shift towards them. The US policies of
reducing benefit entitlements and levels over the 80s may thus have contributed to a
shift in relative labour demand, while maintaining high benefit entitlements for both
skill groups in Europe has caused high general unemployment rates without seriously
affecting relative wages or innovation biases.
ss See OECD (1996).
<* See OECD (1994a) and Muhlau and Horgan (2001).
6' Obviously at higher income levels the replacement rates are lower. Data in OECD (2002a) are
presented for incomes up to 200% of the average production worker.
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1.3.3 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
The close linkages between technology and the labour market imply that science and
technology policies interact with labour market and income policies. This link was
also recognised in the OECD Jobs Strategy mentioned above. The OECD (1994a)
concluded that technological change in general and product innovation in particular
increases the demand for labour, despite the large structural changes that may be
involved. Technologically advanced firms outperform the laggards in employment
growth, the 'new' sectors accounted for a significant share of total employment
growth. New technologies therefore did not seem to be biased against labour in
genera!. Hence their policy advice under point 2 was to stimulate the innovation and
adoption of new technologies. Policy makers and academics have almost universally
accepted that advice and attention has shifted to how governments can support
innovation rather than whether they should. In the light of the hypotheses put forward
in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, however, the argument needs some refinement.
If technological change is biased towards high skilled labour, either by design
or by nature, then stimulating innovation has equity and relative employment
consequences, at least in the short and medium run. Increasing the rate of
innovation increases the bias in relative labour demand, especially when it cuts the
product life cycle short. If higher rates of innovation imply higher rates of
obsolescence in existing mature products, low skilled workers compete for less and
less jobs. Consequently the differences in science and technology policies may also
contribute to explaining the labour market trends discussed above.
As science and technology policy is a relatively recent area of policy making,
however, the detailed data required to evaluate this hypothesis are scarce and
sometimes have not been collected during the 80s at all. Reliable and internationally
comparable data for the 80s only exist on the expenditures on science and
technology policy. The data on the effects of these policies are riddled with
measurement problems and the tools for policy evaluation are still being
developed.*^ But consider the evidence that is available.
" The OECD hosted a conference on this topic in June of 1997.
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It was already shown in Section 1.2 that European governments contribute a
considerable amount to total R&D expenditure in their countries. These funds are
mainly channelled through publicly financed research institutes and universities and
aim at the generation of so-called 'basic knowledge'. This basic knowledge is,
hopefully and somewhere down the line, helpful in both product and process
innovation. Science and technology policy in Europe therefore arguably favoured both
skill types equally. However, the policy stance has shifted. Increasing the share of
business R&D is now the stated aim of many countries and regions, as that has been
shown to spur innovation. Governments reduce their own R&D and channel funds to
the private sector instead. In addition private sector funding of public research is on
the rise. In 1981 some 2 and 3% of public research in higher education was funded
by business in the EU and US respectively. In 2001 these numbers have doubled to
over 6% and continue to rise.^
In the US the government's share in R&D was always smaller and the bulk of
government funded R&D. especially during the Cold War. was spent on defence.™
Tax exemptions and general R&D subsidies and outsourced defence R&D explain the
high share of business R&D financed by government in the US.™ The spillovers of
military R&D to the civilian sector usually come in the shape of new products or
services rather than basic knowledge. The Internet, for example, is a technology that
spilled over from the military in the early 8 0 s . "
In addition, the propensity to patent and commercialise innovations is much
higher at US universities and publicly funded research institutes. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to investigate whether these differences are institutionally,
culturally or otherwise determined, but given their existence, it is clear that publicly
69 See Sheenan (2002).
'o The US government accounted for 50% of total R&D expenditure and spent 1.2 % of total GDP on
R&D in the early 80s. This percentage rose with business R&D to about 1.4% in 1986 and was then
reduced to 1.1 while business R&D continued to grow to 1.6%. In Europe government R&D was about
0.8% of GDP for the entire decade while business R&D rose from 0.8 to 1.0% by 1986 and stayed
there well into the 90s. Civil R&D rose from 1.8 in 1981 to 2% of GDP in 1985 and stayed there in the
US, implying military R&D rose from 0.6 to 0.8% of GDP. As a share of total R&D it thus increased over
the early but fell over the late 80s. See OECD (2000).
' i The data indicate some 50% up until the mid 80s. Then falling quickly to 25% in 1990 and less than
10% in 1999. In Europe the corresponding numbers are 25% in 1981 and falling gradually to 20% in
1985, 15% in 1990 and 10% in 1999.
" See Internet Society (2001).
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funded R&D yields much more commercialised innovation in the US than in the EU. If
such innovations are new products and services clustered around a new, possibly
skill biased general purpose technology such as ICT, the science and technology
policy in the US has contributed to the shift in relative labour demand. To the extent
that science and technology policy has prepared and facilitated the adoption and
maturation of those innovations, it has moderated the inbuilt and inherent product
life cycle biases in Europe.
1.3.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
To evaluate if and how American and European administrators should adjust their
policies in light of the interactions suggested above, one must first agree on their
goals. If one agrees on the interaction of technology and the labour market and on
the policy goals, then formulating policy is an almost mechanical exercise that boils
down to choosing the most effective mix of instruments. Most of the debate in
politics should therefore probably be spent on meeting these prerequisites. In this
thesis, however, setting policy goals will not be addressed. In the final part it is
merely assumed that the government aims to reduce income inequality, foster
economic growth, reduce unemployment and has to balance its budget. Different
governments give different priorities to each of them but in general all OECD
governments care about these issues. Given those different priorities and under the
assumption that technology and the labour market interact as has been
hypothesised above, the normative analysis that concludes this thesis derives the
policy implications.
If wage divergence is primarily innovation driven in the US, then both income
policies and science and technology policy should be geared towards addressing that
issue. More in general, since Tinbergen's (1975, p. 79) "race between education and
techno/ogy" primarily determines the relative position of skilled and unskilled
workers in the labour market, educational and science and technology policies
should be additional policy instruments in managing the income distribution. As the
strong market size effect of Section 1.1 claims that more education provokes more
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skill bias, however, one must be careful to argue for boosting education. In addition,
as education has not been introduced in the analysis below, there are no clear-cut
policy implications in that area. But if technology has won the race in the 80s, the US
government should consider reducing the bias in innovation a bit. Given the product
life cycle this implies stimulating adoption and maturation of existing technologies,
rather than developing new ones. More European style science and technology
policies could help to bring education and technology together.
In Europe on the other hand, the key challenge remains unemployment. But
as the trade-off hypothesis is not supported in the facts and technology, not wage
resistance, causes relative wage stability in Europe, policy makers do not face the
dilemma that they perhaps expect. The reforms of social benefit systems can be
implemented to reduce overall wage costs and restore the demand for labour in
general. The only pitfall that must be avoided in this operation is a shift in the relative
wage bargaining position, as the resulting relative wage cost movements may
provoke undesirable long-term technology responses.
European policy makers must also realise that current priorities in science
and technology policy may have the equity implications they say they fear so much
when social security reforms are discussed. The aims to strengthen the knowledge
infrastructure and move towards a knowledge intensive economy require some
rethinking as the equity implications have not been adequately assessed. It may well
prove to be a blessing in disguise for European low skilled workers that these policies
have failed to reach their objectives so far.
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i.4 CONCLUSION; A GUIDE
This section concludes the overview of the issues in this thesis. This chapterpresented the phenomena that require explanation and will be incorporated in a
model below that aims to formulate a policy response to labour market trends in the
OECD. In Figure 1.11 the 'area' this thesis hopes to cover is presented schematically.
To guide and evaluate an informed policy response one needs a thorough
understanding of the economy.
Figure 1.11: THE AREA COVERED
The crucial relations to be understood are: The interaction between technical change
and the relative demand for unskilled labour, limited by the thick grey line. The
impact of wage setting arrangements in the labour market that govern the link
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between supply, unemployment, wages and demand, limited by the white line. And
the impact of various policies on the entire system of economic interactions, limited
by the black line. These areas correspond to the three parts that follow. Each of the
parts in this thesis will start with a short introduction from which the structure of that
part and its position in the thesis and contribution to the literature is made explicit.
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PART
TECHNICAL CHANGE
AND LABOUR DEMAND
In this part the interaction of technical change and labour demand will beaddressed. The American situation as described in Section 1.1 is the empiricaltouchstone for the model in this part since its labour market institutions are
generally assumed to least interfere with this market clearing process. These
assumptions will be relaxed in Part II of the thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces definitions and terminology and positions this thesis in
the literature. Chapter 3 presents several key models from the literature. The focus
here is on modelling techniques and the structure of endogenous innovation driven
growth models. Those familiar with the economics of technical change are advised to
browse them for they merely sets the stage." Chapter 4 presents a general model
that allows one to illustrate both the induced bias and the product life cycle
mechanism in a unified framework. To study the long-run properties and transitional
dynamics of this model, the chapter also contains an analysis of the comparative
statics in the steady state and some numerical simulation experiments.
The contribution of this part lies in bringing together several related but to
date largely isolated strands of literature and formulating hypotheses to explain
apparently persistent skill biases in US technical change, combining and
reinterpreting existing modelling techniques in a new model of skill biased technical
change.
" Sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.7 are of interest as they formally introduce the concept of biased technical
change and discuss the product life cycle, respectively. Chapter 3 discusses the models by Grossman
and Helpman (1991b), Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
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CHAPTER 2:
THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
Economists have always been ambivalent in their attitude towards technicalchange. On the one hand it is credited for the historically high and apparentlysustainable rates of economic growth one observes in large parts of the world
over the past few centuries. But on the other technical change is also 'blamed' for
important structural shifts in the economy that caused dramatic changes in the
income distribution, both between and within countries. Technical change is a
complex process, that comes in a multitude of forms and has important social,
historical, scientific and technical dimensions. Economists therefore tended to avoid
the issue and it has long been sidestepped in mainstream economics. Recently it is
gaining its due attention, but technical change has always been discussed in the
periphery.
To address the issues that are raised in this thesis it is useful to summarise
the concepts that have been developed in the literature and allow one to start
thinking about technical change in the economic sense of the term. In doing so this
chapter firmly embeds the analysis in the literature and traces its intellectual roots.
The aim is to reconstruct how economists have reduced the complexities of reality to
a set of highly stylised and abstract concepts that have been used in mathematical
models such as the ones developed in Chapters 3 and 4.
In discussing the interaction between technology and economy there are two
directions of causality that guide this survey of the literature. This chapter first
presents the concepts developed to describe the impact of technological change on
the economy. Then it traces the concepts necessary to analyse the economics of
technical change.
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2.i THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
In this section the aim is to introduce the conceptual framework that has beendeveloped in the literature to analyse the impact of technical change on the
economy in general and the aggregate relative demand for skilled labour in
particular. It starts with formulating a workable definition of technology. Based on
some widely accepted definitions one may conclude that the driving factor in
technical change is the introduction of innovations to the process of production and
consumption. Each innovation is by definition unique, but to avoid being limited to
case studies, some generalisations have to be made. This section brings them
together in a simple taxonomy of technical change, introducing a formal
representation of technical change in the process.
Then it turns to the impact that innovations might have on the aggregate
relative demand for skilled labour. A crucial characteristic in this respect, identified in
Chapter 1, is the direction or factor bias of an innovation. If individual innovations are
systematically biased towards skilled workers it is obvious that over time labour
demand shifts towards more skilled workers in the aggregate. It has also been
argued in Chapter 1, however, that the bias of an innovation is likely to change over
its life cycle irrespective of its exact individual characteristics. The changes in the
aggregate distribution of technologies over their life cycles then provide a second
source of aggregate shifts in relative labour demand. This source has received
relatively little attention in the literature so far and by taking it into consideration this
thesis introduces it to the theoretical literature on skill-biased technical change.
2.1.1 DEFINING TECHNOLOGY
Definitions of technology in the economic literature are plenty. Schmookier (1966, p.
1) for example defined it as: "the soc/a/ poo/ of know/edge of the /ndustr/a/ arts".
Most authors followed Schmookier in defining aggregate technology as a stock of
useful knowledge, knowledge that can be used in production. Technological progress
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is then the expansion of this knowledge base over time that implies, as Jones (1975)
put it, that:
fa; More output can be produced g/ven the same quant/t/'es of the /nputs
Cor, equ/Va/ent/y, the same amount of output can be generated by
sma//er quant/t/es of one or more of the /nputs); or
fbj £x/st/ng outputs undergo qua//tat/Ve improvement; or
fcj 7ota//y new products are produced.
- Jones (1975), p. 156-
Jones' definition seems to adequately capture the consensus among economists.
An economic definition of technological change thus defines it as the result of
increments in knowledge, new ideas that are referred to as /nvent/ons. They allow
one to produce the same output using less inputs, more output using the same
inputs or a different kind of output altogether through quality improvements or the
introduction of entirely new products and processes. For technological change to
have an impact on the economy and on labour demand in particular, inventions have
to be introduced into the economic system.™ The commercial introduction of
inventions as new products and services or the adoption of new technologies in the
main production processes of a firm is referred to as an /nnovat/on.
At this point the invention becomes relevant to economists and this concept is
therefore central to the economics of technical change.^ As was also clear in the
above definition, the literature frequently distinguishes product and process
innovations. Those innovations that allow one to produce more output from a given
amount of resources are process innovations; those that allow one to produce a
different kind or quality of output are product innovations. Of course this distinction is
problematic in classifying actual innovations. As Rosenberg (1982, p.4) observes:
"One producer's process /'nnovat/'ons are another one's product /nnovat/ons." In
" A first subtlety that is easily overlooked is the difference between techn/ca/ and technological
change. Kennedy and Thirwall (1972) define the former as the impact on the economy of the latter,
implying all technical change is preceded by technological change. Not all technological change results
in technical change.
" In fact in most of the literature the distinction is not made.
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addition many innovations can be regarded as hybrids.^ still this crude taxonomy
will prove useful in discussing technical change in later chapters and process and
product innovations are discussed in separate subsections below.
2.1.2 PROCESS INNOVATIONS
All products are produced using inputs and a specific process that turns these inputs
into output. That process is formally represented by the product/on /i/nct/on."
Consider a production function in its most general form:
y*=W{x,o,.*.i« "wU) (2.1)
where yit, a number of units of output of type / at time t, can be produced using a set
of m inputs indexed by j'={O,m}, x,jt. The knowledge that is relevant for producing
product / is described by the function ft, which is written as a function of time itself to
allow for new ideas, process /nnovat/ons, to change the process over time. Usually
f/(.)>0 is assumed in all arguments, including time, to exclude the possibility of
technical regress; -one can always stick to the old process.
This definition allows one to measure the rate of process innovations at the
firm level as the percentage increase in output for a given set of inputs over a given
period of time. Since most final output has a market price, one can calculate the
aggregate rate of process innovation as the rate at which the constant price weighted
basket or volume of total output expands, keeping the aggregate inputs constant.™
™ The introduction of personal computers for example could easily be classified both as a product or
process innovation. The characteristics of a product innovation then apply to the personal computer to
the extent that it is a product innovation. Admittedly this is a tautological argument but useful in
defending this and the following generalisations.
" Any microeconomic textbook presents the conditions for such a production function to exist. See for
example Mas-Colell. Whinston and Greene (1995).
'8 Formally this measure would be given by:
£pf(X,.t>
where vector XJI represents {xw, Xru , ... ,x;m,} and there are n types of output that can be traded at
prices p. in the base year. The bar over p and X indicates constant prices and input quantities,
respectively.
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Using such a measure, generally referred to as Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Solow
(1957) estimated that about 90% of the real GDP per worker increase in the US
between 1909 and 1914 was due to process innovations; the famous Solow
Residual. Table 2.1, taken from Grossman and Helpman (1991b) illustrates that
similar high percentages can be found for other industrialised countries and in other
periods.
Table 2.1: TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO GDP GROWTH
ir
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2.43
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50
50
28
2.18
1.68
3.78
1.58
1.06
2.32
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92
32
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22
42
67
11
9
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Source: Grossman and Helpman (1991b) computations based on Maddison (1987), Tables 11 and
20."
This residual begged for explanation. As Abramowitz (1956, p. 11) rightfully observed
it was "a measure of our ignorance" and explaining how these productivity increases
would come about became the core issue in the economics of growth and technical
change. A survey of that literature will be given in Section 2.2.
2.1.3 PRODUCT INNOVATIONS
Total factor productivity provides a useful measure of the importance of process
innovations. It less straightforward to find a similar measure for product innovations.
Product innovations do not affect the existing production functions, yet it is clear that
" TFP growth equals GDP growth minus the imputed contributions of labour accumulation, residential
and non-residential capital accumulation. Augmented TFP (ATFP) growth equals GDP growth minus the
imputed contributions of labour accumulation, residential and non-residential capital accumulation
and imputed contributions of increases in labour and capital quality.
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the introduction of new and better products increases consumers' appreciation of
consuming the economy's output.
To measure the impact of product innovations one therefore needs the formal
representation of consumers' appreciation of consumption, the ut/7/ty funct/on.^o A
measure for product innovations that is conceptually very similar to TFP can then be
derived. The utility function specifies how much utility or enjoyment a consumer can
'produce' from a given bundle of 'inputs', the consumed products. Assume there is a
representative consumer whose utility function is given by:
u({Co,.c,, c j . t ) (2.2)
The utility function u(.) specifies how much utility is enjoyed when a bundle {cot, Cit,
..., Cm} of n different goods is consumed at time t. Generally it is assumed that the
goods consumed are normal, in the sense that consuming more of at least one of
them increases utility so u'(.)>o in all elements of the consumption bundle.
Analogous to the production function, the utility function captures the knowledge
necessary to enjoy the consumption goods. Time, t, is again a separate argument to
allow for product innovations to increase utility without increasing consumed
quantities. When new or better products are introduced this 'improves the
consumption technology' and the consumer can choose from a wider variety of goods
of better quality. The utility function of a representative individual now provides a
standard for weighing new, old and improved products against each o thers The
impact of product innovation can be measured by the percentage increase in utility
given the consumption set.82
80 Again any microeconomic textbook will provide the condit ions for such a funct ion to exist.
81 Formally utility is an ordinal concept that has no cardinal interpretat ion. It is common practice,
however, to give utility a cardinal interpretat ion. For example by assuming a representative consumer,
where one implicitly weighs the utility of individual consumers and by assuming diminishing marginal
utility, which implicitly compares utility intra-personally.
8= One obtains:
1 ,du(C,,t)
u(C,.t) dt
which can be interpreted as the rate of product innovation. Empirically, the problem is to choose a
price to weigh the new products and even if that problem were solved, the impact of quality
improvements on existing products goes unnoticed. For an overview of the literature on this issue see
for example Trajtenberg (1990).
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2.1.4 THE RATE OF AGGREGATE TECHNICAL CHANGE
Assuming that all output is consumed at the aggregate level, one can consolidate the
economy and define a measure of the aggregate rate of technical change."" By
substituting the output bundle for the consumption bundle in (2.2) and substituting
for output with the production functions in (2.1) one can write utility as:
U = U({fo (*0O< • *O1< *Om, • 0 . fi (Xio, - * 1 1 , *lmt • 0 ^ (*nOt • * n l . « * - 0}. 0 (2.3)
where xjt is the amount of factor) used to produce product / at time f..^ By weighing
process and product innovations by their contribution to utility, one can define the
rate of technical change in the proper economic sense: the increase in utility due to
increases in knowledge given the input bundle. By this new definition, all growth in
utility that is not due to growth in the amount of resources used to generate the
output that generates utility is due to technical change.^
Of course this conceptualisation is of little help to empirical growth accounting
since aggregate utility is as hard to measure empirically as the changes in the stock
of knowledge that constitute aggregate technical change.^ But unlike knowledge,
utility is homogenous and as such it is used as a measure for the rate of technical
change in the theoretical models below. The change in utility due to innovation
measures the combined effect of individual innovation size and aggregate innovation
speed. To know where the economy is heading at that speed a measure of direction
is also required.
*" This is a closed economy assumption. Trade allows for consumption and production to differ.
®" Of course this amount will be 0 for some./ in producing product i.
^ Formally:
„_ 1 cu(F(X,,t),t) 1 [>aj(F(X.,t).t).cT,(X.,t) ^u(C,,
u(F(x,,o.t) at u(F(x,.t),o[^ cf,(x,.o at * at
where F(X, t) is a vector of production functions and the last term between brackets is equal to the
rate of product innovation defined above. The impact of process innovation on utility is captured by
the first term, which is very close to the aggregate rate of process innovation defined in Footnote 78.
*s Which is not to say that empirical economists do not try to measure utility, basically by making
adjustments for quality improvements and product innovation in price indices. Adelman and Griliches
(1961) is a early contribution to this literature. More recent applications are found in Shapiro and
Wilcox (1996), Breshnahan and Gordon (1997), Moulton and Moses (1997) and Houseman (1999).
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2.1.5 THE DIRECTION OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
For the purpose of this thesis it is useful to classify individual innovations and the
resulting aggregate technical change according to the direction in which they change
factor demand in general and labour demand in particular. The introduction of the
robot-arm, for example, reduced the demand for manual labour and increased that
for technicians. The conveyer belt on the other hand enabled low skilled intensive
mass production to replace the skilled artisan production on demand. A concept that
allows one to measure the direction for individual innovations but also for technical
change at the aggregate level is factor b/as. An individual innovation can be biased
towards one input or another, increasing or decreasing the demand for that input
more or less than for others. The concept has a long history in economic theory and
Hicks (1932) was the first to define it:
We can c/ass/fy inventions accord/ng/y as the/r initia/ effects are to /ncrease,
/eave unchanged or diminish the ratio of the marg/na/ product of cap/ta/ to
that of /abour. We may ca// these /nvent/ons 7abour-sav/ng', 'neutra/' and
'cap/ta/ saving' respect/ve/y.
- Hicks (1932), p. 121 -
Bias must be distinguished from substitution, which leaves that ratio unchanged.^
Constructing a measure again starts with a formal definition. Kennedy and
Thirwall (1972), who interpret "given initial situation" as maintaining a given factor
ratio, show that for the two factors, one good case bias can be defined formally:
>0 L saving
=0 neutral
<0 K saving (2.4)
for given KA
8' This so-called Hicks-Robinson classification has provoked quite a debate in the literature. Various
authors have proposed alternative formulations of the same concept. Kennedy and Thirwall (1972)
stay closest to Hicks original definition in their formal definition and is used here. The reader is
referred to Thirtle and Ruttan (1987) for an excellent overview of the issues and additional references.
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In this equation the two factors are capital, K, and labour, L, and fx represents the
partial derivative of the production function with respect to factor X. In the more
general n goods, m inputs case this yields n times m-1 bias measures per inputs By
using the consolidated utility function in (2.3) and measuring the marginal products
in terms of the ultimate marginal contributions to utility one can reduce this to m-1
bias measures per input measuring the bias of aggregate technical change with
respect to that input.
Binswanger (1974) developed a method that reduces this still potentially
large number of indicators per input to 1. He argued that in a competitive market
equilibrium, where all inputs are paid their marginal value product and total output is
paid out to the inputs, a change in relative input prices for a given aggregate initial
input vector X={I, XSM, I/- x,i, I, x,™}, implies that the input shares in the total output
have changed. And because input prices are equal to the marginal product, a shift in
input shares given the input vector thus indicates bias. ^
For input/ aggregate bias can now be defined as:
>0 input j using
eft sh =0 neutral
<0 inputj saving
for given X={ Z, xot, X> x,it 1/ x/
Where, taking utility as the relevant output measure, sty is defined as:
sh = ^ * *> = V du(F(X, t), t) df, (X, t) . X,
' dX, u(.) S df,(X.t) dX, u(F(X,t),t)
and Xj= I, x,jt. There are large empirical problems in separating factor price induced
substitution from factor price induced technological bias as both simultaneously shift
the relative factor share over time in the same direction. Bias cannot be measured
** In the m input case there are m (m-l)/2 pairs per production process.
** He derives this result the other way around. Assuming there is a dual minimum cost function to
every production function, Binswanger (1974) shows that any shift in factor shares indicates bias for
given prices.
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directly as the marginal product cannot be observed, much less its marginal
contribution to utility. An empirical measure of bias is therefore by definition indirect
and involves making assumptions, such as the existence of competitive markets.
Only in cases where bias is strong enough to move both relative demand and relative
prices in favour of some factor, can it be observed. Still, even then it cannot be
measured. In the theoretical models discussed below, however, this is no problem
and bias and substitution are clearly defined.
This generalisation also allows one to consider heterogeneous factors such as
labour. Distinguishing high and low skilled labour, changes in the share of both
worker types in the total wage bill can be used to measure the skill bias.
Schimmelpfennig (1998) defined skill bias for a two skill level labour supply: 9°
Tecbno/ogi'ca/ change /s ski'// biased, /f /t /eads to a fa// /n unsk/7/ed /abour's
income share after contro///ng for changes in the ski'// composition of /abour
supp/y.
- Schimmelpfennig (1998), p. 5 -
Obviously the initial introduction of just one skill-biased innovation cannot cause
large aggregate demand shifts. It is by the strength of numbers that individually
biased innovations affect the composition of aggregate labour demand. As was
argued in Chapter 1 the observed collapse in low skilled labour demand must have
been caused by a large wave of individually skill-biased innovations. The idea of a
general purpose technology might explain why such waves could emerge.
2.1.6 GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES
Breshnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) coined the term general purpose technology
(GPT). An innovation qualifies as a general purpose technology if ".../t has the
so Schimmelpfennig also considered Harrod and Solow-neutral technical change. These concepts,
though important in their own right, are of little use when the focus is on the impact of technology on
the aggregate income distribution and the composition of labour demand. See Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1995) for a short summary and Chang (1970) or Thirtle and Ruttan (1987) for more detailed
explanations.
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potent/a/ for pervasive use /n a wide range of sectors /n ways that drast/ca//y c/iange
trie/r modes of operation".^ By their very nature such technologies have an economy
wide impact. It takes a long time for a general purpose technology to develop, but
once introduced, it can be used in a wide range of production processes and/or has
many potential applications in consumption. Hence such a general purpose
technology sparks a cluster of related innovations that is based on the same basic
innovation. In the words of Breshnahan and Trajtenberg:
The phenomenon invo/ves "innovationa/ comp/ementarities", that is, the
productivity of R&D in a downstream sector increases as a consequence of
innovation in the GPT techno/ogy. These comp/ementarit/es magnify the
effects of innovation in the GPT, and he/p propagate them throughout the
economy.
- Breshnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), p. 84 -
The bias of the basic innovation might thus carry over to this offspring and cause
serious skill bias in the aggregate demand for labour. When authors conclude that
aggregate technical change has been skill biased over the past decades, they usually
think of the wave of ICT-related innovations that occurred at the end of the 70s and
diffused during the 80s and 90s. From the often observed close correlation between
computer use and skill intensity, they conclude that this general purpose technology
must have been skill biased to the extent necessary to explain the observed patterns
in low skilled labour market performance. The next subsection will argue, however,
that another source of aggregate bias, related to the dynamics of product and
process innovations, may exist and is especially important when a wave of
innovations follows the introduction of a general purpose technology.
2.1.7 THE DYNAMICS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
Innovations change the nature of aggregate technology. The rates of innovation
measure the speed and size of their impact. The bias of innovations measures the
"Helpman(1998), p. 3.
51
direction in which they change factor demand. The concept of a general purpose
technology explains why innovations may come in waves or clusters. What then is the
impact of technical change, caused by a flow of innovations, on the evolution of
labour demand?
If innovations were static that impact would be entirely determined by the
combination of the speed, size and direction that characterise individual innovations.
A general purpose technology related cluster of skill-biased innovations would shift
the economy to a permanently higher relative demand for skilled labour. An
innovation is, however, not static. Its introduction into the economic system is a
dynamic process in which the direction, speed and size of the innovation change and
interact with existing and new technologies. And although this interaction is unique
between any two technologies over any period of time, there are some general
characteristics of this dynamic process that emerge from a large case study
literature. In that literature researchers have identified a product //fe cyc/e.^ That life
cycle starts with invention and innovation but upon its first commercial introduction
an innovation must d/ffuse through the economy. In the diffusion process there is a
stage of adopt/on in which the innovation increases its market share. Then saturation
occurs in a stage of maturity. Then the continued inflow of new substitutes causes
the product or process to gradually dec/ine until it is obso/ete. Various aspects of the
product life cycle have been addressed in the literature.
There is a large literature on the geographical aspects that was initiated by
Vernon (1966) and of which the models by Krugman (1979) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991a), discussed extensively in Chapter 3, are direct descendants.
Another strand of literature, for example Acs (1996), focuses on the market structure
and firm size over the life cycle of industries. The focus that is most relevant to the
purpose of this thesis, however, is on the evolution of final demand and production
technology, as the combination of both explains the life cycle evolution of relative
factor demand at the individual technology level.
A first attempt to link the life cycle of products to factor demand is Hirsch
(1965), who concluded from case studies that a product requires changing amounts
32 For references see Footnote 15.
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and qualities of capital and labour over its life cycle. He also observed and reported
the typical evolution of the industry structure, the evolution of final demand and
technology in very broad terms. Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of the product
life cycle as presented by Hirsch.
Table 2.2: HIRSCH' PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
Short runs
Rapidly changing
techniques
Dependence on
external economies
Low
Mass production gradually
introduced
Variations in technique
frequent
Long runs and
stable technology
Few innovations of
importance
High, due to obsolescence
specialised
equipment
Entry know-how
determined
Numerous firms
providing specialised
services
Scientists and
Engineers
Sellers' market
Growing number of firms
Many casualties and
mergers
Growing vertical
integration
Management
Financial resources
critical for entry
Number of firms
declining
Unskilled and Low-
Skilled Labour
Growing price elasticities
Spread of product
information
Performance equally
important to price
Source: Freeman and Soete (1997).
Note that the first line in Table 2.2 illustrates that there is a close relation between
the life cycle of the product and the process that is used to produce it. Moving from
one stage to the next in the Hirsch cycle implies changing the production process
rather than changing the product itself. In fact the production process is a key
determinant of the stage a product is in and process innovation is a precondition for
moving a product from one stage to the next. This implies that product and process
innovation are dynamically interrelated. This interrelatedness is quite evident when a
few examples are considered.
The conveyer belt was by all definitions a process innovation that
revolutionised manufacturing in general and the car industry in particular. Its
introduction allowed car producers to shift the car from an early stage, where a few
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high skilled mechanics produced a car on demand, to maturity.^ Also a relatively
new technology like the PC has shown clear signs of a life cycle. Initially used by few
very high skilled programmers the PC is now used by many at work and home. The
development of user-friendly interfaces like windows can be regarded as innovations
that matured this product.^
To test for the existence of Hirsch cycle in a more general setting, Audretsch
(1987) first determined the lifecycle stage of all 4-digit Standard Industrial
Classification Industries for the US in 1977, using data on their real sales from 1958-
1977.95 The industries are classified as growing, mature or declining industries
depending on the sign of the coefficients in a simple regression of real sales on time
and time squared.^ Then some variables that Hirsch suggested would characterise
the cycle, research intensity, skill intensity and capital intensity, were used as
explanatory variables in a probit regression on each of the stages.
Audretsch' results confirmed the existence of a product life cycle. The skill
intensity of employment indeed varied over the cycle as Hirsch had hypothesised.
Recently the interest in these aspects of the life cycle has resurfaced in the literature.
Goldin and Katz (1998) for example argued that in most manufacturing sectors firms
went through the Hirsch-cycle. Empirical research, for example Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1987) and Xiang (2002), also corroborated Hirsch' finding that high
skilled workers are on average more in demand in rapidly changing technological
environments. Recent studies by Aw and Batra (1999) and Baldwin and
Rafiquzzaman (1999) also show that wage differentials vary over the life cycle as
Hirsch had suggested.^
93 Obviously a host of other, less conspicuous innovat ions to process and product were required to
make the conveyer belt such a success. Examples are the standardisat ion of parts and all innovations
required to guarantee the reliable product ion of such parts.
9* The PC and ICT-technologies in general have the property that they can be regarded as product or
process innovations as they have af fected product ion as much as consumpt ion. The development of a
user interface can thus be regarded as a product innovat ion matur ing a process and the other way
around. The key issue here is that a new innovation may change the character ist ics of an exist ing one,
as was he case for the conveyer belt.
95 At the 4-digit level th is classif icat ion is very close to the product level one would ideally use.
96 If sales rise at an increasing rate (both coeff icients positive) the industry is in growth, if sales
decrease it is in decl ine and if both coeff icients are insignif icant the industry is mature.
9' They analyse the wage dif ferent ial between blue- and whi te collar workers.
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As the focus of this thesis is on the relative demand for skilled labour, the
relevance of that aspect in the product life cycle is evident. It implies that progress
over the cycle will shift the skill intensity of labour demand. But if this is the case at
the product level than, by aggregation, the distribution of total output over the life
cycle stages affects aggregate relative labour demand.
As was argued in Chapter 1, the introduction of a general purpose technology
like ICT can now produce an aggregate bias, not necessarily because the individual
ICT-related innovations are biased but because they are new. The distribution over
the life cycle is driven by innovation both from the outside due to entry and exit and
internally as innovation is also required to shift existing technologies over their life
cycle. A key difference is that, as the innovations mature and the distribution shifts
back, so will aggregate relative labour demand and relative wages.
^£&re£ate Tecrjno/ogy can now be defined as a body of knowledge that
consists of the innovations made up to a point, weighed by their penetration rates in
consumption and production and distributed over the several life cycle stages.
Aggregate technical change may then be skill biased and cause shifts in aggregate
relative labour demand for two reasons. First, a drop in relative low skilled labour
demand may have been caused by a wave of low skilled labour saving or high skilled
labour using innovations. Second, a wave of product innovations may have caused a
shift in the aggregate distribution of jobs towards the early stages and process
innovation has yet to move the new products and services over their cycle to restore
the balance.
The interesting question that arises at this point is: Why would anyone want to
develop, introduce or adopt product and process innovations in the first place, and
secondly why indeed if the innovations that are adopted are biased towards a factor
that continuously increases its relative price? To answer that question one must turn
to the economics of technical change.
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2.2 THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
The previous section argued that innovation may cause bias in aggregate relativelabour demand. The observed positive correlations between skill intensity and
technology indicators such as computer use and R&D efforts strongly suggest that
explanation. What remains to be addressed is why individual innovations might have
been biased and why innovation changed the cycle phase structure in a way that
caused aggregate bias.
In Chapter 1 it was argued that technical change is the result of deliberate
action on behalf of the innovator. For an economist the question is to what extent
this deliberate action is economically motivated. Generally formulated economically
motivated behaviour is the result of a rational decision by an agent to commit scarce
resources to the pursuit of some gain. Rationality implies that the benefits achieved
outweigh the costs to achieve them. Answering the question above as an economist
thus requires a closer look at the agents, costs and benefits in the invention,
innovation, diffusion and obsolescence stages of the life cycle.
2.2.1 THE ECONOMICS OF INVENTION
Invention is the initial conception of an idea. The agent in invention is therefore an
individual or group of individuals that comes up with such an idea. In the literature
these inventors have been discussed extensively. Usher (1954) claimed that the
views on the process of invention always find themselves between two extremes.
The transcendenf.a//st approach at one extreme attributes the advances made
in technology to the individual genius of the inventor. According to this view James
Watt actually developed the steam engine from scratch and was not motivated by
economic incentives but pursued his own intellectual challenges. In this approach
the economy simply absorbs the inventions that are supplied and was therefore
labelled the supp/y push approach. Although useful for gaining a historical
perspective, the example immediately exposes the weaknesses of this approach.
Watt developed his engine based on an earlier design by Newcomen. He was inspired
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to do so while working on a scaled down teaching model a mining company had
commissioned him to build. And upon his invention he and many other engineers
worked for many years to perfect the engine and invent new, profitable
applications.^
At the other extreme is the mecrian/st/c approach that claims invention is
merely the result of people looking for and finding the solution to problems that daily
life confronts them with. In this view technological change merely responds to the
signals from the society it develops in. Obviously in capitalist societies economic
(price-) signals then play an important if not dominant role and it was therefore
labelled demand-pi/// approach. In this approach James Watt was a mere instrument
of history. He happened to be faced with the problem how to drain water from mining
shafts and that problem required a solution. By reducing Watt's invention to a mere
mechanistic response to an external historical fact or economic incentive, Watt's
genius is fully denied, as if any other could and would have done the same thing in
his position.
Scherer's (1982) attempt to establish the relative importance of demand-pull
and supply push empirically was inconclusive. He confirmed results obtained by
demand pull proponents such as Schmookler (1966), but also found significant
effects of such proxies as the size and richness of an industry's knowledge base,
indicating significant supply push effects.
These results and the steam engine case show that reality is usually to be
found somewhere between the extremes. Usher himself put forward an alternative,
the cumu/at/ve synt/ies/s approach. In this approach inventors combine their
individual genius with the existing knowledge base in society and apply this package
to the economic or intellectual challenge they wish to apply it to. Since individual
genius and society's knowledge base develop largely independent of economic
considerations, these provide the supply push elements in his approach.^ The
demand-pull elements come from the anticipation of and the testing and revising in
economic applications that feeds back into the invention process. Both supply push
« See Suplee (2000).
* Popper (1959) and Kuhn (1962) for example provide a theory for the dynamics in science that is
largely if not entirely independent of economic considerations.
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and demand pull elements thus play a role and for each individual invention in
varying degrees. This also implies that in the aggregate the direction and rate of
invention are determined both by economic and non-economic factors.
Summarising the above in economic terms clarifies the picture. In the
invention stage inventors - individuals or institutionalised in R&D laboratories - are
the agents whose actions shape new technologies. In the process they face costs,
even if crucial inputs such as the existing knowledge base and individual genius are
available to them free of charge, providing supply push elements. Labour time
foregone, physical inputs and the costly process of trial and error put a price on
invention. To the extent that these agents act rationally, weighing these costs against
the benefits of their action, invention is an economic activity. The benefits come to
some extent in the form of profits.i°° Demand-pull elements therefore operate mainly
through benefits, whereas supply push elements tend to affect costs. There is room
for both in the economics of invention when agents respond rationally and direct
their efforts towards projects that they perceive to have a positive balance.
2.2.2 THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION
In the innovation stage of the life cycle an invention is commercialised. Invention is
thus a necessary condition for innovation and supply push elements in the invention
stage carry over to this stage. Economic incentives and rational decision-making,
however, become increasingly important. According to Schumpeter (1934)
entrepreneurs who seek to either gain or consolidate monopoly rents, are the agents
that commercialise inventions. Again he can be an individual starting up a new firm
from his garage or an executive at a large electronics company who considers
commercialising some invention made in the company's R&D lab. Initially
Schumpeter saw these entrepreneurs much the same as the inventors above. They
were supposed to commercialise their invention and then expose themselves to the
market where a process of natural selection would pick winners and losers. In that
100 Personal gratification, satisfaction of curiosity, intellectual status and the pursuit of an academic
career are other, less quantifiable aspects of the benefits. It should also be noted that perceived
future benefits are what motivates inventors. Their expectations may well be way off, but this does not
change the rationality of their behaviour.
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view the supply push elements in invention would carry over to innovation one-for-
one. But the emergence of the firm based R&D laboratories and the strong demand-
pull for military technology in the mid 30s showed that the allocation of resources in
innovation responds strongly to profit incentives. As entrepreneurs introduce an
invention commercially they can be expected to be motivated mainly by (anticipated)
profits and therefore select the inventions they will commercialise. Unlike the
inventor, the entrepreneur can select, as they may purchase these inventions from
inventors and are not bound to any specific invention. This also implies, however,
that there is competition over inventions and under certain conditions a market for
them can emerge. The costs to the entrepreneur are then equal to the market price
of an invention. His benefits are the profits he expects to make.
On this common basic foundation economists have developed a new field in
economics, the economics of innovation.*°i In that field both the endogenisation of
the rate and the direction of technical change have been attempted. These strands
of literature are at the heart of the analysis in following chapters and a short survey
of both is offered here.
The early literature on the economics of innovation can be classified in three
broad approaches."^ The first focussed on the microeconomics of innovation in
general and centred on the Schumpeterian hypothesis and the relation between
market structure and innovation in particular.*^ This approach focussed on the
agents and their private costs and benefits, much less on the macroeconomic
implications of their actions.
The second approach followed up on Solow's (1957) work and focussed on
explaining aggregate technical progress without much consideration for
microeconomic foundations. The focus was on incentives and environmental factors,
much less on the behaviour of agents. An early reference taking this approach is
" " This literature does not distinguish between the innovation, diffusion or invention stage for
simplicity. The usual assumption is that inventions are immediately commercialised and that the
adopting population is fully informed and homogenous. The latter implies that all adopt when one
adopts and diffusion is immediate. The former implies that the innovating agent is inventor-
entrepreneur and weighs entrepreneurial benefits against invention costs.
" " Schneider and Ziesemer (1995).
" * See for example Kamien and Schwartz (1982). Schumpeter posed the hypothesis that monopoly
rents are the incentive for innovation and hence a testable implication would be that monopolistic
sectors are more innovative than competitive ones.
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Arrow's (1962) article on learning-by-doing. He hypothesised that aggregate
production would generate a knowledge stock that increases productivity without
agents actually introducing further innovations. Technical change is endogenous but
treated as an unintended and costless side effect of production.
The third approach took an evolutionary perspective on innovation. This
approach is much more empirical and descriptive in nature."^ In this approach the
rationality of agents under the extreme uncertainties involved is questioned, with very
interesting results that are of little interest to this thesis, as the whole analysis here
rests on the assumption of rational behaviour.
The microeconomic and growth theoretic approaches, however, are also of
little use when considered in isolation. The former does not allow one to analyse the
impact of innovation on and feedback effects of aggregate variables such as labour
demand or the aggregate stock of knowledge, the latter lacks a decision theoretic
foundation that would explain how bias is the result of rational decision-making.
Fortunately the economics of innovation has progressed and with the
contributions of Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and especially Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) 'New Growth
Theory', integrating the micro- and macroeconomic perspective, was born.
Aghion and Howitt (1998) provide an overview that explicitly links this field of
research to the Schumpeterian approach in which the search for monopoly rents
provides the incentives for innovative activity. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) give an
overview of endogenous growth extensions to the neoclassical class of growth
models that have their roots in the Solow growth model. These models typically
address the issue of market failure and usually link economic growth to positive
externalities (Arrow (1962), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991b)) or
constant returns to capital, the so-called AK-models (Romer (1986, 1987), Lucas
(1988) and Rebelo (1991))."*
«>4 nosi, et al. (1988) collects many contributions in this approach.
i°5 Jones (1999) and Jones and Manuelli (1999) contain useful updated overviews that place different
accents.
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For the purpose of this thesis a subclass of endogenous growth models, that of the
R&D or innovation driven growth models, is particularly relevant.*^ in these models
individual innovations are the result of a rational decision-making process on behalf
of an R&D sector. This sector aims to maximise profit and represents both the
inventor and the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. The costs of R&D are expenditures on
scarce resources this sector has to compete for and allocate to the development of
innovations. However, the existence of knowledge spillovers at the aggregate level
captures the idea that the innovators can benefit from an evolving knowledge base.
As such these models explicitly consider the microeconomic foundations of
aggregate technical change, but also capture important feedbacks and supply push
elements present in the aggregate economic environment in which these innovators
operate.
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) were the first to introduce a research and development sector that produces
innovations/ideas that are non-rivalrous inputs in the production of final output into a
model.i°7 Their work will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
The resources allocated to R&D are a decision variable in these models, which
endogenises the rate of innovation and explains how it is a result of the combination
of preferences, market interaction and individual rational decision-making. Still these
models concentrate on a homogenous R&D output by dealing with one type of
innovation at a time, precluding the analysis of individually biased innovations or the
aggregate distribution of products and processes over life cycle stages.
Acemoglu (1998) and Kiley (1999) explicitly address the issue of individually
biased innovations and introduced heterogeneity in R&D output by allowing agents to
choose between innovations that are complementary to skilled or unskilled labour.
By using similar techniques it is also possible to endogenise the life cycle by
distinguishing and endogenisingthe types of innovations that move the product over
the life cycle as in lyigun (2000), Van Zon and Sanders (2000) and Sanders (2002).
" * Other classes of endogenous growth models follow for example Lucas (1988) and focus on the
endogenous accumulation of human capital or Jones (1999) where the focus is on explaining the
stability of growth. These approaches are less suitable in analysing the implications of product life
cycles in innovation, as they do not allow for labour demand to be distributed over individual products
and technologies.
""See Jones (1999).
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Before turning to such models in the next chapter, however, it is useful to provide
some additional background. The ideas underlying Acemoglu (1998) and Kiley
(1999) and indeed all other work that addresses the issue of endogenous bias can
be traced back to the debate on Hicks' (1932) induced innovations hypothesis,
briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 above.
The debate on endogenous biases in technical change was initiated when
Hicks (1932) put forward the inducement hypothesis:
A change /n the re/at/Ve prices of the factors of product/on /s ftse/f a spur to
/nnovat/on, and to /nvent/ons of a part/cu/ar k/nd - d/rected at econom/z/ng
the use of a factor that has become re/at/Ve/y expens/ve.
- Hicks (1932), pp. 124-125 -
Here too there exists a micro-, a macro and a historically oriented literature. David
(1975) provides a comprehensive review of the debate from the economic historians'
perspective. There are many interesting accounts in this literature but again no
useful reference is made to decision theoretical foundations. Thirtle and Ruttan
(1987) give an extensive summary of the debate on induced innovation both from
the microeconomic and growth-theoretical perspective.
The microeconomic debate focussed on the issue of factor substitution versus
factor bias, shortly addressed in the previous section. Based on a substitution
argument Salter (1960) refuted Hicks' original claim, that factor price changes would
induce innovations that are biased towards saving the relatively more expensive
factor. He argued that due to factor substitution all factors are always equally
expensive to a firm (at the margin since they all are paid their marginal products).
Hence the incentive to bias the allocation of R&D resources towards saving the more
expensive factor would disappear. Salter, however, defined his production function to
include all feasible production techniques that can be developed from the existing
knowledge base. He then called the choice between these techniques factor
substitution and thereby defined all possible bias in technical change away. Fellner
(1961, 1962, 1966) introduced market power and expectations into the Salter
framework and Ahmad (1966) redefined Salter's isoquant as an innovations
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possibility curve (IPC), an envelope of all the alternative isoquants a firm might
expect to develop given its available R&D resources. Both were able to rehabilitate
the induced innovation hypothesis. The latter model also allowed the supply push
elements to affect technical change since an exogenous shift in the IPC would reflect
the autonomous progress in scientific knowledge."^
In this debate the agents are typically assumed to be firms, considering
whether or not to develop or adopt a particular innovation. They are constrained by
the alternative production technologies available to them and driven by profits. With
their focus on firms both the proponents and opponents of the induced bias
hypothesis stress the demand-pull factors in innovation, although both reach
diametrically opposed conclusions. The concentration on firm behaviour also shifts
the focus away from innovation and towards adoption and diffusion, discussed
below.
The macroeconomic growth-theoretical approach, on the other hand, has
focussed on the issue of explaining the empirical constancy of factor shares without
having to assume purely labour augmenting technical change."^ Kennedy (1964)
proposed an innovation possibilities frontier (IPF) for the aggregate economy. It
describes the rate of labour augmentation that can be generated by technical change
as a function of the rate of capital augmentation. Underlying this curve is the
assumption that R&D resources are scarce and have to be allocated to augmenting
either factor and represents the analogue of a production possibilities frontier in
R&D. When the aim is to maximise unit cost reductions at given relative factor prices,
this curve yields an optimal allocation of R&D resources and hence a bias may result
endogenously. Kennedy (1966) also showed that, if technical change only occurs in
final goods production, the stable rates of technical change are necessarily Hicks
neutral in the long run. If technical change also affects the production of capital
™ Ahmad (1966) assumed that this shift would be Hicks neutral. This assumption, however, can
easily be dropped to allow for exogenous biases as well.
" " This is one of the famous Kaldorian stylised facts of growth. In Jones (1975) among many others it
is shown that sustainable growth with fixed income shares requires technical change to be Harrod-
neutral in the aggregate production function. Harrod (1939) defined neutrality as technical change
that for a given interest rate leaves the capital share in output unaffected. His concept is equivalent to
Hicks' for a Cobb-Douglas production function. For all others Harrod neutrality implies that technical
change is purely labour augmenting in Hicks' definition.
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goods, a long-run stable growth path only exists if technical change is purely labour
augmenting.
Drandakis and Phelps (1966) and Samuelson (1966) subsequently integrated
the Kennedy model in the standard neoclassical growth model by Solow (1957). Von
Weizacker (1966) extended the model by explicitly modelling the decision regarding
the total amount of resources (labour only) to be allocated to R&D, which allows for
the determination of the optimal rate of technical change. Still, as before, the
macroeconomic approach does not address the decision theoretical foundations of
innovation and analyses technical change at the aggregate level only. For an analysis
of product life cycle effects it is required that these micro foundations are addressed.
A main further criticism that can be put forward on both approaches is that
the IPF, like the IPC are both simply assumed to exist, to exhibit the required
properties and to be known to the decision makers in the economy.n° Especially the
required long-run stability is an undesirable feature of the IPF since the rate of capital
or labour augmentation is not likely to be boundless. If labour augmentation is
limited, a purely labour augmenting exogenous drift in the IPF is required to re-
establish the stable long-run growth equilibrium, which brings us back to square one.
The assumption of purely labour augmenting technical change is merely replaced by
the assumption of a labour augmenting drift in the IPF. The innovation possibilities
frontier lacks the sound microeconomic foundation that endogenous growth models
do provide.
The debate on endogenous biases in technical change has not been
concluded and little attention was devoted to it until recently. By combining a micro-
approach to innovation with a macro-approach to technical change, R&D driven
growth models have also allowed for the analysis of endogenous bias. Among the few
recent theoretical contributions are the above-mentioned models by Kiley (1999) and
Acemoglu (1998, 2002), who will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Before
turning to their work, however, this chapter first shortly discusses the possible
impacts of economic considerations over the diffusion and obsolescence stages of
the life cycle.
no Hacche (1979) discusses the relationships between IPC and IPF in detail.
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2.2.3 THE ECONOMICS OF DIFFUSION AND OBSOLESCENCE
Upon being introduced commercially an innovation will (usually) diffuse. The speed at
and extent to which it diffuses as well as the time it takes for substitutes to compete
the innovation out of the market are all variables that affect the impact of that
innovation on aggregate labour demand.
Empirical evidence shows that there are large differences in the speed and
extent to which new innovations diffuse."-* Casual observation reveals that some
innovations have been around for ages, whereas others had hardly seen the light of
day when the next innovation wiped them o u t . ^ still the descriptive literature on
diffusion finds a remarkable empirical regularity in the diffusion of new products and
processes. Diffusion, measured by the market share of a new technology over time,
typically follows an S-shape. This pattern was also present in the diffusion pattern of
PCs in the US shown in Chapter 1. The S-shaped pattern of diffusion is well described
by so-called contagion models. These models argue that adoption follows
information, which spreads through a population like a contagious disease.*^ The
first contributions, made by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961) apply the
epidemic approach to the diffusion of new process innovations. Such models,
however, lack decision theoretical foundations entirely. Agents adopt whenever they
are 'infected', and are assumed to be automatons, not rational decision makers.
Saturation levels and adoption speed are observed or assumed rather than
explained.
This empirically robust pattern justifies the above-discussed R&D driven
growth models in simply sidestepping the diffusion stage. They conveniently assume
that events between innovation and obsolescence are similar and predictable for all
innovations. All relevant information is available and can be discounted to the time of
' " See for example David (1975) and Mokyr (1999).
i " Examples are sailing boats and steam powered automobiles, respectively. Of course the essence of
the life cycle hypothesis is that innovations that have been around for ages will change, sometimes
dramatically, over time due to further technical change.
' " Meijers (1994) gives a brief summary of the literature in this field and refers to Stoneman (1983,
1991) and Gomulka (1990) for more elaborate and detailed surveys.
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innovation. Introducing endogenous aggregate profit erosion or hazard rates can thus
capture diffusion.""
It was argued above, however, that subsequent innovation in the diffusion
stage plays a key role in moving innovations over their cycle. Events in the diffusion
stage, in particular the introduction of maturing process innovations, drive the
dynamics in the distribution of aggregate output over the life cycle. Progress on a
decision theoretical foundation has been made for one important category of
subsequent process innovations: new capital equipment. The adoption of such
innovations requires large investments on behalf of firms, so benefits and costs are
large and firms must behave rationally if they want to remain in business. The
economics behind the adoption of new capital equipment have therefore been
studied extensively and are consequently better understood then for other types of
innovation.
For example David (1969) and Davies (1979) investigated possible links
between diffusion speed and economic environment by regressing the probability
that a firm adopts a new technology on firm characteristics, such as firm size. As
should be expected, both find that a firm adopts when, given its characteristics, the
cost reduction allowed by the new technology outweighs the costs of adoption.
Obviously that cost reduction depends on factor and output prices as well as on the
different technical characteristics of the new process considered.
In models proposed by Stoneman (1981), Tsur et al. (1990) and Kim et al.
(1992) the effects of expectations and learning on adoption costs are taken into
account. These models are shown to go a long way in explaining observed patterns of
intra-firm diffusion and stress the importance of information gathering and
knowledge accumulation. To explain international diffusion Grossman and Helpman
(1991a) also used the idea that anticipated operational cost reductions drive the
innovative effort required to move a product over its cycle stages. The required effort
is reduced as knowledge accumulates.
Now shortly consider the economics of obsolescence. The phasing out of an
obsolete product or process usually follows an inverse S-shape. This is again
"« See Chapter 3.
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attributed to the evolution of demand, not the supply of the technology itself. Since
obsolescence is the result of adopting substitutes, this pattern can be explained as
the mirror image of diffusion and similar considerations are raised.
At this point it should be noted that both diffusion and scrapping models
assume the agent to be a firm that is motivated by expected cost reductions and
constrained by the availability of the technology and required knowledge to operate
it. Once that constraint is lifted he can adopt the new technology at a cost. " ^ This
makes their decision comparable to that of the entrepreneurs in R&D driven growth
models. The model in Chapter 4 will illustrate this by assuming that the transition of a
new product to the next life cycle stage reduces operating costs, but requires an
additional, costly process innovation.
" ' This cost covers the removal of old and installation of the new equipment. The price of the new
machine also includes (part of) the development costs incurred by the innovator.
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2.3 CONCLUSION
In this chapter concepts, definitions and ideas from various strands of literature ontechnical change have been presented. First aggregate technology was defined as
the stock of knowledge that allows us to generate utility from a bundle of outputs
produced with a given bundle of inputs. Then it was argued that the evolution of
aggregate technology is determined by the introduction, diffusion and exit of a flow of
new technologies that may or may not be clustered around a general purpose
technology. The bias of (a cluster of) individual technologies, the speed at and extent
to which individually biased innovations diffuse and the distribution of the economy
over the life cycle have been identified as potentially complementary sources of bias
in aggregate technical change, resulting in shifting relative aggregate input demands.
It was also argued that the individual bias and life cycle distribution are at
least partly the result of economic decision-making and therefore affected by
economic variables such as relative factor prices. Since these prices are likely to
respond to demand shifts, this implies that the economic effects of technical change
feed back into the processes of invention, innovation and diffusion.
The analysis in this chapter was kept general and informal to keep the focus
on tracing the origins of ideas and concepts in the literature. To evaluate the exact
implications of the hypotheses, it is useful to formulate them in more precise
mathematical models. The next chapter will discuss the tools needed to do so by
presenting relevant models from the literature. The formalisation in and analysis of a
model that illustrates the above-identified mechanisms is postponed to Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3:
MODELLING ENDOGENOUS
TECHNICAL CHANGE
In this chapter the aim is to bridge the gap between the descriptive analysis in theprevious and the formal mathematical one in the next chapter. To do so it isuseful to consider some basic models in the endogenous innovation literature. In
addition to providing the required modelling tools and their underlying intuition, this
approach is intended to give due credit to the work of others upon which the model in
Chapter 4 is built.
The first section shortly presents the basic structure of a model by Grossman
and Helpman (1991b). It illustrates how product innovation can be modelled. The
aim is to trace the roots, identify basic principles and provide the necessary intuition
and analytical tools for the Acemoglu (2002a) model, presented in detail in Section
2. His model allows for individually biased innovations and offers the market size
explanation, mentioned in Chapter 1.
Section 3 then adds insights from product life cycle models by presenting the
innovation driven life cycle model by Grossman and Helpman (1991a). Their insights
make it possible to introduce the life cycle explanation for the observed shifts in
relative labour demand and feature prominently in the model in Chapter 4.
To avoid being swamped by mathematical technicalities, the main text in this
chapter will present the models in an intuitive way. All models presented are also
summarised in formal synopsis tables at the end of every section to facilitate
comparison and summarise the main ingredients of these models. Derivations,
proofs and all but the most obvious mathematics are deferred to the appendices.*^
" * The appendices of this thesis are not included in the printed version of this thesis but can be
downloaded in .pdf and word-format at www.marksanders.nl.
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3.i THE INGREDIENTS OF A MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS INNOVATION
This section will focus on a model by Grossman and Helpman (1991b), illustratingthe endogenisation of product innovations. It will relate this model in footnotes to
models by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), shortly pointing out the
similarities and differences when the aim is to model process innovation. * " All these
authors regard the generation of ideas or innovations, which are non-rivalrous and
therefore generate positive externalities, as crucial to explain long-run (steady state)
economic growth. In addition they all:
...treat commerc/a/ research as an ordinary econom/c act/vrty
requ/res trie input of resources and responds to profit
opportunities. Returns to R&D come in the form of monopo/y rents
/n imperfect/y competitive product markets.
- Grossman and Helpman (1991b), p.43 -
Thus introducing the basic channels for interaction between labour demand and
technical change.
3.1.1 A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PRODUCT INNOVATION
The Grossman and Helpman (1991b) book is among the first and most significant
contributions to the field of endogenous growth theory in general and innovation
driven growth models in particular.*^ Being among the first in their kind, their model
provides a useful starting point for the more precise formal arguments that follow. As
" ' The appendices to this chapter contain the 'no-frills' formal derivation of the models referred to.
Each appendix concludes with a synopsis table of the mathematical structure as the one developed
for Grossman and Helpman (1991b) in this section. Those familiar with innovation driven growth
models can quickly browse these tables for reference and proceed with the model by Acemoglu
(2002a) that bears more direct relevance for the analysis in Chapter 4.
"s In it they position this then new field of research in the older neoclassical tradition and influential
early models by Arrow (1962) and Shell (1967) and also consider a host of extensions to their basic
framework. This subsection is based primarily on their Chapter 3 as that chapter contains the most
relevant model for the purpose of this thesis. The model in their Chapter 4, in which a slightly different
interpretation of product innovation is given, is presented in Appendix 3B.
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was argued in Chapter 2, a model of product innovation requires the specification of
consumer preferences in a utility function. This formal representation should reflect
consumers' valuation of products relative to other products. In addition, as R&D
requires resources that have to be invested in advance, the utility function must also
reflect consumers' preferences over time, since savings are required to finance
innovative activity.
A first key property of the utility function, which is commonly assumed in
growth models, is therefore time separability. The idea is to separate the decision on
how to spend a given budget on the available consumption bundle at any po/nf. in
f/me from the decision what budget to consume over t/me. This property thus implies
that it is possible to separate the /ntra- and /ntertempora/ decision. Although
consumers can borrow and lend to shift consumption over time, they are constrained
to the extent that the present value of their lifetime consumption cannot exceed that
of their lifetime earnings. Intuitively, utility is maximised when consumers spend and
save over time in such a way that the marginal utility of spending a euro on
consumption today is equal to the discounted marginal utility of spending the return
on risk free asset, (1+r) euros, on consumption tomorrow.*^ In Cell 1 of the formal
synopsis table below the consumers' problem in Grossman and Helpman (1991b) is
represented formally.
Table 3.1: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 B )
AGENT(S) PROBLEM(S) SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINT(S) RESULTS
max: j e " " Iog(£(r)/P(r))dr
s.t.
On the left the problem is presented as choosing the budget £(() to be spent on a
consumption index with a unit price of P(t) to maximise a time separable utility
function subject to the lifetime budget constraint. The budget constraint limits the
expenditure on consumption and the accumulation of assets -A(t) to total income, the
"s See Appendix 3A for the formal proof. Basic textbooks such as Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) and
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) are much more elaborate on the issue of intertemporal utility
maximisation.
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sum of labour income V(t) and the interest r earned on assets owned at time t.
Appendix 3A derives the result that consumers will save to ensure:
| = r - p (3.1)
Equation (3.1) implies that if the return on assets exceeds the subjective discount
rate, p, consumers are willing to postpone consumption such that in the future they
may consume more. Equation (3.1) conveniently implies that, when the budget is
normalised to one in every period, the equilibrium interest rate must equal the
discount rate. Given these preferences, assets that yield a higher rate of return will
be in infinite demand, whereas the consumer will not purchase those with a lower
rate of return. This in turn implies that all investment, including R&D, must yield a
rate of return equal to the exogenously given discount rate in equilibrium. Most if not
all innovation driven growth models will implicitly or explicitly assume a version of the
above Ramsey (1928) optimal savings rule to describe consumers' intertemporal
consumption decisions.*^ it describes how much consumers wish to save and spend
on consumption in each period.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) then proceed with the derivation of the
(intratemporal) demand curves. To maximise their utility, consumers must spend the
budget they decided to spend at every point in time such that they maximise direct
utility. The consumers' appreciation for product innovations is embedded in the
specification of direct utility.
Table 3.1 (Continued): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 B )
AGENT(S)
CONSUMERS
PROBLEM(S) SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINT(S) => RESULTS
max:U(.) = fc(/T
s.t. Jp(i)c(/)d/ < E
120 An often-applied shortcut is to assume a constant exogenous interest rate. The optimisation
programme presented in the text can be thought of underlying this assumption. Appendix 3A presents
a slightly more general case that yields a similar relation between consumption growth, interest rates
and the parameters of the utility function.
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The intratemporal problem is formally represented in Cell 2 of the synopsis table
above. Intuitively a consumer maximises utility by setting the marginal utility of
spending a euro on one product equal to the marginal utility of spending that euro on
any of the other products available. In that way the consumer cannot increase his
utility by reallocating the (fixed) budget over the goods he can spend it on. Appendix
3A derives the formal results for an n varieties direct utility function. Note at this
point that demand for any individual variety / is proportional to the budget and
obviously the effect of price increases is to reduce demand. But note also that due to
increases in n direct utility (£/P) increases, whereasc", falls. This makes the model a
variety expansion model.^i Consumers will reduce their demand for existing
varieties when a new product enters the market.
Now consider the second group of agents in the model, producers, who are
assumed to maximise their profits. They do so by setting a price and/or choosing a
quantity to produce such that their marginal revenue equals marginal costs. In
Appendix 3A the Amoroso-Robinson condition for setting profit maximising prices is
formally derived and it is shown that that price is a mark-up over marginal costs.^2
p, = - ^ - m e , with a, - * ° ' * " ' * - 5 ^ - < 0 (3.2)
l + o dp, c°i(p,)
where a, is defined as the (negative) price elasticity of demand for good /.
Corresponding profits are given by:
rr,•= mc,c°,(p,)>0 (3.3)
1 + 0,
It can be verified that under perfect competition, with producers facing a price
elasticity of (minus) infinity, prices would fall to marginal costs and profits would fall
to 0. In innovation driven growth models, however, market power is assumed as
" i As opposed to the quality /adder model presented in Chapter 4 of Grossman and Helpman (1991b)
and Appendix 3B, where quality improvements increase the direct utility of consuming a given number
of varieties.
' " If demand is iso-elastic this is a general result.
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positive profits are required to provide an incentive to innovators below. In Grossman
and Helpman every producer is therefore assumed to be a monopolist in his own
market. They face the downward-sloping iso-elastic demand curve for variety / in Cell
2 alone. In that case it is easily verified that o; = l/(or-l)<-l is the price elasticity of
demand for all products / and the mark-up of prices over marginal costs is l/or>l.i23
Grossman and Helpman then assume a simple one-for-one production technology
with labour, L, as the sole input, such that marginal costs equal wages, w."4
Table 3.1 (Continued): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 B )
AGENT(S) PROBLEM(S) SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINT(S) => RESULTS
) = —mc(/)
a
s.t. c°(/) = /(»)
V/
All monopolists therefore set their price at w/a. With prices equal and perfect
symmetry in the utility function, the quantity demanded of each variety is equal. By
the one-for-one production function aggregate labour demand is equal to the
aggregate quantity consumed and one obtains L° = £ / p = orE/ w .125 The profits that
an individual firm makes are then given by:
IE 1-
R , = =
o n n
(3.4)
These results are summarised in Cells 3 to 5 of the synopsis table above, where a
dot over a variable signifies the time derivative.
"3 Note that it is assumed that many products are in the market, such that one individual price, pi,
does not affect the cost-minimising price of a util, P. See Appendix 3A.
i " Obviously such a production technology precludes any analysis of process innovations but it
simplifies the model a great deal. More complicated production structures are considered below.
"s Note that by the assumption that the utility function is symmetric and all producers use the same
production technology, profits, prices, produced quantities and required inputs are identical for all
producers, so one can drop the index /'.
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The ownership claims to these profits are assets that consumers can buy. The price
of such an asset, assumed equal to the consumers' willingness to pay, will be equal
to the discounted present value of all future profit flows. In general the return on an
asset equals the cash flow, here the instant profit flow, plus the change in the value
of the asset, v, (t), divided by the current price of the asset, v,(t). For consumers to be
willing to hold such assets, this total return must, as was derived above, equal the
consumers' discount rate."6 Grossman and Helpman present the resulting capital
market arbitrage condition as:
rr + v
-^ ^ • (3.5)
where time arguments have been dropped to save on notation. Since all assets are
assumed to be perfect substitutes they must all yield the common rate of return.
Since, in a rational expectations model with perfect foresight, an asset's value is
equal to the discounted flow of future cash flows, the above arbitrage condition is
always fulfilled. But v is not only the value of an existing firm at any point in time. It is
also the value of the marginal new firm at that point in time and hence the maximum
amount an entrepreneur is willing to invest in R&D.
In the variety expansion model in Grossman and Helpman (1991b) the R&D
sector can 'produce' innovations that allow an entrepreneur to set up a the n+1*
firm. Hence the number of firms, n, increases over time according to the following
/nnovat/on function:
n = aL"*°n (3.6)
Despite the fact that (3.6) is a relatively simple equation, the intuition behind it is
important to stress at this stage. Parameter a is merely a productivity parameter that
allows one to measure R&D labour inputs, L"*°, in the same units as for production.
The presence of n on the right hand side, however, requires some elaboration. It
^ Grossman and Helpman assume a unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution and a normalised
and constant consumption budget to derive this result. See Appendix 3A.
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represents the externality effect of knowledge accumulation, r> is introduced as a
proxy for the accumulated knowledge available to all R&D firms at no costs.127 By
introducing a new variety, an individual entrepreneur generates and appropriates the
value of one firm, v, but by increasing n he also increases the productivity of R&D
labour in producing future innovations. This externality is the driving force of this
endogenous growth model, enabling steady state positive growth rates and
introducing increasing returns at the aggregate level. The behaviour of the R&D
sector is summarised in Cells 6 and 7 of the formal synopsis table:
Table 3.1 (Continued): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 B )
6
7
Price-taking in R&D
max: rr,^ = n(L»»o) * v - wi.,,,,
S.t. n(^a>n} ~ ^^"ft^^
... n,(i) + v(')
r
=> »v = anv
rr^  +v
r
With the R&D sector fully specified, all basic elements of a product innovation driven
growth model are now present. A simple labour market clearing condition,
/_R«D+/_D=L*, is sufficient to close the model and allows one to write down an equation
for the evolution of the number of varieties in equilibrium as:^8
^ = aL™ = a(L* - L") = a(V - -^-1 = a/.* - H £
n \ avny vn
(3.7)
Together with (3.5) this yields a system of two differential equations in two
unknowns, v and n . ^ That system of equations can be solved for the steady state
growth rate, a constant given by:
ot)aL* -orp (3.8)
i " Grossman and Helpman (1991b) show that without such a spillover the variety expansion model
will not generate a positive steady state growth rate. In other words, in the end innovation will stop
without it.
"s see Appendix 3A.
129 The fact that in the steady state the value of total assets is constant (relative to the consumption
budget) is used. See Appendix 3A.
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The formal synopsis of the full model is presented in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1 (Full): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 B )
AGENT(S; bUtSJUJl luC(JI\i
1NSUMERS
1
: . D u 6 T R ^
R&D
1
2
3
-
max: je °" ' log(E(r)/P(r))dr
max:U(.)= Jc(/)°d/
s.t. |p(i)c(i)c(/< £
0
max:r7,(;) = c(/)p(i)-TC(/)
01"
s.t. c°(/) = /(/)
^,/, = ( l -a)£/n VI
Price-taking in R&D
max: n^, = n(L^) * v - wL^
s.t. n(L,,j,) = aL,^n
E(D
=> = r-p
H(t)
VO /
=>p(/) = -MC(/)
a
L°=a£/tv
=> —-— = —
fT,(/) n
r r
=> w = anv
LABOUR
MARKET
MARKET
STEADY
STATE
8
10
n
Y ^ n ~ v
such that nv/Y =nv is constant
=> g = (1 - a)aL' - ap
a£
nv
v (l-a)£
v nv
One can verify in Cell 2 that the normalised and therefore constant expenditure
generates increasing utility due to the drop in price (P) as the number of firms (n)
increases. Hence, by the assumed proportionality between knowledge and the
number of existing varieties, the utility value of normalised consumption expenditure
can grow at a positive rate in equilibrium. According to Equation (3.8) this is the case
for sufficiently inelastic demand (low a) a sufficiently productive R&D sector (low a) a
large enough supply of labour (L*) and sufficiently patient consumers (low p). Of
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course this result does not depend on the normalisation chosen. If the price of a util,
P, had been normalised to 1, then the consumption budget (and wages) would grow
over time at rate g."°
In the variety expansion model presented above, the only form of innovation is
final output variety expansion. Only new entrants will therefore issue stock to finance
R&D activity. The incumbent firms do not have the means or the incentive (see
Equation (3.4)) to innovate in this model, but a capital market must exist in order to
allow entrepreneurs to use savings for the investment in product innovation."!
Grossman and Helpman show that positive long-run equilibrium growth can be
maintained even if knowledge-spillovers are less than proportional in Equation (3.6).
Also GDP growth, when it includes the value added of the R&D sector, adequately
measures the rate of technical change."? A similar set-up and in fact identical
results can be derived from a quality ladder version of this model as is illustrated in
Appendix 3B and Grossman and Helpman (1991b) Chapter 4. Romer (1990) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992) introduce process innovation as an expanding variety and
a quality ladder in intermediate goods, respectively. Technically and conceptually
they therefore differ very little from the two Grossman and Helpman models."3
Aghion and Howitt chose a process innovation interpretation, because they
focus on the welfare implications of the two externalities that exist in the quality
130 see for example Appendix 3C and Romer (1990).
" i By introducing new varieties incumbents would be eroding the profits on their existing varieties.
However small this erosion, they can never outbid the entrants for funds. Of course the authors
abstract here from a host of reasons why incumbents might actually be at an advantage in introducing
new products. A vast literature on imperfect information and the Schumpetarian hypothesis deals with
the implications of such admittedly more realistic assumptions. Still to the extent that future profits
drive the demand for R&D, the innovation driven growth models capture the elements of innovation
this thesis will focus upon.
"2 See Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Chapter 3 for further details.
133 /\s Grossman and Helpman (1991b) point out in their book the instant utility specifications can
easily be interpreted as intermediate production functions. To see the analogy one only has to
consider that the mathematical structure of the utility function could also describe how homogenous
final output is produced using a range of different intermediate goods, a heterogeneous input. Doing
that for variety expansion basically yields a specification like Romer (1990), whereasAghion and
Howitt (1992) present a model with quality ladders in intermediate products. The main difference
between these models and the models presented in the text comes from the fact that labour is now
combined with the intermediates to produce final output instead of being the single primary factor in
the model. See the derivations and synopsis tables presented in the Appendices 3C and D.
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ladder model."" Aghion and Howitt reintroduce the term "creative destruct/on" for
the negative spillover effect to stress the linkages to the Schumpetarian tradition.
Their model is also set up in more general terms than Grossman and Helpman's, as
Appendix 3C illustrates. In their model Aghion and Howitt show that two 'wrongs', a
positive externality due to the quality ladder and a negative one due to creative
destruction of rents, do not necessarily make a 'right' and socially optimal growth
may differ from private equilibrium.
Romer (1990) introduces process innovation by considering a two-stage
three-factor production function in which capital is a CES-aggregate of intermediate
products at the lowest l eve l . ^ in this model the key result is that knowledge
spillovers are required to maintain long-run positive growth rates as was illustrated
above.
3.1.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Comparison of the structure of the Tables 3.1 and 3B.1-3D.1 in the appendices
clearly illustrates how the models discussed fit a general structure, summarised in
Table 3.2 below. Although many have made generalisations and extensions in later
models, this general structure still constitutes the core of R&D driven growth models
in general and of the model to be presented in Chapter 4 in particular.
In the Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) models innovations respond to profit levels and as such labour market
developments caused by technological shocks were allowed to feed back into
technical change. In all models an exogenous productivity shock in R&D would for
example initially increase R&D labour demand and increase the innovation rate such
that production labour demand also rises. Then, due to competition between R&D
and production wages rise. This erodes profitability, reduces the value of innovations
" * As was shown in Appendix 3B. in a quality ladder model there is the positive knowledge spillover
from inherited quality, but the future replacement of firms by innovators reduces the ex ante value of
innovation and creates a negative externality.
"5 Cell 4 in the synopsis table of Appendix 3D shows that this capital aggregate is combined with
'human capital', H, and 'labour', L. at the highest level to produce a homogenous output. In Romer
(1990) R&D competes with final output production for human capital. H. not labour, L
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and in the long-run equilibrium the increase in demand for R&D is at least partially
reversed.
Technological deveiopments caused by labour market shocks also feed back
into the labour market. As Jones (1995} pointed out, a labour supply shock, for
example, would cause lower wages, generate higher rates of innovation and
consequently higher long-run wages and growth
Table 3.2: GENERAL STRUCTURE OF INNOVATION DRIVEN GROWTH MODELS
Choose savings/consumption Intertemporal Savings-and
to maximise intertemporal Budget Constraint Consumption
utility y+rK=£+AK S(r)(= AK)
E(r)=y+rK-S{r)
Choose consumption volumes Intratemporal Demand
to maximise intratemporal Budget Constraint Function
utility pC=£ C°(ft£J
Set prices to maximise profits Demand Functions Supply Schedule
C°(p,£) C*(p)
Choose inputs to minimise
costs
Production Function Input Demand
<?(X,L) Functions
X°(px), L°(w)
Set prices to maximise profits Demand Functions Supply schedule
Choose inputs to minimise
costs
Production Function Input Demand
XS(K,L) Functions
Set prices to maximise profits Demand Function Price-taking
Vc.x=f(nc.x)
Choose inputs to minimise
costs
Innovation Function Input Demand
R(K,L)=lnnovations Functions
L_
INTER-
TEMPORAL
9
10
EQWIUBRIUM CONDITIONS
All markets clear intra-temporally
K*<">(r)+ Kx°(r)+K°(r)=K(t).
X°(px)= XS(px) and C°(p,£)= C (^p)
Savings finance R&D inter- S(r*)=Rcj<(K*X*)V<y<
temporally
w*, p*, px*, r*
g*,K*
"6 in the Romer (1990) model that effect requires a positive shock to H, not L.
" ' Imperfect competition is assumed when innovation is interpreted as product innovation through
quality improvements or variety expansion in final goods. Otherwise the usual assumption is perfect
competition and price-taking. Step 3 is then trivial. Prices are fixed at minimum marginal costs.
'^* Imperfect competition is introduced here when innovation is interpreted process innovation
through quality improvements or variety expansion in intermediates. Otherwise intermediates are
trivial and disregarded.
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Jones (1995) criticised endogenous growth models for this property since it seems in
sharp contrast to the empirical evidence on demographics, R&D employment and
growth.*^ Despite this critique these models do identify the key elements for a
model that hopes to identify labour technology interaction mechanisms and are a
useful first step in explaining induced biases, as the next section will show.i*°
The models discussed so far have no or at best trivial implications for the
relative position of low skilled labour, admittedly because they did not aim to address
that issue. Those models that distinguish two types of labour, Romer (1990) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), have introduced manual labour in such a way that a fixed
share of total income is spent on a fixed amount of labour. Technical change takes
the form of or can be reduced to total factor augmenting innovation, leaving the
relative positions of high and low skilled labour unaffected. To extend the models in
that direction, the innovations that generate technical change should somehow be
made skill specific. This implies that, in addition to having (at least) two types of
labour, one has (at least) two types of innovations in one model. Combining two types
of innovation in one model, however, requires one to rethink some issues.
A first issue is patent protection. The variety expansion models by Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and many more assume that the patent
system provides perfect and indefinite protection to the innovator. This assumption
sanctions the monopolistic market structure in final or intermediate output markets
and the flow of monopoly rents generated thus lasts indefinitely. It declines over
time, however, due to the introduction of ever more varieties that compete for scarce
inputs in production.
The perfect patent protection assumption is dropped without blinking an eye
when quality improvements are considered. To replace the rent erosion due to
increased competition in input markets the possibility of being replaced is introduced
and reduces the value of an innovation. To deal with the possibility that many
"9 His critique is mainly aimed at the models' property that a high population growth rate would imply
a high and actually increasing GDP growth rate. As population growth rates are typically negatively
correlated to economic growth rates this is strongly contradicted in the data.
" ° Jones (1999) surveys the literature that emerged following his critique. Most models that
succeeded in addressing his points used more complicated innovation functions but borrow heavily
from the early work and mainly use the tools developed there. More importantly none of these newer
models deviates a lot from the general structure presented in Table 3.2.
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entrepreneurs try to improve the same product at the same time, both Grossman and
Helpman (1991b) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) introduce a stochastic lottery type
of innovation function in which only one entrepreneur can win and the losers have
wasted their effort, "*•
If one would like to combine different types of innovation in one model, there
is a choice to be made. Assuming life-long patent protection implies that no
producers can ever come in and steal a patent holder's business. This has
implications when combining product and process innovations. If patents are
protecting the product design, a new process, that produces that product cheaper
using a wider variety of or higher quality of inputs, is only valuable if the patent on the
product is owned or purchased first.
The assumption of indefinite patent protection for final and intermediate
products thus implies that the value of quality improvements or product specific
process innovations is limited to the add/t/ona/ discounted flow of rents that accrue
to the incumbent producer. The cost reductions generating such additional flows of
rent were already identified as a key driving force in the diffusion of new capital
equipment in Chapter 2. Th;s requires a m/nor but important change in the mode/fmg
of the R&D sector decision.
A second issue that could be raised here is that of R&D inputs. The models by
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) assume labour to be homogenous and the only
input in innovation and production. This assumption obviously will not stand in a
model with multiple skill levels. The assumption is generally made, however, to stress
the idea that labour has an alternative use in final or intermediate production, such
that the R&D sector must compete for its employment. That element of competition
in factor markets disappears when R&D is performed using a specialised factor such
as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) or final output."^
" i It can be seen in the Tables 3.1 and Appendix Tables 3B.1-3.D1 that the role of v(L""°)in the VE-
model is taken over by -Pr(L"*°)in the QL -models. Depending on the normalisation chosen, v is
either constant or grows at the common growth rate in QL-models so one has v(L"*°).
" ' Although of course the use of final output as an intermediate input in the innovation function can
be interpreted as using a two-stage innovation function where the first stage is identical to production.
This assumption implies innovation competes with consumers for intermediate inputs.
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It will come as no surprise that empirically the key input in R&D is high skilled
labour."^ it is also evident that these workers can be employed in current production
and the R&D sector must compete for them with other sectors in the economy. The
Romer (1990) model is slightly more sophisticated than the Grossman and Helpman
(1991) models in the sense that it does distinguish between human capital and
manual labour. In the aggregate final output production the two types of labour are
substitutes but Romer (1990) assumes a substitution elasticity of 1. The model
presented in Chapter 4 will be more general in that respect.
The next section proceeds with two model specifications by Acemoglu (2002a)
that formally illustrate the market size explanation, described in Chapter 1, by
implementing the general structure in a model with high and low skilled labour and
two skill specific variety expansion types of skill specific process innovation.
See for example Cameron (1998).
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3.2 MODELLING ENDOGENOUS BIAS IN INNOVATION
Acemoglu's models (1998, 2002a) are best known among the few recentattempts in the literature to link endogenous growth theory to the issue of biased
technical change."" Acemoglu considers aggregate skill biases in technical change
to be the result of (a wave of) innovations that are individually biased towards or, as
he calls it, comp/ementary to high skilled labour. To develop and adopt such
innovations is relatively profitable when high skilled wages are low. This biased
innovation then generates a shift in demand that, under normal circumstances,
generates rising relative wages and the bias in innovation would go back and forth,
always shifting towards complementing the relatively cheaper factor.*^ jh js would
be consistent with Hicks' original formulation of the induced bias hypothesis; as was
argued in Chapter 1, however, it is inconsistent with empirical facts.
Acemoglu introduced skill type specific innovations in various guises to
explain the paradoxical simultaneous decrease in relative wages and demand for low
skilled. In his models an exogenous supply shock causes a shift in innovation
towards complementing high skilled labour as in the older induced bias models.
Through knowledge spillover, however, the shock has a lasting positive effect on the
R&D productivity for that type of innovation. As this productivity increase translates
into a higher rate of skill complementary innovation, relative demand for skilled
labour shifts up. Under various specifications and restrictions Acemoglu shows that
the induced bias can be so strong that relative wages have to rise above their pre-
shock levels to re-establish long-run equilibrium. Figure 3.1 was taken from
Acemoglu (1998), p. 1057 and repeated from Chapter 1 to illustrate. Following the
relative supply shock relative wages drop, but as technology responds, they move up
to their long-run equilibrium level at C, which may lie above A. Acemoglu (2002a)
" * Another early paper was Kiley (1999), who pursued a similar modelling strategy as Acemoglu
(1998. 2002a). As was mentioned in Chapter 2 these models build on the older induced bias models
developed in the 60s. See Chapter 2 for more references.
"5 Note how close this is to normal substitution. In Acemoglu, however, an act of innovation is
required to make the switch towards higher skilled. Innovation also causes a permanent change in the
shape of the production possibilities frontier.
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labelled this the strong /nduced b/as hypothes/s. In Chapter 1 what follows it is also
referred to as the strong market s/ze effect. - • • •• •
Figure 3.1: THE MARKET SIZE EFFECT
A more formal treatment of the 2002 variety expansion model will show how
Acemoglu's work relates to the general class of innovation driven growth models
presented previously and the life cycle models presented later on.
3.2.1 A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS BIAS
Acemoglu (2002a) illustrates the strong market size effect in a variety expansion
model. Synopsis Table 3.3 presents Cells 1-6 in this model."^ Acemoglu introduces
consumers, final output producers and intermediate output producers, who face the
decisions discussed extensively above. Consumers in Cells 1 and 2 are trivial as they
consume the homogenous final output and their intertemporal time preferences
merely provide a constant interest rate at which the innovators can borrow later on.
" * Acemoglu (1998) introduces it into a quality ladder model. Both models are process innovation
models and have Cells 1 to 6 in Table 3.2 in common. Table 3.3 presents these common steps in the
familiar formal synopsis table.
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Table 3.3: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF ACEMOGLU ( 2 O O 2 A )
Basic Structure
AGENT(S)
^ ^ ^ I - i - . .V: £
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FINAL O U I ^ ^ ^ |
•P
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f „„-., Ul£(T))^  ^
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s.t. pC < £
Perfect Competition
max:R, = y(y*,yj-p
s.t. y(y»,yj=(b«yH
Perfect Competition
max rj, = p ^ - w j ^ -
s.t. y« = A^(x^,t)L
=> —
X,
max: n^  = x»x^ -
s.t. x,, = x / (
~* "" "„ + ! '
TO CONSTRAINT(S) - > RESULTS
- 1 ^ £(t) .^
^ £(t)
M(t)/dt
=^C = E/p
=> p = MC»l
Pi luvj
/ \o-l
+ b V 1* —^  p ^ Ly O a-i + 0 P o-l 1
^> 1^!L = 2.
Pi TJC^
-X^H and max:rr^  = p V - w l -XA
* s.t. v = A (x ,t)t-"
/ l ' ( x ° t ) t ) f ' / » ( x ° t ) L ' T " '
-to, and max:rT^ =x^x^-tc^
TIC, r5 Xi mC,
0 ^ + 1
Homogenous final output, V, is produced by a competitive sector in Cells 3 and 4
according to a CES-production function, combining two homogenous intermediate
inputs, VH and VL, produced in an earlier stage, by high and low skilled labour and a
skill specific range of sub-intermediates, XH.L, in Cells 5 and 6. These sub-
intermediates expand in variety in Acemoglu (2002a).^9
Finally, in Cell 7 two (groups of) monopolistic producers, who can choose a
price, ^Hx^uch that their profits provide an incentive to innovate, produce these sub-
"7 This structure is identical for the Acemoglu (1998) quality ladder model. See Appendix 3E.
"8 in Acemoglu (1998) the marginal utility of consumption is assumed constant and the interest rate
equals p, the rate of time preference, as in Aghion and Howitt (1992). In Acemoglu (2002a) the slightly
more general CIES specification of Romer (1990) is used. This, however, is trivial for the results.
" ^ And exhibit a quality ladder in Acemoglu (1998).
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intermediates. Compared to the general structure presented above, he thus
distinguishes one additional step in the production chain. By doing so, high and low
skilled labour are still substitutes in final output production but innovation can be
made skill specific. As is custom in innovation driven growth models, a separate R&D
sector 'produces' the innovations for each range of skill specific sub-intermediates.
Following the variety expansion model presented above, Acemoglu (2002a) assumes
deterministic innovation functions, indefinite patent protection and expanding
monopolistic competition.*5°
Acemoglu assumes the competition for resources between production and
innovation away for convenience. The model can be interpreted as a combination of
elements from the models discussed above. The main novelty in Acemoglu's work is
that there are now two types of innovations. One increases the productivity of high
and one that of low skilled labour. This allows him to link the re/at/Ve labour market
position of low skilled to technical change and analyse the feedbacks that emerge.
To model this skill specificity, innovation takes the form of increases in D* and nt, the
number of sub-intermediate goods in both sectors (Cell 6 in Table 3.4 below). The
value of a new design in both sectors is given by the present value of the monopoly
rents a new sub-intermediate producer can expect to receive.
Acemoglu (2002a) identifies and analyses two distinct innovation function
specifications. The resources required to innovate differ between these specifications
but they do share the property that two innovative activities compete for the same
pool of R&D resources. He refers to these specifications as the 'lab equipment'
specification, where new varieties are produced using units of final output as the
input, and the 'knowledge based' specification, where an exogenous supply of
scientists is allocated over low and high skilled complementary variety expansion.*si
The lab equipment specification is summarised in Table 3.4 below.
's° Also in line with the models discussed above, Acemoglu's (1998) quality ladder model assumes
probabilistic innovation functions, no patent protection and full displacement of the incumbent
monopolists.
" i In the former the R&D sector buys resources at a given price until marginal product equals
marginal costs. In the latter, the R&D sector employs a given amount of resources that earns a wage
that is equal to the marginal product at that employment level. The specifications are not that different
in that respect.
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A6tM(S)
Table 3.4: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF ACEMOGLU ( 2 0 0 2 A )
'Lab Equipment'-specification
PROBLEM(S) SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINT(S) => RESULTS
S MDLXLS S I C I OR/SKILL
•'RODUCER
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PRODUCER
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6
7
8
9
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In this specification a steady state in which relative prices and wages are constant,
implies that the innovation rate in both sectors is equal. Consumption, output and
R&D effort then grow in proportion to that rate such that growth can be sustained.*"
As is shown in Appendix 3E, the long-run elasticity of substitution between
high and low skilled labour is given by (l-a)/( a/3-l+ a) under this specification, which
is positive for /3>(1- cO/a.*"
The knowledge-based specification, summarised in Table 3.5, is more
interesting, because the externality is explicitly identified as a knowledge spillover
that generates growth. As will be shown below, it also relaxes the restriction on the
parameters a bit. In this specification an exogenous supply of scientists, R", uses a
stock of knowledge that has been accumulated over the past to invent new varieties.
Like Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Acemoglu (2002a) assumes that the
knowledge that has been accumulated is proportional to the number of varieties that
have been invented, r>H and ML.
In addition, this specification allows knowledge accumulated in one type of
innovation to be productive in the generation of innovations of the other type. The
parameter ( l-5)/2 in Cell 11= of Table 3.5 determines the degree of cross-sectoral
knowledge spil lover.^ Again a balanced growth path requires both ranges of
intermediates to expand at the same rate, such that the ratio n^/rii. is constant. This
time, however, long-run positive growth is possible even if there are diminishing
returns to the number of scientists.*^
' " The spillover that is essential for any endogenous growth model is here provided by growth itself.
More output reduces the price of output and hence the costs of R&D. Constant returns then ensures
the innovative effort grows with output. Introducing diminishing returns to lab equipment would imply
that non-zero steady state growth is not possible. Note also that the constant returns specification
implies that out of equilibrium all R&D investment is spent entirely on one or the other type of
innovations until the balanced growth path is reached.
"3 As this condition is identical to the one obtained in Acemoglu (1998), this result illustrates once
more that variety expansion and quality ladders can yield equivalent reduced form results.
* " Acemoglu actually only considers cases where <5>0 and cross-sectoral spillovers are smaller than
intra sectoral ones. In Sanders (2002) a slightly more general version with the possibility of
asymmetric spillovers - i.e. using different d's in the two equations - is considered. The next chapter
will present an even more general spillover structure.
"^ Even though Acemoglu (2002a) does not consider this generalisation. It will be argued in Chapter 4
that this is crucially important for the market size effect.
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AGENT(S)
Table 3.5:
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Also the strong market size effect is more likely to occur than in the lab equipment
model. The parameter restriction that has to hold for the long-run relative demand to
be upward sloping is now j3 > (l-5)(l-a)/a.^6 As the right hand side is now lower, this
condition is met for a larger range of j3.
For the model to have a stable steady state, however, an additional condition
now has to be met. Intuitively the reason is that, when cross-sectoral knowledge
spillovers are small, a lock-in in one type of innovation can emerge, such that relative
wages tend to 0 or infinity in the long run. In the extreme case of no such spillovers,
5=1, the knowledge accumulated by innovations of a given type only increase the
see Appendix 3E.
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productivity of scientists in that field and only one type of R&D is undertaken if high
and low skilled workers are substitutes, — — >1,OSR < - l . It turns out that this
situation will not occur when l+a/3/(l-a)<l/<5."" So one obtains after some
rearranging that the strong market size will emerge iff:
a/3 1 - 5
Hence the existence of the strong market size effect depends on the interaction of
demand and production parameters that enter the decision to innovate through
profitability and knowledge spillover parameters that affect the costs of R&D.
Acemoglu concludes that a low cross-sectoral knowledge spillover combined with a
high derived short-run elasticity of substitution makes the strong market size effect
more likely.
3.2.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the Acemoglu (2002a) model the Hicksian induced biases hypothesis is taken to
its extreme to explain the observed labour market trends in the US over the past 20
years or so. And the key predictions of his model are indeed consistent with the
observed facts in Chapter 1. As Figure 3.1 illustrated, relative wages first drop but
then rise in response to a high skilled supply increase as observed in the mid 70s. In
the 90s relative wages seem to stabilise at the new, higher level. However, some
questions remain. The strong market size effect requires high elasticities of
substitution to generate a bias strong enough to generate the results. Unfortunately
empirical evidence is inconclusive in this respect. Freeman (1986) concludes that
the elasticity is larger than 1 and 1.4 is often suggested. Only few find estimates
' " This condition implies that the steady state relative range nuAu is positive in relative labour supply,
which is necessary for the model to converge to a steady state. See Acemoglu (2002a) and Appendix
3E for details.
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above 2 . i ^ This range implies that the strong market size effect does not occur in
the lab equipment specification and depends on the knowledge spillover
specification in the knowledge-based model.
Finally, current output producers do not compete for R&D resources, implying
that the growth rate is fully determined by an exogenously given stock of
scientists.*^ These issues will be taken up in the next chapter. A final point to be
made here is that in the knowledge-based specification the strong market size effect
requires restrictions on the knowledge spillover parameter for which Acemoglu offers
no empirical or theoretical intuition. He remarks that empirical evidence is not
available and there are no a priori theoretical constraints. The former is beyond
dispute, but in the remainder of this chapter it will be argued that some a priori
intuition can be developed when the product life cycle is considered.
'58 in Chapter 4 the empirical evidence and the conditions for the strong market size effect are
discussed in more detail.
159 of course the bias in technical change, Acemoglu's main focus, is fully endogenised since the
allocation of the R&D resources over the two innovation types is endogenous.
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3.3 MODELLING THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
In this section two models from the literature are shortly discussed. They illustratehow product life cycles can be represented in models of innovation driven growth.
The models considered, Krugman (1979) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
address a seemingly very different topic than skill bias: the impact of product life
cycles on international specialisation and trade patterns. Still these models provide
the intuition to pin down the knowledge spillover parameters in Acemoglu's
knowledge-based innovation functions. As before the mathematical details of these
models are found in the appendices, Appendices 3F and 3G.
3.3.1 PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE MODELS
As was shown in Chapter 2 the idea of a product life cycle has been formulated early
on in the economic literature. Krugman (1979) noted, however, that the actual
modelling of this empirically robust phenomenon was taken up relatively slowly.
One m/grit have expected that phenomena wh/ch are of
recogn/zed /mportance and at the same t/me d/sp/ay c/ear
emp/'r/ca/ regu/ar/t/es wou/d have attracted the attent/on of
theorists. But there have been few attempts to introduce
techno/og/ca/ change /'nto the theory of /nternat/ona/ trade.
- Krugman (1979), p. 254 -
And he presented a model in which the life cycle of products plays a prominent role in
explaining the international pattern of specialisation and distribution of income. In
Muysken, Sanders and Van Zon (2001) it was shown that this model provides a
suitable basic framework for introducing product life cycles in a closed economy as
well. The basic idea in Krugman (1979) is that the North invents new products and
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has the exclusive capacity to produce them for some time.iso Then these new
products are imitated in the South and they start producing them as well. Both
'countries' are identical in all other respects. He assumes that there is no labour
mobility and free trade between the North and South.
Having the background in innovation driven growth models that was
developed in previous sections, it is easy to see that the exogenous invention and
imitation parameters in the Krugman model can be endogenised in an innovation
driven growth model.^i Grossman and Helpman (1991a) took up this issue. They
merely applied the endogenous innovations framework developed in Grossman and
Helpman (1991b) to the Krugman (1979) model. By introducing R&D sectors that
use labour to generate new designs (North) or actively acquire and imitate the
existing Northern designs (South), they present an endogenous innovation driven
product life cycle model.^2
In line with the endogenous innovation models discussed above, they
introduce monopolistic competition and entrepreneurs who innovate or reverse
engineer to obtain the resulting monopoly rents. As before, the entrepreneurs borrow
from consumers to finance the required R&D expenditures.
Deviating from custom in variety expansion models, however, patent
protection is not assumed to be perfect. Rents that flow to a successful Northern
innovator are not permanent. In this model Northern innovators run the risk of being
replaced in the world market by a low cost producer from the South. In the quality
ladder models mentioned above, there was a similar risk of being replaced by a local
competitor introducing a higher quality of the same variety. The risk of replacement
in this model is dealt with in the same way: the flow of profits in the North is
discounted at a higher rate to compensate for the replacement risk. Obviously this
risk depends positively on the reverse engineering efforts in the South.
**> Krugman does not assume that one firm holds this exclusive capacity. Perfect competition is
assumed in the North and South. Innovation is exogenous in this model. See Appendix 3F for a full
formal derivation of the Krugman model.
1 " Actually Kiugman's imitation rate is quasi-endogenous, since he assumes a fixed percentage of all
new goods is imitated. See Equation (3.11) below.
' " in Grossman and Helpman (1991c) a model is presented that illustrates how the product life cycle
operates in a quality ladder model. This model, however, needlessly complicates matters and, since
the model in Chapter 4 will feature variety expansion, it is less relevant.
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With monopolistic competition firms in the North set monopoly prices. As was derived
earlier, prices are thus a fixed mark-up over marginal costs. Grossman and Helpman
assume the latter to equal wages in both countries. Because Bertrand competition
drives the profits to zero if a second Northern producer imitates, no Northern
entrepreneur will do so, as they would be unable to recover the strictly positive
reverse engineering costs.*" Hence for every variety there is at most one Northern
producer. For the same reason there will also be at most one Southern firm imitating
it. Thus two possible equilibria exist in a single product market: an uncontested
Northern monopoly or a duopoly with one Northern and one Southern producer. If a
Southern competitor steps in, however, he has lower marginal costs due to the fact
that wages are lower in the South.*6" Hence he can and will undercut the Northern
competitor's marginal costs and take the entire world market for that product.
However, it depends on the wage gap between North and South whether he
can charge his monopoly price and still undercut his competitor. The maximum price
a Southern imitator can charge is the Northern firm's marginal costs. Therefore
Southern imitators' profits decrease rapidly when the wage gap is closed. This
implies that, when all varieties have been imitated and wages are equal, the
incentive to imitate a variety is zero as was the case for the Northern entrepreneurs.
This feature overcomes a rather peculiar feature of the knowledge spillover
structure assumed in the Grossman and Helpman model. They assume that the rate
of imitation is 'produced' using labour as an input according to:
(3.10)
Note that the knowledge spillover in this innovation function is strictly proportional to
previously imitated products, ns, whereas Krugman (1979) implicitly assumed an
i " Under Bertrand competition a duopolist sets his price optimally given his opponents price. His
opponent does the same and they end up undercutting each other until price equals marginal costs
and profits are zero. Any microeconomics textbook contains the details and proof. See for example
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
i " In an equilibrium with international specialisation this must be the case, as was already shown by
Krugman (1979).
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international knowledge spillover as imitation was an exogenously fixed percentage
as of the existing new products, /IN, implying:
" s = (3.11)
As opposed to Krugman (1979) it is therefore in principle possible in the Grossman
and Helpman (1991a) model to imitate non-existing varieties and ns can grow even if
n/v=O. Because of the above argument though, that will not happen in the
equilibrium.
Table 3.6: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 A )
AGENT(S)
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Table 3.6 (Continued): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN ( 1 9 9 1 A )
PROBLEM(S) SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINT(S)
C INDEXES COUNTRIES NORTH AND SOUTH
Price-taking in R&D
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Grossman and Heipman then show that there is a unique and stable steady state
equilibrium in their model. As in the Krugman model, the share of the North in the
total number of varieties is constant and both ns and n/v grow at the same rate.
Appendix 3G and Table 3.6 above present the Grossman and Heipman (1991a)
model formally and in full detail. The equilibrium innovation rate determines relative
wages as in the Krugman model. Due to the introduced feedbacks of wages on
innovation and imitation, however, the response to shocks is very different.
An increase in Northern labour supply for example, which in Krugman simply
lowered the Northern wage and had no impact on technology, increases the rate of
innovation in Grossman and Heipman (1991a) as Northern R&D employment
increases. Consequently the steady state demand for labour in the North increases
and relative wages may increase in favour of the N o r t h . ^ This terms of trade effect
is very similar to the Acemoglian market size effect discussed above. Grossman and
i*s This is formally derived in Appendix 3G.
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Helpman (1991a) also argue that in their model it may be strong enough to offset the
initial downward relative wage pressure. Once more the result depends on the
elasticity of substitution between Northern and Southern workers in aggregate world
output, as Grossman and Helpman essentially assume a zero cross-sectoral
(international) knowledge spillover.
3.3.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Whereas Krugman (1979) lacks the endogenous innovation element, the Grossman
and Helpman (1991a) specification suggests that there is no direct link between
introducing a product and introducing the 'innovation' that moves it to the next stage
in the cycle. Still it should be clear that both models are not just limited to studying
issues of international trade. Simply replacing 'Northern' by 'high skilled', 'Southern'
by 'low skilled' and interpreting 'imitation' as a process innovation that matures a
product and enables low skilled workers to produce it, yields models that provide
quite an adequate description of a stylised endogenous product life cycled The
high skilled produce products in the early stage of the life cycle and a resource
consuming act of innovation is required to make the transition from new to mature
product. There are, however, still some issues that have to be addressed if one wants
to interpret these models in a closed economy context.
First of all in the Grossman and Helpman (1991a) model, the R&D resources
can be used for final output production and R&D, but are not mobile between the
types of innovation. Southern workers earn Southern wages and Southern R&D
competes for them with Southern production. In a closed economy context, however,
it is more realistic to assume that low skilled workers earn low skilled wages and low
skilled complementary R&D competes for h/gfi skilled workers with high skilled
complementary R&D and new output producers.^?
'66 in fact the underlying idea behind the international product life cycle is that products move from
the skilled labour abundant North to the unskilled labour abundant South, precisely because the
production becomes less demanding.
'^' In Grossman and Helpman (1991a) this would be equivalent to assuming international labour
mobility for Northern workers only and assuming that imitation requires Northern workers' effort. As
will be shown in the next chapter, that minor adjustment will reduce the possibility of a strong market
size effect in their model.
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The second issue is patent protection. Without patent protection there are no
monopoly rents in the closed economy and with it imitation is prohibited. When
imitation is interpreted as moving a product into a mature stage, then patent
protection can only be assumed if, as was argued above, process innovators capture
only additional rents.iss
The final issue to be addressed is the knowledge spillover parameters. In the
models by Krugman and Grossman and Helpman these have not received much
attention and they have been set at mathematically convenient values. Grossman
and Helpman use 5=1, Krugman only implicitly suggests an extremely asymmetric
positive spillover from past product innovation to present imitation/process
innovation. Taking the life cycle seriously implies that more general and asymmetric
spillover structures should be considered. As was suggested in Krugman's (1979)
specification, product maturing process innovation is likely to benefit a lot more from
knowledge accumulated in product innovation than the other way around.
The next chapter will present a model that does so and introduces Acemoglu's
arbitrage between types of R&D into an appropriately reinterpreted innovation driven
product life cycle framework with arbitrage between production and R&D as in
Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
'** A similar result follows from assuming that process innovators can keep their innovation secret and
engage in Bertrand competition. In that case no patent protection is required.
99
3.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter several models have been presented. The explicit aim was tointroduce the mathematical tools necessary to build a model that can endogenise
the market size and the life cycle explanation for aggregate biases in technical
change offered in Chapter 1. It can be concluded that such a model must distinguish
at least two production sectors using high and low skilled labour respectively and two
R&D sectors that generate the technical change in them. The Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) life cycle model illustrated that the introduction of intertemporal
and international knowledge spillovers in R&D allows one to combine the life cycle
and endogenous growth. Acemoglu (2002a) illustrated that sector specificity of
innovation is required to allow for endogenous bias at the individual innovation level.
Still these models are inadequate to illustrate the full story outlined in Chapter
1. The Grossman and Helpman (1991a) model requires several adjustments to apply
to a closed economy with a high and low skilled sector, whereas the Acemoglu
(2002a) model provides no empirically or intuitively well-founded specification of the
innovation functions and has no life cycle structure. It would also be interesting to
see if the Acemoglu (2002a) model yields different results when the trade-off
between innovation and production is introduced and R&D must compete for its
resources with (one of) the final goods sectors. The next chapter will present a model
that incorporates all these elements. It allows one to analyse the strong market size
explanation and the life cycle explanation jointly and separately in a unified
framework.
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CHAPTER 4:
A MODEL OF TECHNICAL CHANGE AND
LABOUR DEMAND
The models presented in Chapter 3 studied life cycle dynamics andendogenous individual biases separately. In this chapter a model that isgeneral enough to incorporate both the market size effect and the life cycle
effect is developed. The market size effect turns out to be very sensitive to the exact
specification of the model. The life cycle explanation on the other hand is quite
robust. In light of this result it can be concluded that the life cycle hypothesis is an
interesting alternative explanation for the drop in relative demand for low skilled
workers.
Section 1 presents a general model that allows for several specifications,
varying from an adapted Grossman and Helpman (1991a)-like endogenous life cycle
model to an Acemoglian (2002) model of endogenous individual biases.^9 The
model is built up along the lines of a standard final output variety expansion model
as described above. To stress the linkages with these models it too is presented in a
formal synopsis table. The mathematical details are presented in the appendices to
this chapter.*™
Section 2 analyses the comparative statics in the steady state equilibrium.
From this analysis it is concluded that the strong market size effect is an interesting
but not a very general steady state result. In particular the introduction of diminishing
returns in R&D, often advocated to deal with the Jones' Critique, mentioned in
Chapter 2, proves devastating to the strong market size effect.
i® To construct a model that can hold both a closed economy interpretation of Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) and a final output variety expansion version of Acemoglu (2002a) requires several
minor changes to the assumptions. The general model will therefore not exactly reproduce their
results as special cases but contains specifications in which their primary mechanisms are
reproduced.
" ° These appendices are downloadable at www.marksanders.nl.
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To evaluate the complementary life cycle hypothesis proposed in Chapter 1, however,
comparative statics analysis alone is inadequate. The life cycle explanation attributes
(a part) of the shift in US demand to a temporary acceleration in high skilled
complementary ICT-related product innovation. By definition such a shock does not
affect the steady state and will therefore not show up in comparative statics analysis.
Section 3 therefore turns to transitional dynamics in the model. The absence
of an analytical solution to the general model makes it too complex for more
traditional, analytical transitional dynamics. Therefore 'real time' numerical
simulations are presented to bring out the response that such a temporary shock
implies. Numerical simulation generates hypothetical time series that illustrate both
the transitional dynamics and steady state equilibrium effects of exogenous shocks
in an intuitively appealing way. However, there is also the disadvantage of specificity.
The specificity problem is all the more pressing as the presentation and discussion of
numerical simulation results is quite extensive and one has to be selective on what
specifications to present.
Therefore some time is spent to justify the values chosen for parameters in
the model. Then Section 3 presents a baseline simulation for 2 versions of 8
different specifications. These simulations show that the model has a stable steady
state equilibrium that can be calibrated in such a way that they reproduce the
situation in the US in the mid 70s. By introducing an exogenous shock to relative
labour supply, the strong market size effect is illustrated in some specifications.
In Section 4 the simulations combine the exogenous labour supply shock with
a calibrated R&D productivity shock that represents the introduction of a new general
purpose technology. Such a shock can yield the desired relative wage shift in all
specifications. In this section the aim is to establish the empirical plausibility of the
life cycle hypothesis by reproducing the stylised facts without getting lost in inevitable
data problems and econometric details.
In addition to providing a possible explanation for the US experience, the
general model also provides a summary of recent models of endogenous biases in
technical change. It allows one to study several linkages between technical change
and the demand for labour and as such it sets the stage for the analysis of labour
market institutions and their {lack of) interaction with technology in the next part.
102
4.i A GENERAL MODEL
The model presented here is an endogenous variety expansion model that followspretty much the same steps as outlined in the previous chapter. This can be
verified in the formal synopsis in Table 4 .1 .
Table 4.1: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
max: fe " logL/(E(T))dT
s.t
max:U(.) = Jc(/y di
Vo
s.t. fp(/)c(i)d/<£
= _ i iff 1^
",(/) n, X,
In Cell 1, consumers save and consume in a by now standard fashion. Maximisation
of the love of variety direct utility function in Cell 2 generates the required iso-elastic
demand curves for goods that are symmetric in all aspects except the production
method. In Cell 3 the monopolistic producers set prices as a mark-up over marginal
costs to maximise profits. In Cell 4 diminishing returns in production imply that
marginal costs are a function of wages and employment when costs are minimised.
While Krugman (1979) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a) assumed constant
"iwhereX, s 1 + p^-
103
returns, this generalisation brings the model in line with the Acemoglu (1998, 2002a)
models presented above. For convenience a variable Xs was defined to represent the
total expenditure on goods of type S={H, L}. Note that this variable depends positively
on total expenditure, the relative number of varieties per type and the productivity of
labour in both sectors but negatively on relative wages.
Note also that when these relative variables are constant, as they will be in
the steady state, total expenditure on goods of type S is also constant when total
expenditure is normalised to 1. In Cell 5 this implies that profits fall at the growth rate
of the relevant variety range. From Cell 4 one can derive relative labour demand in
function of relative wages. It is conditional on the relative size of the varieties ranges
and given by:
(4.1)
For given relative employment levels, for example when exogenous inelastic labour
supplies are assumed, Equation (4.1) can be rewritten to trace out a concave upward
sloping curve in nn/ni.-wn/W(.-space. This curve represents the labour market
equilibrium in the short run and therefore also in the steady state. In what follows it
will be referred to as the Product Market Arbitrage or P/VM-curve as it equates the
relative marginal product of labour in production to the relative wage. This curve is
constructed graphically in Figure 4.1 below. In the right panel the labour market is
depicted. An exogenous relative supply is equated to a relative demand that is
conditional on DH/ML- TWO relative demand curves have been drawn and were
labelled Zi and Z2. By plotting the equilibrium wage with these curves against the
corresponding values for DH/DL one obtains the P/vM-curve in the left panel. Intuitively
this curve is upward sloping as the employment level per variety is negatively related
to the relative number of varieties per range and therefore positively to the relative
marginal value product.*"
i " It is concave because demand is convexly downward sloping in the relative wage. Hence an ever-
larger increase in n^/rii. is required to push relative demand out and relative wages up by the same
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Figure 4.1: GRAPHICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE P/MA-CURVE
The figure also illustrates the impact of an increase in relative labour supply. For
every Df/ru the relative wage now drops. Consequently an increase in relative supply,
L H / U , will cause the P/VM-curve to rotate down and to the right as is illustrated in the
left panel."^
So far the model closely followed the standard models of Chapter 3. There is a
lot more to tell about the R&D cells (Table 4.1 is continued below). Like before in Cell
6 it is assumed that innovations are priced competitively and therefore an innovation
percentage. This is easily verified by solving Equation (4.1) for relative wages. The exponent on
is less than 1.
"3 Note that the short-run elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labour can be derived
and is strictly negative. Its absolute value is given by: o^ = . This expression is identical to the
l-or/3
elasticity of substitution in the Acemoglu (2002a) model for given A, see Equation (3E.10), but slightly
different from the derived elasticity when A is interpreted as a variety of differentiated capital goods,
see Equation (3E.46). The difference is the result of total demand for differentiated capital goods
being proportional to labour when A is subject to optimisation. It also corresponds to the Grossman
and Helpman (1991a) model (see Equations 3G.15 and 3G.16) that assume constant returns to
labour (|3=1).
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is valued at the discounted profit flow it will generate. In absence of a product life
cycle, the value of an innovation is equal to the discounted profit flow, as usual.
Table 4 .1 (continued): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
AGENT(S) M(S) SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINT(S)
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In a closed economy product life cycle model, however, patent protection implies that
the incumbent producers of new products cannot be competed out of the market.
Even if the entrant has a process that allows him to produce at lower cost with low
skilled labour. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, this implies that only the
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discounted add/t/ona/ profit flow is the return to the entrant, as he must compensate
the incumbent or sell his process innovation to him at his maximum willingness to
pay. In Cell 6 a switch variable, A={O,1}, has been introduced to enable the product
life cycle.
In Cell 7 the innovation functions are introduced. The most obvious extension
to the models in Chapter 3 is the very general Cobb-Douglas knowledge spillover
structure that was assumed. With this general structure Grossman and Helpman's
(1991a) life cycle, the knowledge based specification in Acemoglu (2002a) and an
infinite number of other structures can be analysed. A subtler but also important
generalisation is the innovation output elasticity of R&D resources, y. It will be shown
that this turns out to be quite a significant parameter for the strong market size
effect. At any rate this extension is required when numerical simulation is
considered."'* Finally it is important to note that in a product life cycle model, A=l,
one R&D sector expands the total range of varieties, whereas the other R&D sector
moves them from the first to the second stage. In the non-life cycle models both
ranges are expanded independently and merely add up to the total range. Note that
the life cycle operator, A, is used again to switch between specifications in the
general set of innovation functions:
ri = n n^-"X
R
where
0 < y < 1
0 < <p < 1
o < * < 1
0 < v < 1
Setting A=0, (=(l-5)/2, y= l , x=( l+5)/2, <p=0, i//=0, yields the Acemoglian (2002a)
structure. Setting A=l , £=0, y= l , x=0, (p=l, <//=0 yields Grossman and Helpman's
" * It can be verified in Cell 7 that the allocation of R&D resources will end up in a corner solution out
of equilibrium otherwise. With constant returns in both applications, the entire available R&D
resources would switch to one or the other type of innovation until the steady state is reached (or
overshot). One can imagine that in the numerical simulations of transitional dynamics, in particular
with endogenous allocation of high skilled labour over production and innovation, this is very
inconvenient.
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(1991a) specification."5 With A equals 0 one has a standard two-sector innovation
driven growth model, where, by the lack of strong intuitions on spillover parameter
values, it is natural to assume knowledge spillovers to be symmetric. In Equation
(4.2) one can distinguish /ntra-sectora/, cross-sectora/ and jo/nt knowledge spillovers.
When knowledge is represented by the number of innovations made in each sector
the intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers are represented by (1- (// )( l -0 and (1- <p)x. The
cross-sectoral knowledge spillovers by (1- ij/ )? and (1- (p)(l- x). and the joint
knowledge spillovers by <p and </J. For the symmetric types of models, such as for
example Acemoglu (2002a) one would therefore typically assume:
<P = V
Obviously parameter A equals 1 in any life cycle model, but the existence of a life
cycle also provides a stronger intuition on the knowledge spillover parameters. It is
intuitively plausible that process R&D benefits more from product R&D than the
reverse. Knowledge about the product is required to design or improve the process.
Product R&D, on the other hand, benefits more from the general level of knowledge
that has accumulated, as process R&D is by its nature more applied and product
specific. Hence in a product life cycle model it would seem appropriate to assume:*^
(4.4)
The specification of Equation (4.2) also determines to a large extent the possibilities
for the market size effect to emerge. To see this, one should consider the steady
i " This does not imply that the entire model is equivalent to theirs, only the innovation functions are.
As was mentioned before, in the original Grossman and Helpman (1991a) model there is no perfect
patent protection and international immobility of labour. The original Acemoglu (2002a) model has
labour and a variety of intermediates combine into homogenous final output, whereas here labour
produces a variety of final output directly. This causes a slightly different relative profit and hence
innovation value function but with similar characteristics.
"® Strictly speaking cp now represents intra-sectoral knowledge spillover in research, whereas ^
represents joint knowledge or even cross-sectoral knowledge spillover in development. Also (1- i//)(l-0.
(1- <p)x. (1- V) (and (1- ip)(l-x) have different interpretations. Still these parameters will be referred to
as intra-, cross- and joint-knowledge spillovers respectively to avoid confusion.
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state in this model. As Figure 4.1 already illustrated a steady state equilibrium
requires a stable relative number of varieties in both ranges, nn/ni., that must lie on
the PMA-curve. In addition to the P/VM a second relationship between relative wages
and /IK/ML can be derived from the information in Cells 7 and 8. Cell 7 allows one to
derive the relative effort in both types of R&D. The steady state condition in line 2 of
Cell 8 can be combined with the innovation functions to derive the relative effort for
which the ranges all grow at the same rate. Setting these equal yields an expression
for the relative value of innovations in the steady state, which, by substituting for
profits, is a function of relative wages and the relative size of the variety ranges
only.*" This relationship can be labelled the Research and Development Arbitrage
curve or RDA-curve as it traces out the combinations of relative wages and the
relative number of varieties in both ranges, n^ni., for which the R&D sector has no
incentive to reallocate means and both goods ranges grow at the same rate. For the
general case it is given by:*™
l-ofi
(4.5)
Relative wages enter through relative profits, which affect the relative value of
innovations. The relative ranges enter through the knowledge spillover assumed in
the innovation function. Figure 4.2 shows the three basic shapes that the RDA-curve
can take on around the steady state, convex downward sloping, concave upward
sloping and finally convex upward sloping.
With strong intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers the curve is upward sloping.
Higher relative wages are required in equilibrium to reduce the incentive to invest
R&D resources in the sector with the larger knowledge base. If knowledge spillovers
are largely cross sectoral, however, it could be that lower relative wages are required
to offset the incentive to invest R&D resources in the smaller sector.
" ' See Appendix 4A.
"s ibid.
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Figure 4.2: THE SHAPES OF THE RD-4-CuRVE
The white arrows indicate the direction in which n^/rii. will change when one starts in
a point off the RD/A-curve. Below the RQA-curve nn/ni. will grow. The intuition is quite
straightforward. In that situation relative wages are, given the available knowledge
stocks, too low. Consequently relative profits are too high and this provokes too much
investment in high skilled complementary innovation, causing n^/rii. to rise. Hence
the equilibrium is only stable if the RD^-curve intersects the P/VM-curve from above
and it can be verified that the RDA Ill-curve yields unstable equilibria.^9
Hence only in the second case (RD/\ II) will relative wages rise in response to a
relative employment shift.^° As Acemoglu (2002a) has pointed out, the short-run
elasticity of substitution, OSR=1/(1-O/3), plays a big role in determining the shape of
the RDA-curve. But Equation (4.5) indicates that it is also determined to a large
extent by the innovation functions chosen in Equation (4.2). Appendix 4C and the
'™ See also Appendix 4B.
•so The expansion of relative high skilled employment will rotate the P/VM-curve to the right and down.
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next section analyse the specifications of the R&D sector and the resulting properties
of the RDA-curve further.
First shortly consider the remaining cells in the synopsis table. In Cell 8 the
allocation of high skilled labour over R&D and final output production is still to be
determined. As can be seen in Cell 8, the general model can be set up such that R&D
competes for high skilled labour. This implies that the wages paid in R&D must equal
those in production in equilibrium. In Appendix 4A the two resulting steady state
relationships between the high skilled wage level and the relative number of varieties
per sector, nn/ni. are derived.^i The existence of the market size effect and the life
cycle implications of introducing a new general purpose technology, however, can be
fully described by the characteristics of the RD/4-PMA interaction. As there is no
analytical solution in the general model, Cell 9 contains no equilibrium growth rate in
parameters and exogenous variables only.
Figure 4.3: STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM
i " This extension is of little importance at this point, as it only implies that at lower high skilled wages
there is not only a reaiiocation from low to high skilled labour using innovation within R&D, but also a
larger overall demand for and employment of high skilled labour in R&D. This ceteris paribus increases
both innovation rates but has no implications for the market size effect or the relative position of low
and high skilled labour. It is the relative allocation of R&D that matters for the evolution of the relative
size of variety ranges that in turn determines the relative wage.
I l l
Combining Figures 4.1 and 4.2 yields the complete model in Figure 4.3 above.
Starting from a point such as A in the right panel, the corresponding position on the
PMA relative to the RDA-curve determines that n^/rii. will grow. As fin/rii. increases,
the relative labour demand curve in the right panel shifts out and relative wages
increase. In the left panel the economy moves up along the P/vJA-curve. This process
stops and the model is in steady state equilibrium when the intersection of P/WA and
RDA is reached at points 6.
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4.2 COMPARATIVE STATICS IN THE STEADY STATE
In this section a comparative statics analysis of the model identifies under whatspecifications the strong market size effect occurs and when it is lost. Since the
strong market size effect is a steady state property of the model, one can analyse
under what conditions it will prevail by analysing how the steady state relative wage
responds to a positive shock in relative supply. For some specifications one can
calculate the long-run elasticity of substitution directly, but as was argued above, in
general its sign crucially depends on the shape of the RDA-curve, the combination of
relative wages and n^/ru for which there is no incentive to reallocate R&D resources.
Subsection 4.2.1 starts by analysing the more generalised knowledge
spillover structure proposed in Equation (4.2) in a specification that is otherwise very
close to Acemoglu (2002a). In this particular subclass of specifications, the long-run
elasticity can still be derived analytically. Then some generalisations are analysed
one by one to investigate their impact on the sign of the long-run elasticity by
numerically analysing the shape of the RDA. Table 4.2 gives a schematic overview of
this section.
Table 4.2: GENERALISATIONS CONSIDERED
In Subsection 4.2.1 diminishing returns to scale in R&D are considered. Then the
product life cycle is introduced. As the analytical solution is lost at this point,
Subsection 4.2.2 relies on graphical analysis. Using that technique the impact of
endogenisingthe allocation of high skilled labour can also be considered.
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4.2.1 THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIMINISHING RETURNS TO SCALE IN R&D
The RDA in Equation (4.5) gives us the relative wage in function of nn/ni.. If one
assumes /.H=f-H* and A=0 as in Acemoglu, one can use Equation (4.1), the PMA, to
solve for z and substitute into Equation (4.5), the RDA, to obtain the relative wage in
function of relative supply and the relative wage itself. Dividing both sides by the
relative wage and taking the total derivative one obtains the growth rate of the
relative wage as a function of the growth rate of relative supply and the level of
relative supply and relative wages. Using Equation (4.5) again to substitute for
relative wages one then obtains the long-run elasticity as a function of exogenous
labour supplies, parameters and n^/riL alone. This procedure, however, can only be
applied when A is equal to 0 and high skilled labour only produces final output. For
the general model under those restrictions the percentage change in steady state
relative wages in response to a percentage change in relative supply is given by:^2
The market size effect exists and the long-run elasticity will now be positive
whenever:
(4.7)
The right hand side of this inequality is positive and larger than 1, as empirical
evidence suggests that the short-run elasticity of substitution lies between 1 and
2.183 Because the denominator on the left hand side can be positive under the
general parameter restrictions and can be set arbitrarily close to 0, there are many
combinations of the knowledge spillover parameters that satisfy the above condition
'82 See Appendix 4C.
i*3 See also Subsection 4.3.1.
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for the strong market size effect. By choosing y= l , (=(l-<5)/2, x=(l+<5)/2, cp=O and
i//=0, Acemoglu (2002a) reduces the parameter space to a strictly symmetric (x=l-0
one-parameter knowledge spillover structure, where 'own' spillover effects are always
larger than cross-sectoral spillovers (x>0.5). He obtains:^" . :, -
(4.8)
As was mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence seems to suggest 1<OSR<2 and the
strong market size effect appears as long as 5 is not too large. As Acemoglu (2002a)
indicated the condition in Equation (4.7) fails in this model when the elasticity of
substitution is too close to 1. Still he concluded that, since there is no a priori
intuition about the value of 5, the market size effect is a plausible explanation for the
deterioration in relative wages and employment for the low skilled in the United
States over the 80s.
One should realise, however, that the implied long-run elasticity goes to
infinity or minus infinity as 5 approaches (OSR -1)/OSR, making it very large and
sensitive to small perturbations in the parameters space. In addition, looking at
Equation (4.7), it should be noted that the impact of the knowledge spillover
structure is much more complex and important than Acemoglu's (2002) model
suggests. In Equation (4.7) the first and second terms in the denominator on the left-
hand side are linked to the spillover terms of high skilled complementary innovation
on the generation of high and low skilled complementary innovations respectively. In
the Acemoglu (2002a) model, where these 'machines' are intentionally biased
towards one or the other type of labour, it might be natural to assume the former to
be larger than the latter. In the product life cycle models of Krugman (1979),
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Sanders (2002), however, it is more natural to
assume the opposite.
The fifth term in the denominator reflects the spillover effect of the expansion
of the total range of goods on product range expansion (cp) and process development
(<//). Acemoglu (2002a) conveniently sets these parameters to 0, such that the
" * See also Equation (4.6).
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condition does not depend on the value of z. In the life cycle models seen so far
these parameters were 1 and 0 respectively. In general the strong market size effect
depends on the relative size of the variety ranges as long as these parameters differ
from each other. A situation the product life cycle makes intuitively plausible.
Finally, in Equation (4.6) it is easily checked that the derivative of the long-run
elasticity with respect to y is positive, so decreasing y decreases the long-run
elasticity. 185 Beyond y=l-(l-<p)x+(l-^K-(cp-ij/)z/(l+z), however, the denominator in the
first term will drop below 0 and so does the long-run elasticity. The strong market size
effect therefore crucially depends on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in
R&D, a point that was not recognised by Acemoglu (2002a).
4.2.2 THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
To introduce the product life cycle extension the switch parameter A is set to 1. Now
the value of low skilled complementary process innovations is reduced by the
compensation of the patent holder of the corresponding product. It also rearranges
the knowledge spillover structure in the innovation functions, such that processes
can only be developed for existing products and only product innovation expands the
total available variety range. Consider Equation (4.5) under this restriction:
(l-ip);Hl-<y)< o-w+y-l
(4.9)
It is shown in Appendix 4C that this RQ4-curve now has two possible shapes as in
Figure 4.4.
"5 n is interesting to point out at this stage that Acemoglu (2002a) suggested that introducing
diminishing returns to R&D effort would not affect his general conclusions and could overcome the
Jones' (1995) Critique that his model, like all innovation driven models, is also vulnerable to.
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Figure 4.4: LONG-RUN RELATIVE WAGE RESPONSE TO A SUPPLY SHOCK
A necessary condition derived for the RDA-curve to be of type II and the model to
generate a strong market size effect, at least for some part of the domain, is derived
in Appendix 4C and given by:*^
(4.10)
As can be verified in Equation (4.10), the presence of strong diminishing returns will
reduce the scope for the strong market size effect, as was the case without the
product life cycle extension. In addition Equation (4.10) tells us that intra-sectoral
knowledge spillover must be relatively strong in product innovation (high (p and (1-
(|/)(l-0). as was the case before. As the product life cycle intuitively imposes a strong
cross-sectoral knowledge spillover towards process innovation, however, the strong
market size effect is less likely to occur when the product life cycle extension is
considered.
' * Note also that the type II RDA in principle allows for multiple steady states. The stable ones are
those where the RQA-curve intersects the P/HA from above. This theoretical possibility is less relevant
here as multiple stable equilibria (at most 2) will not occur under realistic parameter values in the
specifications analysed below.
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4.2.3 ENDOGENISING THE ALLOCATION OF HIGH SKILLED LABOUR
When the allocation of high skilled labour between R&D and manufacturing is
endogenous, the shift in the P/VM-curve in response to a given relative supply shock
is no longer given. The downward shift may be less pronounced when additional high
skilled workers move into R&D. However, as an increase in R&D employment will
always reduce the marginal productivity in R&D and thereby reduce wages paid in
that sector, at least some of the additional high skilled workers will move into
manufacturing. As long as some do, the long-run shift in the P/VM-curve will be
downward. The size of the shift no longer depends on the size of the exogenous
shock alone. It also depends on the relative elasticity of demand in Research,
Development and Manufacturing. But as the RDA-curve is not affected by changes in
relative employment levels in manufacturing, the model will or will not generate the
market size effect under the same conditions that were derived above. This rather
intuitively derived result will be corroborated in the numerical simulation experiments
presented below.
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4.3 BASELINE SIMULATIONS OF THE MARKET SIZE EFFECT
When the model is numerically solved, the steady state relative wage responseto a shock in relative supply can simply be calculated. For a numerical solution
to make sense, however, parameters and exogenous variables have to be set at
reasonable values. As the remainder of this thesis will rely heavily on numerical
analyses of the model, it is useful to first set and justify the numerical values for
exogenous variables and parameters, used in that analysis.
Exogenous variables typically pose little problems, as they can generally be
observed in the data. All relevant data for the US was presented in Section 1.1 and
will shortly be recapitulated. Parameters on the other hand come in three sorts. First
there are est/mated parameters on which a lot of empirical research has been
conducted. A short overview of the empirical results will do to set realistic and
justifiable values for these parameters and determine the appropriate range for
sensitivity tests. The remainder can be split in what one might label specif/cat/on and
ca//brat/on parameters. Examples of the former are the knowledge spillover
parameters in the innovation functions, as they differ between a life cycle model and
a symmetric model. As this section will test several specifications, each specification
has its own vector of specification parameters.
Having set estimated and specification parameters and using the exogenous
variables, the remainder of the parameters can be calibrated such that endogenous
variables in the model replicate observed data as well. This implies that each
specification has its own calibration parameter values. Admittedly this reduces the
model to a tautology for the period that is used for calibration but not for the
response to subsequent exogenous shocks. The model predictions can be compared
to developments in endogenous variables in the model. At the very least a fully
calibrated model still illustrates that the structure of the model is consistent with the
data.
After setting the numerical values, a subsection will present the baseline
simulations of the model for 16 specifications. Some do and some do not have the
market size effect. In addition it must be concluded from the analysis that some of
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the specifications tested here can even replicate the relative wage shock observed in
the US from the strong market size effect alone. The analysis will also show, however,
that the size and direction of the relative wage change is sensitive to specification
and parameter changes.
In the next section the general purpose technology related temporary positive
shock to relative R&D productivity is introduced. This shock can be calibrated to
generate wage patterns that are comparable to US relative wage behaviour over the
80s. These simulations do not prove that this mechanism underlies observed wage
behaviour, but it illustrates that the possibility requires serious consideration.
4.3.1 PARAMETERS AND EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
Since the whole recent debate on endogenous biases is centred around the labour
market shifts in the US over the 80s and 90s, it is natural to start from the US data
presented in Section 1.1 to set the exogenous variables for the baseline run. In
Figure 1.1 it can be verified that the relative supply of low skilled workers decreased
continuously from about 3.6 to 1.4 over 30 years. Normalising total labour supply,
LL*+/-H*, to 1000, these numbers imply that LH* should be set to about 225
(1000/(1+3.6)) for the early 70s and increased to about 400 (1000/(1+1.4)) over
some 30 years. By implication LL* then falls from an initial 775 to 600 over that
period.
Data in the OECD (2000) show that about 0.6% of the total labour force was
employed in R&D in the US in 1975.^'' However, they also argue that this number is
an underestimation of total effort in innovation activity and to double that number
would be more appropriate. Since labour constitutes the major input in R&D set R*,
the exogenous supply of R&D resources equal to 0.012*1000=12.">8
18' This number increased to about 0.8% by the early 90s.
is* Note that in half of the specifications analysed in the next subsection, the number of workers
allocated to R&D is in fact an endogenous variable. The observed R&D employment level is used to
calibrate a parameter below.
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As was mentioned, the general model has three types of parameters for which there
are no direct observations available: est/mated, spec/ffcat/'on and ca/ft>rat/on
parameters. In the following the parameters are set in this order.
The estimated parameters, on which empirical research is available, are the
elasticity of substitution in demand I /a , the output elasticity of labour, p, the output
elasticity of labour in R&D, y, and the subjective rate of discount, p. As was shown
earlier in Equation (4.1), the first two parameters can, by consolidating the model, be
linked directly to the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labour in
production.
Freeman (1986) surveys the empirical literature in this field and concludes
that this elasticity most likely lies somewhere between 1 and 2, although values of 8
and above have been repor ted.^ Typically, however, these elasticities are estimated
as the inverse of the coefficient in a regression of the natural log or percentage
change of relative wages on the natural log or percentage change in relative supply.
Taking the first difference in natural log of Equation (4.1) immediately shows that
these estimates are hard to link directly to a/3 when technology is biased
endogenously:
(4.11)
l - a / 3
Because the second term is omitted, the estimates are biased in these regressions
when time series data are used as technical change is correlated with wages in the
model above.iso The problem is that movements along the production possibilities
frontier due to substitution cannot be separated from simultaneous movements of
the frontier itself due to technical change. In the models presented here the elasticity
increases in the long run as technical change responds to the supply shift. ^ This
is* See also the references in Chapter 1, p. 16.
**> This is known in the literature as the Daimond-McFadden-Rodriguez Non-Identification Theorem.
The empirical estimates are typically obtained under the assumption that technology is the same over
time or across firms and the observations represent different points on the same isoquant. In reality,
however, the isoquants shift due to technical change and possibly these shifts are biased. See
Binswanger (1974) for a discussion of the non-identification problem and the solutions he suggests,
" i This is a property that Acemoglu (2002a) refers to as the LeChatelier-Principle.
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implies that the elasticities obtained using time series are biased upwards and
provide at best an upper bound for the short-run elasticity of substitution, 1/(1- aj3),
in the model.
Cross-section results are suspect for another reason. Because the wage and
relative supply are determined simultaneously, especially when observations are
used on well-integrated labour markets such as the US-states, the estimated
elasticities are also biased. Across countries these problems are less pronounced but
there the classification of skill levels usually poses a problem. Tinbergen (1974)
addressed this issue explicitly and showed that the bias is upwards as well. In his
own analysis he finds elasticities between 0.4 and 2.1, implying a/3 should lie
between -1.5 and 0.5.
However, in the model a/3 is only indirectly linked to the elasticity of
substitution. In fact the a is linked to the elasticity of demand for final output and j3
parameterises the diminishing returns in production. By the monopolistic competition
assumed in the model both are therefore also linked to the profitability of final output
production. The model predicts that producers appropriate a share of (l-a/3) of all
expenditure on their product as rents. This property precludes the use of negative
values for aj3 in the simulations. Furthermore in equilibrium these rents are used to
pay the investors that financed R&D. This would suggest that a/3 should be as large
as 0.8, the labour share in income. Considering the fact that monopoly power is not
absolute in reality, the actual profit share provides a lower bound for (l-a/3) at 0.2,
implying an upper bound at a/3=0.8. The implied elasticity of substitution would then
be as high as 5. In the simulations a/3=0.48 (0.6*0.8) will be used, taking what
Acemoglu (2002a) considers the highest possible realistic estimate. One should bear
in mind, however, that lower values for a/3 are more realistic when considering the
evidence on substitution elasticities.
Nadiri (1993) discusses at length the available empirical evidence on the
second estimated parameter, y, in the innovation functions. The relationship between
R&D inputs and outputs has been the subject of many empirical studies. Griliches
(1979,1984) dedicated most of his work to it and Mansfield (1980, 1984) and Jaffe
(1986, 1988) also feature prominently in this literature. The estimates for y, the
output elasticity of R&D inputs, in this literature range from 0.2 to 1. Nadiri (1993)
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argues that it is more likely that this parameter is close to 1 in the late 70s. The
lowest estimates are typically obtained in time series analysis on small firms using
plain domestic patent counts as R&D output measure. Correcting patent counts for
quality differences as in Pakes and Simpson (1989) and Schankerman (1998),
discounting R&D expenditures with appropriate (higher) deflators and using cross-
section data and large firms all push the estimates up.
However, the output elasticity of R&D when inputs are measured in euros and
output in patents is quite far from the output elasticity of high skilled labour in the
innovations function as specified above. Using a dataset based on the communal
innovation survey (CIS) for the Netherlands held in 1996, an elasticity between 0.4
and 0.5 can be estimated in a regression of the log of the number of innovations
reported in the 2-digit sector on 1-digit sector dummies and the log of R&D labour
employed in FTE in that 2-digit sector."? These values correspond very well to results
obtained by Acs and Audretsch (1988) for the US and Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang
(2002) for the Netherlands, who, both in more elaborate studies, also report values
between 0.3 and 0.5."3 Given the wide range and importance of this parameter,
established above, y will be treated as a specification parameter in the numerical
analysis below, with y=0.4 (low) and 0.9 (high)."*
Finally there is p, the subjective discount rate. Usually a value of 2-7% is used
in the literature."^ Empirical estimates are rare and vary a lot but indicate that rates
of up to 15% are not implausible."^ As was shown in the previous chapter, this
parameter is the return consumers require on the assets in the model to postpone
consumption. This is the real rate of return on risk free assets. Using such low rates,
however, implies that the value of an innovation is about ten to twenty times the
" * In that regression it turned out that using the number of product innovations and the number of
process innovations yielded statistically indistinguishable coefficients. This implies that based on that
observation the assumption of an identical y in both innovation functions cannot be rejected and
diminishing returns to R&D labour are comparable in both types of R&D. The data used and several
other results are discussed in more detail in Van Zon and Sanders (2002).
' " Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang estimate the elasticity of TFP with respect to R&D intensity, correcting for
inter-sectoral and international spillovers. Acs and Audretsch use innovations as counted in trade
journals and control for variables such as industry concentration, unionisation, advertising and capital
intensity. The latter indicate that their sample is possibly biased towards product innovations.
" * Numerical analysis with y=l will fail as 1- y appears in some denominators and the allocation of
R&D resources switches between corner solutions out of equilibrium.
"^ See for example Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).
"« See Van Praag and Booij (2003) for a short summary of the evidence.
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current profit flow, provoking a large R&D investment in the model when R&D
resources are endogenous."? There are two reasons why it is justified to set a higher
P-
First the risk in R&D projects is much higher than on the assets usually
considered in the literature. For this additional risk a consumer requires
compensation. Estimates of private returns to R&D investments, which range from
10 to as much as for example 92% according to Nadiri (1993), therefore provide a
better estimate.
Second the success rate of R&D investments in the model is 100% by
construction. Lower success rates would reduce the return on R&D investments
proportionally and hence a 50% success rate could be represented in the model by
doubling the discount rate.*^ When R&D effort is endogenous and p is calibrated to
obtain an employment share of 1.2%, the resulting values lie between 0.8 and
1.83.199 Adjusting these for a less than 50% success rate puts them within the 10-
92% range mentioned above. As this parameter does not affect the results
qualitatively, it is set to the calibrated values in simulations below.
Switch parameter A, the knowledge spillover parameters, <p, (^ , f and x and the
competition over high skilled labour operator (not parameterised although this can
easily be done) are the specification parameters in this model.^oo in Subsection 4.2.1
the Acemoglian case with A=0 was analysed. To check the robustness of the market
size effect in that symmetric model, it is useful to also simulate a non-PLC version of
the model that satisfies the conditions for symmetric endogenous bias model in
Equation (4.3), but violates some of the inbuilt assumptions in Acemoglu (2002a).2°*
With A=l and the spillover parameters set in accordance with the conditions in
Equation (4.4) the model can be interpreted as a life cycle model.
i " It is larger than the above-ment ioned 1.2% of the workforce by an order of magni tude.
198 n j o e s not mat ter for the model whether one exogenously doubles the required rate of return or
exogenously halves the actual rate of return. In both cases the invested amount and thereby the
employed labour is reduced by a simi lar amount . Using a higher p to capture th is success rate saves
one parameter in the model .
" 9 The very high values are obta ined when d imin ish ing returns are assumed to be weak in R&D. This
also st rengthens the case against constant returns, made above.
200 ^5 was ment ioned earlier, y is considered a specif icat ion parameter as wel l , since empirical
evidence suggest a rather broad range and, as was argued in Section 4 .2 , the impact of v on the
strong market size effect is profound.
201 Notably tp=<|/=0 and y = l . See Table 4 .3 below.
124
Here too it is useful to simulate two versions. One ties the model in with the existing
product life cycle models of Krugman (1979) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
As it turns out, that specification has a type I RD/A-curve that rules out the market size
effect for all values of y and OSR. Therefore a final specification, in which the
knowledge spillover structure satisfies the conditions in Equations (4.4) and (4.10)
such that a market size effect may emerge, is also simulated. When simulating these
4 specifications for one high (0.9) and one low (0.4) value for y, one obtains 8
specifications, presented in Table 4.3, of which the endogenous and exogenous
allocation of high skilled labour over manufacturing and R&D yield two different
versions. 202
Table 4.3: SPECIFICATION PARAMETERS
SPECIFICATION
PARAMETERS
EXTREME
1 2
MODERATE
3 4
EXTR
5
32
EME
6
MODERATE
7 8
0
• i 0
! ' • . • • • • • • _ • : - • ' • ' • • • • v . ; - : ^ ^ ^ ^
0
0.6
0.4
0.4
0
0
0
0.6
0.4
0.9
0
0.25
0.25
0.75
0.25
0.40
0
0.25
0.25
0.75
0.25
0.90
1
1
0
0
1
0.4
1
0
0
1
0.9
0.8
0.3
0.8
0.3
0.4
1
0.8
0.3
0.8
0.3
0.9
Note that specifications 1-4 are symmetric Acemoglian models with 5=0.2 and 0.5
determining the degree of intra- and cross-sectoral knowledge spillover respectively.
Models 3 and 4 add a joint knowledge spillover. Models 5-8 are consistent with the
product life cycle, where 5-6 are close to the Grossman and Helpman (1991a)
specification presented above.203 For future reference the models from the literature,
1, 2, 5 and 6, are labelled 'extreme', whereas 'moderate' refers to versions where
*>* As was shown earlier, these versions will yield comparable results in terms of their market size
effect and are considered in this chapter to merely illustrate the different transitional dynamics. The
endogenous labour allocation versions have been calibrated to yield the same employment in R&D as
was assumed in the exogenous allocation version. See below. Hence the long-term equilibrium results
are identical and only transitional dynamics differ. The endogenous vs. exogenous allocation models
will start to generate more interesting and different results when labour supply is endogenised and
labour market institutions are considered in Part II.
* " This model specification was discussed elaborately in Sanders (2002).
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the built in assumptions in these existing models are relaxed. The remaining group of
parameters, bw, OL, ap and ao cannot be considered specification parameters, as they
do not change the nature of the model. Direct empirical evidence on their values,
however, is also lacking. The value of these parameters can only be linked to
empirical evidence indirectly. By rewriting the innovation functions in terms of growth
rates of the respective ranges of goods one sees that a unit of labour that produces
6H units of high skilled labour using output can also be used to 'produce' additional
growth in a range of goods. It is not unreasonable to assume that the contribution to
such an aggregate growth rate is rather small. Typically the aggregate economic
growth rates are around 3% in developed countries and therefore ao and a»? can be
calibrated such that when 1.2% of the labour force is employed in R&D it produces a
growth rate of 3% in the steady state. As there is no theoretical or empirical reason to
assume that these parameters differ between the two R&D sectors, they are
assumed equal.***
Having normalised total labour supply to 1000, the exact level of the labour
augmenting productivity parameters OL and &H also has no particular meaning, so
one can normalise &L=1.^°^ The value of ton relative to that, however, is of importance
and Equation (4.1) shows that one can calibrate it, using relative wages in the mid
70s as a benchmark. Having pinned down all other parameters and setting relative,
LH//-L, employment at 1/3, bw is calibrated to yield a long-run equilibrium relative
wage of about 1.4 in all specifications. This is the observed wage ratio around 1975
in Figure 1.1. Sensitivity analysis showed that, as might be expected, steady state
relative wages respond very strongly to this parameter, whereas other equilibrium
variables are less responsive. Finally p, the discount rate, was calibrated, such that
the share of R&D in total employment is about realistic at 1.2% in the base run
steady state when the allocation of labour over production and R&D is
endogenous.^ The calibration of the model thus involves solving it numerically for 4
* * The relative productivity shock in R&D in the next section is a natural experiment that provides a
sensitivity test on this assumption.
205 in fact this normalises the unit of output such that a unit of low skilled labour produces one unit of
low skilled labour using output.
2°6 The obtained p is not sensitive to the specification of the model and holds for all specifications with
a given value of y.
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variables, z, p, aR, and 6H given 3 additional restrictions.^? The parameters and
exogenous variables are summarised in Table 4.4. Appendix 4D presents the actual
calibrated numerical values for the calibration parameters.
Table 4.4: EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS
225-400
775-600
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS
12
0.48
Normalised
JLOOO/(1+L/H)
Normalised
1OOO/(1+H/L)_
"0ECD(2000)
MSTI-database
RELEVANT KANGE IN
LITERATURE
Normalised
Normalised
1.2%* 1000 =12
SENSITIVITY I EST KA\GL
-1.5-0.8 0.1-0.8
0.4 and 0.9 0.3-1 0.3-0.9
CALIBRATED PARAMETERS V RELEVANT RANGE IN SENSITIVITY TEST RANGE
LITERATURE
Calibrated to get
R»+RD=0.012(LH*+LI.*_)_|
Calibrated to get
GnL=GnH=Gn=0.03
a»
Calibrated to get
0.02-0.92 +/-50%
NA
NA
NA
See Section 4.4
See Section 4.4
V-50%
1 Normalised Normalised
4.3.2 THE MARKET SIZE EFFECT
Section 1.1 proposed the strong market size effect as a possible explanation for the
rise in relative labour demand, observed in the US over the 80s. For this hypothesis
to have merit, the models should be able to produce the key prediction. Long-run
relative wages must rise in response to a relative supply increase. The hypothesis is
robust to parameter and specification changes if all models generate a similar
response to the same shock. A straightforward way of quantifying the market size
effect is to simulate the model and calculate long-run elasticities by dividing the
* " These restrictions are in the lower part of Table 4.4. The equilibrium condition of the model
provides the 4'" restriction. In the exogenous labour allocation cases one actually solves only 3
equations in 3 variables. As was mentioned earlier, p is inconsequential for the steady state in those
cases. In addition, as in the exogenous allocation cases the supply of R&D labour is set at 1.2% of
total labour, the steady state results are identical. The responses to shocks, however, differ slightly.
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observed percentage change in relative wages or variety ranges by an exogenously
introduced percent change in relative supply.
Table 4.5:
SPECIFICATION;
LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES OF RELATIVE SUPPLY
d(L./L-)/(U/LL)-1^B
BBB
B
H
No
PLC
PI P
NO
PLC
PLC
EXTREME
MODERATE
EXTREME
MODERATE
EXTRFMF
MODERATE
EXTREME
MODERATE
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
+0.24
+1.57
+0.36
+7.36
+0.22
+0.51
+0.77
+1.73
+0.24
+1.48
+0.36
+6.92
+0.21
+0.56
+0.75
+1.50
-0.19
+0.11
-0.17
+0.91
-0.21
-0.12
-0.06
+0.14
-0.20
+0.11
-0.16
+0.84
-0.20
-0.17
-0.06
+0.12
The experiment, presented in Table 4.5 above, that was conducted allowed the
model to settle in its calibrated steady state at a relative wage of 1.4 and then,
starting in period 50 over an interval of thirty periods increased the supply of high
skilled at a constant growth rate from 225 to 400.2°s The positive elasticities on
relative goods ranges, n^/riL, indicate the existence of the weak Hicksian induced
bias effect in all specifications. This is a precondition for the strong market size effect
and a robust result in all specifications.
The strong market size effect, however, is a far less robust result. It is no
surprise that Model 2, the extreme, no PLC, high / model that is closest to
Acemoglu's (2002a) specification, yields a strong market size effect. Having set the
knowledge spillover parameters and the short-run elasticity of substitution such that
the conditions for an upward sloping concave RDA-curve are met, it would indeed be
a surprise if it did not occur. What is more, the inverse long-run elasticity of
208 implying that given the normalisation of total labour supply to 1000 low skilled labour supply is
reduced 1 for 1 from 775 to 600 over the same interval.
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substitution of about 0.11 implies a new steady state relative wage is about 1.6 - the
level around which relative wages seem to stabilise in the late 90s. Model 2
therefore replicates the movements in the data in both direction and size. But as the
table shows, this result is far from robust to specification and parameter variations.
Model 4 illustrates that a slight change in the knowledge spillover parameters has
huge effects on the size of the elasticity. Models 1 and 3 illustrate the devastating
effect of assuming diminishing returns to scale in R&D. Model 6 illustrates that
introducing a product life cycle the way Krugman (1979) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) suggested, eliminates the market size effect as well. But Model 8
illustrates that the product life cycle model can generate the strong market size
effect and observed wage patterns as well.
A final comment on Table 4.5 is that competition over high skilled labour
between R&D and production hardly makes a difference for the results. This,
however, need not be a surprise as the discount rate in the competition models was
calibrated to yield the exogenously imposed employment level in R&D relative to total
employment. As total employment remained at 1000, total R&D employment
equalled 12 in the pre- and post-shock steady states.^ it should also be noted that
strong diminishing returns generate much more stable results. The elasticities lie
between -0.06 and -0.2, whereasthe models with high values for y have elasticities
ranging between -0.17 and +0.91. This jumpiness also shows up when a sensitivity
test is performed on other parameters.^
From this it can be concluded that the strong market size effect is not very
robust and its size is very sensitive to variations in parameters for which no solid
estimates are available. Hence although capable of explaining the relative wage
shifts observed in the US over the 70s and 80s, it requires a leap of faith to attribute
the observed labour market shifts to the strong market size effect alone. By the same
token, however, the lack of robustness can also be regarded a strength of the
hypothesis. Small differences in the parameters and specification of the model can
cause widely different relative demand shifts in response to similar supply shocks. In
* * But not between these steady states. See the figures towards the end of this chapter.
2io Appendix 4D presents a table containing the elasticity of the steady state relative wage with
respect to a 10% shock in a, p, ai? and (JH The sensitivity to shocks in an is also illustrated in the
simulations presented in the next section and Appendix 4E.
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light of the international evidence presented in Section 1.2, this flexibility might
actually be desirable. As the model does not yet contain the parameters most likely
to differ between the US and Europe, this possibility will be discussed in the next
part. First a final section presents numerical simulations to evaluate the second
hypothesis proposed in Chapter 1.
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4.4 THE INTRODUCTION OF A GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY
In the previous section it was shown that the market size effect is not robust toparameter and specification changes. In addition to the market size effect, Chapter
1 suggested the combination of a Product Life Cycle and the introduction of a new
general purpose technology as a potential explanation for relative demand shifts.
Such a shock can be analysed in the context of the general model by simulating its
response to a temporary increase in the productivity of high skilled complementary
product innovation. The idea is that upon the discovery of a new general purpose
technology there is not an exogenous wave of new products and services (e.g. an
exogenous jump in /IH/OL), but rather a shift in the allocation of R&D resources
towards 'mining' the new possibilities. The opening up of such opportunities can best
be simulated in the model by temporarily reducing the cost of making a product
innovation.^*
In the simulations the parameter a/? is therefore increased in period 65 by a
factor that was calibrated to ensure that relative wages rise to the observed 1.6 in
period 80 in the m o d e l s Table 4.6 presents the multiplication factors that were
found. From these values it can be concluded that some specifications require quite
a productivity shock indeed to offset the downward pressure on relative wages. High
values for y and endogenous labour allocation reduce that factor considerably.213
The moderate product life cycle specifications generate observed wage behaviour for
a temporary 70-90% increase of the productivity level when diminishing returns are
strong in R&D.
^" Note that this is not a valid argument in no-PLC specifications as in these symmetric models there
is no a priori reason why a GPT would be skill biased in general.
^ " In period 65 the market size effect starts to kick in for real in the models that exhibit the strong
market size effect. In that period relative wages start to rise after falling in response to the exogenous
rise in relative supply. In period 80 the exogenous rise in relative supply ends and the model starts to
tend towards its new steady state.
"3 This implies a nice alternative way of introducing a GPT-shock would be to simulate a temporary
shock to Y- The intuition for such a shock would be that a GPT temporarily lifts the diminishing returns
in innovation as a large new field of possibilities is opened up and R&D efforts are not crowding each
other out. As this implies varying elasticities in relative innovation functions by sector, however, the
model is greatly complicated and the analysis of such an experiment is therefore left for future
research.
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Table 4.6: CALIBRATED GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK 214
bPECIFICAT
EXTREME
MODERATE
3 MODERATE
y
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
0.4
0.9
FIGURE
4D.1
4D.2
4D.3
4D.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
2.90
1.15
2.75
1.052«
2.85
1.80
1.90
1.10
2.40
1.05
2.25
0.95215
2.40
1.40216
1.70
1.00
For high values of y the required productivity shock drops to -5-15% for the models
that also exhibit the strong market size effect. Although empirical research provides
little guidance in this respect, it is not unreasonable to assume that the introduction
of ICT-technology has increased the productivity of research efforts in product
innovation by more than 15% relative to product maturing process innovations.
Figures 4.5-4.8 in the next pages present the simulated relative wages in the product
life cycle specifications of the model with short comments.
^ " These have been set by trial and error until relative wages in period 80 were close to 1.6. In
Chapter 5 a more sophisticated method is used to calibrate an R&D productivity shock such that the
stylised relative wage developments are reproduced in the model.
"5 As was mentioned above, the relative wage in these specifications exceeds the required 1.6 in the
steady state. Still the factor was calculated to get it at 1.6 in period 80. After that the relative wage
continues to rise to its new steady state level of about 3.
216 This specification is unstable and oscillates around some mean relative wage in the steady state.
This is because the combination of high output elasticity, endogenous R&D employment and high
skilled labour abundance leads to an explosive growth in n and always overshooting of the steady
state.
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Figure 4.5: SIMULATION OF A CALIBRATED GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Extreme Product Life Cycle, (=1, <p=l. x=0, 1^=0, A=l
Strong Diminishing Returns, y=0.4
Time
' Baseline Comp GPT Comp Baseline no Comp GPT no Comp
product life cycle version of the model with (white) and without (black) competition over high
skilled labour between R&D and production. A first observation is that the baseline model
has no market size effect. Following the shock to relative supply in period 50-80, the model
stabilises at a lower relative wage. However, there is a weak market size effect as induced
biases in innovation increase the relative wage from period 80 onwards. The thin lines
present the models with supply shock and GPT-introduction. Note that the endogenous
allocation model is much quicker to adjust as the productivity increase increases product
innovation directly, but also indirectly as more labour is drawn into product R&D. Smoother
and faster adjustment is shown to be an attribute of competition in the simulations below,
even if the competition and no-competition versions converge to the same steady state.
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Figure 4.6: SIMULATION OF A CALIBRATED GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Extreme Product Life Cycle, ( = 1 , <p=l,x=0, i//=0. A = l
Weak Diminishing Returns, y=0.9
Relative
Wage
Baseline no Comp
8 per. Mov. Avg. Baseline Comp
GPT no Comp
8 per. Mov. Avg. GPT Comp
value for y. The most important feature in this simulation is the absence of the strong
market size effect. As was shown above, this model does not feature the strong market
size effect despite the absence of strong diminishing returns. All the other specifications
analysed do and so this specification stresses the importance of the knowledge spillover
structure. The endogenous high skilled labour allocation version experienced numerical
problems. Following the employment shock the number of varieties grows very rapidly as
diminishing returns do not put a brake on the inflow of labour into R&D. Strong cross-
sectoral knowledge spillovers in combination with labour re-allocation then produces the
oscillation, not presented in the figure. A moving average was plotted in white instead to
get a better feeling for the properties of this model.
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Figure 4.7: SIMULATION OF A CALIBRATED GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Moderate Product Life Cycle. (=0.3, cp=0.8, x=0.8. i//=0.3, A=l
Strong Diminishing Returns. y=0.4
Baseline Comp GPT Comp Baseline no Comp GPT no Comp
strong diminishing returns are presented. As can be verified the knowledge spillover
structure strongly limits the fall in steady state relative wages from the initial relative
supply increase. However, in the steady state still a relative wage drop results. The sharp
breaks at period 80, particularly well illustrated in this version of the model, are the result
of the abrupt stabilization of relative supply and, in the GPT-experiments, the abrupt drop
in the relative productivity level that occurs at that period. Comparison to the extreme PLC-
version in Figure 4.5 suggests that this model has not yet reached a new steady state by
period 80, implying its adjustment time is longer and the size of the relative wage effects
of a relative productivity shock in R&D are much larger. Hence small relative productivity
shocks cause large and long lasting deviations from the baseline evolution of wages and
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SIMULATION OF A CALIBRATED GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Moderate Product Life Cycle, <=0.3. <p=0.8, x=0.8, v=0 .3 . A= l
Weak Diminishing Returns, y=0.9
Baseline Comp
75 85 95 105
Time
GPT Comp Baseline no Comp GPT no Comp
returns, me moaei aoes exnioit tne strong market size enect..
market size effect is strong enough to explain the relative wage shift over the 80s as a
steady state phenomenon. Small relative productivity shocks are sufficient to bring
about the significant additional relative wage shifts. As was shown in table 4.6 the
shock for the competition model is so small that the line does not show up in the graph.
The lines coincide. Smoothening the series by introducing and fading out the temporary
shock could improve the correspondence with labour market trends in the US further. As
was mentioned, the results are very sensitive to small changes in parameters. The
reproduction of relative wage behaviour in numerical simulations is therefore more of a
happy coincidence than a robust result in this specification. Note also that the
introduction of ICT cannot have had very strong relative productivity effects in the R&D
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The simulation of a general purpose technology shock can only be justified in the
context of a product life cycle model. The results obtained in the symmetric models
are less relevant in this experiment. For completeness and to provide a sensitivity
test for as they have been presented in Appendix 4E. As is mentioned in the
comments to Figure 4.8, all simulations look unrealistically erratic, due to the fact
that the relative supply and productivity shock were introduced rather bluntly."? The
next chapter will be more sophisticated in this respect without altering the main
results.
The main conclusion from these simulations is that a productivity shock in the
R&D sector generates a temporary positive relative wage shock that is reversed
partially or entirely in the long run. The results are robust to specification changes.
The size of this required shock differs with the degree of diminishing returns but the
sign of the effect is robust. From the analysis of the model in this and the previous
section, the moderate PLC-specification of the model emerges as the preferred
specification for further investigation. It is preferred over the symmetric models as it
contains the intuitively appealing and empirically important product life cycle. Within
the class of product life cycle models it is preferred over the extreme specifications,
as its knowledge spillover structure does not preclude the emergence of the strong
market size effect by construction. Recent evidence, notably the evidence collected
by Anderson (2001), seems to suggest that over the 90s the situation improved for
the low skilled. This makes the low y version of the moderate PLC specification the
preferred model, as it predicts such an improvement after some time.
' " Relative supply increases between period 50 and 80 by some 100% and then remains stable,
whereas the productivity shock is modelled as the blunt pre-multiplication of the productivity
parameter on product R&D between periods 65 and 80.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
With this chapter Part I of the thesis has been concluded. In it the interactionbetween technical change and labour demand has been analysed in the
context of a general model of endogenous innovation driven growth. This model was
simulated to address the robustness of two hypotheses on why relative demand for
skilled labour increased in the US over the 80s.
Without completely dismissing the possibility of a strong market size effect as
suggested in Acemoglu (2002a), it was shown that the parameter restrictions that
such an effect requires, are quite restrictive. The simulation of various specifications
indicated that v, the output elasticity for labour in R&D, plays a pivotal role in
generating or preventing the strong market size effect. In addition the strong market
size effect proved very sensitive to parameter variations in general and to small
changes in innovation function parameters, y and as, in particular.
With the introduction of the product life cycle, a new general purpose
technology provides an additional source of bias that is robust to model variations
and causes a temporary relative demand shift in the model. Although several
specifications yielded the observed facts in Chapter 1, the moderate product life
cycle specification of the model is the preferred specification that emerged. That
model predicts that the recent ICT-bubble extended itself to labour markets and the
aging of the new economy may cause a reversal of fortune for low skilled workers in
the near future as relative wages return to 'normal' levels.
Obviously the reproduction of stylised facts in a calibrated numerical
simulation does not prove any hypothesis wrong or right. Instead it indicates that
neither can be rejected at this stage. This may change when the international
evidence is considered and the model is required to also reproduce European wage
stability. As unemployment is a clear distinguishing element in the international
context, however, the model will first have to be extended by generalising the labour
market structure, such that it allows for unemployment. This will be done in Part II.
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PART II:
TECHNICAL CHANGE
AND THE LABOUR MARKET
The previous part focused on illustrating the interaction between innovationand labour demand. The model developed there explained a prominent USlabour market trend, rising relative high skilled wages, as the result of an
endogenous innovation driven shift in relative demand. But one rightfully wonders:
Why only in America? Europe saw similar increases in relative labour supply and
adopted similar technologies. Relative wages nevertheless remained stable or even
fell in some countries. In addition, the model in Part I assumed the absence of
unemployment, rather than consider the fact that it first rose and then fell in relative
terms, be it at low levels in the US and high ones in Europe. To explain such quantity
adjustments in the labour market and evaluate the possibilities to trade-off relative
wage stability for unemployment, extensions to the basic model have to be
considered. To that end Chapter 5 introduces endogenous participation and
unemployment theories as potentially underlying a less than perfectly inelastic labour
supply curve. Chapter 6 then proceeds with analysing the impact of such an
extension in more detail and addresses the different US and European labour market
trends. The main contribution in this part lies in the extension to more general labour
market structures that allow one to address unemployment in general and the
European situation in particular.
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CHAPTER 5:
THE LABOUR MARKET
Obviously, the labour market model of Chapter 4 will not suffice to explainobserved international labour market trends. People will generally not workat any wage level the market dictates and, as they have many alternatives to
spending their time at work, they usually reduce the quality (effort) and quantity
(hours) of their labour supply as wages fall. In addition workers, who are perfectly
willing and qualified to occupy a job at the going wage level, might fail to find one. As
unemployment levels are also linked to wage levels, the key implications of such
quantity adjustments can be analysed by introducing an upward sloping aggregate
relative supply curve as has been suggested in Section 1.2. In this chapter the aim is
to introduce this general extension to the model and argue that it captures the
essence of several models of participation and unemployment that have been
developed in the literature.
The first section introduces upward sloping supply curves into the model by
reformulating the labour market equilibrium conditions. A second section then shows
how the resulting aggregate upward sloping relative supply curve can be linked to
endogenous participation. In the final section of this chapter the main concern is with
unemployment. Many potential sources for unemployment have been identified in the
literature. Most theories of unemployment can be related to the so-called wage
curve. 218 The implications of this negative relationship between unemployment and
wage levels can be analysed in the model by an appropriate reinterpretation of the
upward sloping relative labour supply curve proposed in Section 5.1. 219 Again all
mathematical details are in appendices and the extensions are presented in the
21* Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) used this term to refer to the robust negative relationship
between wage levels and regional unemployment rates they found in many countries.
* " For those able or willing to accept the claims made in Section 5.1 without a review of labour supply
and unemployment theory, the later sections are less relevant.
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familiar synopsis table format. Chapter 6 then proceeds by analysing the labour
supply and unemployment extension to the model.
At this point it is useful to stress that in this chapter and the next one must
carefully distinguish between levels and ratios. Most of the analysis refers to relative
rather than absolute levels and existing preconceptions may or may not apply in that
context. Note also that relative levels always refer to the high over low skilled ratio,
except for the unemployment rate, where the conventional definition of low over high
skilled unemployment rates applies.
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5.i QUANTITY ADJUSTMENTS
To introduce endogenous labour supply into the model at this point, only a fewadjustments are required. When /s represents the share of the available stock of
workers of skill S that is willing to accept a job at a given wage level, the labour
market equilibrium conditions in Cell 8 of the synopsis tables in Chapter 4 have to be
adjusted accordingly. Table 5.1 presents the adjusted equilibrium conditions.
Table 5 .1: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Extended
Equilibrium without Competition Equilibrium with Competition
The properties of F(.) depend on the underlying theory of endogenous participation or
unemployment as later sections will show. Still, F(.) is increasing in the relative wage
when the employment rate is positive in the wage level, as is generally the case. The
relative quantity of labour employable at a given relative wage is given in the last line:
(5.1)
Recall also that relative labour demand was given by Equation (4.1):
w,
(5.2)
which, assuming that wages clear labour markets, can be set equal to Equation (5.1).
"° See also Cell 4 of Table 4.1.
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In the short run, for a given DHAIL, Equations (5.1) and (5.2) determine the relative
wage and relative employment levels as in Figure 5.1 below.221
Figure 5 .1 : EQUILIBRIUM IN THE LABOUR MARKET
In the long run the equality of Equation (5.1) to Equation (5.2) dictates a relation
between relative wages and OH/DI.. Solving the labour market equilibrium condition
. yields a new (inverse)
(5.3)
By the fact that the right hand side is now the product of an upwards-sloping convex
factor in relative wages, ( w j ^ )i^u and the upward sloping function F(.) in relative
wages, Equation (5.3) is an upward sloping curve in the relative wage.
" i it should be noted that, unlike the more familiar supply curve in levels that typically has a vertical
asymptote, the relative supply can lie both left and right of the exogenously given relative availability of
labour.
"2 Note that the 'no-competition' specification was used to keep things tractable. The model can also
be solved when R&D and production compete over high skilled labour, but then relative labour
demand is much more complex, as was shown in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.2: GRAPHICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PAW-CURVE
The adjusted PMA-curve can also be constructed graphically, as is illustrated in
Figure 5.2 above. By plotting the relative wage that equilibrates the labour market on
the right against different values of n^/ru, denoted by Zo, Z i and Z2 in the left panel,
the new P/VM-curve (II) generally retains its original concave upward sloping s h a p e d
The innovation part of the model, the RDA-curve and all that underlies it, is
not affected by the introduction of endogenous labour supply. Hence the structure
and steady state properties of the model remain intact. A stable steady state solution
exists as long as the RD4-curve intersects the PMA-curve from above and the model
still generates the strong market size effect if the RDA-curve is upward sloping.
In Chapter 6 it will be shown that this extension indeed leaves the basic
structure of the model unaffected and analyses its impact more elaborately. Before
proceeding in that direction, however, some justifications for the upward sloping
relative supply curve F(VVH/WL) are offered to guide its functional specification and
"3 The exact shape obviously depends on the parameters in the model. The point of intersection with
the original PMA-curve (I) is defined by the relative wage at which relative supply equals relative
availability, i.e. where participation or unemployment rates are equal. In the extreme case of perfectly
elastic relative supply, the PM/\-curve, like the relative supply curve, is horizontal. Other properties,
such as horizontal asymptotes and positive intercepts also carry over from relative supply to the PMA
Chapter 6 will be more elaborate on the issue.
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1provide an interpretation of its parameters. The models of labour supply and
unemployment presented in this chapter are classics in economics and basically
reproduced from well-known textbooks by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) (on
bargaining and efficiency wages), Filer, Hamermesh and Rees (1996) (on labour
force participation) and Davidson (1990) (on search models). Those familiar with that
literature and satisfied with the claim that such models may underlie an upward
sloping relative supply curve are advised to proceed to Chapter 6.
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5.2 ENDOGENOUS LABOUR PARTICIPATION
BASED ON FILER, HAMERMESH AND REES (1996)
In the model of Chapter 4 workers supplied their labour at any given wage level. Thepopu/at/on was assumed to be equal to the /abour forced In classical labour
market theory, however, labour force participation is typically assumed to be the
aggregate result of individuals' choices to spend their time on (looking for) paid
employment rather than something else. The individuals in the population are
assumed to value both the expected labour income and the leisure forgone, hence a
trade-off has to be made. This trade-off can be formalised by introducing leisure as
an argument in the utility function. The properties generally attributed to that utility
function are substitutability between leisure and consumption, diminishing returns to
both arguments and a marginal utility that tends to infinity when either leisure or
consumption approaches O.225
Substitutability implies that individuals are prepared to trade leisure for
consumption and the other way around.226 in addition, diminishing returns cause a
given amount of consumption to 'buy' less and less additional leisure time. A logical
implication of that assumption is that a very large (infinite) amount of additional
consumption is required to make the individual give up his last hours of leisure and
at the other extreme, he is willing to give up all his leisure for the first unit of
consumption.
In Appendix 5A it is shown that, when utility is maximised, the individual will
supply hours of labour until he is indifferent between spending his last hour as
leisure or at work, consuming the wages earned.
22* In this chapter 'population' is used to refer to the population of working age. typically between 16
and 65 years of age.
"5 See for example Filer. Hamermesh and Rees (1996).
"6 There are models of labour supply that assume that leisure and consumption are complements.
Both time and goods are used as inputs to 'produce' utility. See for example Abbott and Ashenfelder
(1976), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) and Biddle and Hamermesh (1990). These models aim to
explain certain aspects of individual labour supply that are of lesser concern when relative aggregate
supply is analysed. See Filer, Hamermesh and Rees (1996) for a more elaborate overview.
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This is captured in an individual labour supply curve like:
,5.4,
where Uc and Ui-/ are the marginal utility of consumption and leisure, which are
constant or negative and positive in labour supply / by the assumed diminishing
marginal utility, respectively."? Equation (5.4) implies that / is positive in the real
wage, w/P, if the substitution effect dominates the income effect.^ Aggregation
over L* identical atomistic price-taking individuals yields an aggregate labour supply
curve /L* =/_s (w/P) that increases in the real consumption wages earned.229
Assuming that both high and low skilled workers consume the same goods
and make the trade-off described above, one could obtain:
A ,(/,)
This implies that the parameters in the functional specification of F(.) can be related
to the parameters of the utility function. In Equation (5.5) the sensitivity of aggregate
relative supply to relative wages depends on the sensitivity of low and high skilled
individual labour supply with respect to their own consumption wages. In addition to
the individual labour-leisure trade-off, skill specific reservation wages, non-labour
incomes, mixed households and endogenous human capital accumulation may affect
aggregate relative labour supply and the sensitivity of relative participation rates to
relative wages. Box 5.1 shortly discusses these additional factors and how they
would typically affect the sensitivity of relative participation to relative wages.
22? u« is the partial derivative of utility with respect to x. In general these partial derivatives are
themselves functions of the arguments in the utility function. The signs are above the arguments.
™ individual supply curves can be backward bending. Then further wage increases beyond some
point reduce the supply of labour, as people prefer to consume more leisure when their income rises.
At the aggregate level, however, this effect is not likely to be strong. See Box 5.1.
2» Consequently. If one interprets (1-/) as voluntary unemployment, than Equation (5.4) defines a
wage curve that relates the wage level negatively to the voluntary unemployment rate.
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Box 5.1: THE SENSITIVITY OF RELATIVE SUPPLY TO THE RELATIVE WAGE
For obvious reasons individual labour supply is strictly positive. Individual supply functions are therefore
truncated. Although it is not immediately clear from the discussion above, there will be no supply of labour
when the real wage falls below the reservation wage. This reservation wage represents the utility value of the
first hour of leisure that has to be given up and includes the value of home production and the non-labour
incomes lost when one accepts a job, such as unemployment benefits. As reservation wages typically depend
on the prevailing wage levels in the market, through reservation wages, the impact of relative wage changes is
increased. Similarly all increases in non-labour income, also those that are not lost when employment is
accepted, have a wea/th effect. Higher non-labour income decreases labour supply, because the additional
consumption reduces the marginal value of working and consuming relative to that of leisure. The aggregate
relative supply may be more or less sensitive to relative wage changes when reservation wages and non-labour
incomes differ by skill and depend on the market wage of the own or the other skill group.
Another factor of importance is the fact that labour supply is typically a househo/d decision (see for
example Gregg and Wadsford (1996) for an empirical investigation). Households consist of several individuals
that pool their incomes and share consumption. They also decide how much labour every individual member
will supply. In that case the incomes of the other members in the household will reduce an individual's labour
supply, whereas there will also be some specialisation, possibly increasing the supply of some members
beyond their individually preferred levels. Typically those with a comparative advantage in working, i.e. those
with high wages, will then supply more labour. The existence of mixed households (containing skilled and
•unskilled labour) implies that relative wages matter for the relative supply of that household. In fact, due to the
specialisation within households, relative labour supply will become more sensitive and more elastic to the
relative wage than when one considers atomistic agents.
t A final issue that may affect the sensitivity of relative available labour to relative wages, is the
'endogenous accumulation of skills. Not only do individuals decide on how much time to spend on labour and
leisure, they also decide on how much time should be spent in education, necessary to acquire skills. In
principle that decision is not much unlike the consumers' savings decision in the previous part, which brings
one to the human capita/ approach. The idea in this approach is that individuals invest time in education and
consider it an asset that yields a return. This idea goes back to Adam Smith (1776). but Schultz (1961) and
Becker (1964) were among the first to seriously and precisely formulate and analyse this hypothesis.
The key result of the human capital approach is that the anticipated returns to education determine to
a large extent the amount of time devoted to education. These returns are mainly higher wages and
consequently the future stock of skilled labour will depend positively on anticipated relative wages. The human
capital approach predicts that the elasticity of relative supply is larger in the long-run. The argument is
intuitively clear. Consider the long-run implications of a rise (fall) in the relative wage. The immediate effect is to
increase (decrease) the returns to education and reduce (increase) the opportunity costs of education (since
the low skilled wage is foregone while one is being educated). Hence the investment in education will rise (fall)
and in the long run the relative supply of skilled labour rises (falls) even more than in the short run.
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The inactivity discussed here is voluntary, both at the micro and macro leve ls The
resulting upward sloping relative supply curve must be interpreted as tracing out the
relative numbers of participating workers of either skill type at a given relative wage.
As it was argued in Section 1.2, however, the US and Europe shared similar trends in
relative participation rates. US and European labour markets differ primarily in their
involuntary unemployment levels, which will be addressed below.
" ° And therefore it is also Pareto-efficient and no cause for (policy) concern. Still low participation is
generally perceived to be problematic as the non-participation can be induced by generous social
security benefits. In that case non-participation generates a negative externality and is cause for
concern.
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5.3 UNEMPLOYMENT
The part of the population that voluntarily supplies its labour to the market atgoing wage levels makes up the labour force. A large part of the labour force will
typically be emp/oyed. Not every individual in the labour force, however, has or
instantly finds a job that matches his abilities and preferences and pays the going
market wage. Those thus involuntarily out of work are defined as the unemp/oyed.^*
As opposed to voluntary entry and withdrawal from the labour force,
involuntary unemployment poses a serious policy problem. It implies inefficiency as
productive resources are left idle and in addition those affected suffer a serious
income loss, potentially causing strong negative externalities.^?
In most unemployment models the employers have the right to manage their
firms, such that actual employment will always be on the labour demand curve and
the going wage level reflects productivity. Unemployment can therefore be
interpreted as the amount of labour that employers do not employ at the going wage
level despite the fact that these workers would want to accept going or even slightly
lower wages. If, for whatever reason, wages fail to adjust fully to this excess supply in
the labour market, unemployment may persist in equilibrium.
Adjusting labour market equilibrium conditions accordingly one can write the
inverted P/vM-curve in Equation (5.3) as:
(5.6)
where LH ^ and Li.s are the amounts of high and low skilled labour supplied, M-H* and
'(XL*, respectively. As Equation (5.6) illustrates, the levels of (un)employment
33* Involuntary part-time employment also fits this definition. When unemployment exists, the rational
forward looking individuals that decide to participate in the labour force will take the probability and
expected duration of unemployment into consideration and discount the observed market wage
accordingly. This implies that participation will vary with unemployment rates and duration, even
though going wages may remain constant. To introduce unemployment into the labour-leisure trade-off
in the previous section, the wage, w, must be interpreted as expected income when deciding to
participate. The results are not qualitatively affected by such a reinterpretation.
"2 See for example Freeman (1997), who links unemployment rates to crime rates.
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equilibrate the labour market at going (relative) wages and unemployment arises for
all the reasons that wages fail to adjust to excess supply.
Most models of unemployment would predict that wages are correlated
negatively with unemployment levels. Empirical research has indeed uncovered a
robust negative relation between wage and unemployment levels .^ This negative
relationship has been labelled the wage curve. Introducing an inverted wage curve
directly into the inverse PA/M-curve in Equation (5.6) would again imply adding terms
in (relative) wages to the right hand side, as was the case with endogenous supply in
Equation (5.3).2^
Using a wage curve, the model in Chapter 4 can thus accommodate
unemployment in much the same way as it accommodated endogenous supply. The
required extensions can all be made to the labour market equilibrium conditions and
without further specification voluntary and involuntary unemployment are
indistinguishable in the model. Table 5.2 presents the extension
Table 5.2: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Unemployment
Equilibrium without Competition Equilibrium with Competition
There are many models of unemployment that identify possible causes for the failure
of labour markets to clear. Consequently there are many possible specifications and
" 3 See for example Blanchflower and Oswald ( 1 9 9 0 , 1 9 9 4 a and b and 1995) .
234 Blanchflower and Oswald contrast their wage curve to the classical Phillips (1958)-curve that
suggests a negative relationship between the level of unemployment and the change in wages. The
Phillips-curve, however, is based on inflation expectations and assumes a degree of money i l lusion. As
the model has no monetary sector and assumes perfect foresight, the introduction of a Phillips-curve
is less straightforward in this sett ing. The causality in the wage curve, however, is less clear and it is
not an unchallenged hypothesis in the l iterature. The possibility that the wage curve is in fact a mis-
specif ied Phillips-curve, as for example Card (1995) seems to argue, is an important quali f ication to
the conclusions drawn below.
235 where us(ws) is the inverted wage curve for workers with skill S=(H,L).
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interpretations of the wage curve. Traditionally economists distinguish seasonal,
demand deficient, structural and frictional unemployment.^
The first two categories are not considered. As workers are usually assumed
to dislike large income fluctuations, relative wages will respond very little to these
types of unemployment. Workers absorb the seasonal and cyclical variation by
working fewer or more hours and relative hourly wages remain quite stable over the
cycles. Moreover Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) show that the bulk of the
variation in unemployment rates cannot be attributed to conventional business
cycles, so by implication demand deficient unemployment is of minor importance in
explaining the development of unemployment itself over longer periods of time.
Finally, as the lifetime of a patent spans several years, the seasonal and cyclical
variation in unemployment would normally be anticipated and has little impact on
expected future profits."? For this reason these types of unemployment cannot be
expected to affect the process of technical change much.
This leaves frictional and structural unemployment. Structural unemployment
emerges when wages do not adjust in the equilibrium. The government may enforce
this for example by setting a (binding) minimum wage. Supply will then exceed
demand in the labour market, creating a pool of workers who cannot find a job at the
going wage. Workers may also push wages above the market-clearing level in a wage
bargain. Bargaining, by unions or workers individually, prevents labour markets from
clearing because union members and insiders with other types of market power care
less about the unemployment of outsiders than about their own wages .^ Finally
employers may set wages above market clearing levels to attract, motivate and retain
a productive work force. In the minimum wage model unemployment simply assumes
the role of the wage in equilibrating the labour market. In the bargaining and search
236 See for example Lipsey (1968) or any modern textbook on the labour market such as Ehrenberg
and Smith (1996) or Filer, Hamermesh and Rees (1996).
* " It does have an impact on the variance of profits but arguably to the same extent for high and low
skilled labour using firms.
*w The union reduces competition among workers, creating monopoly power. Due to asymmetric
information, however, hiring and firing is costly to firms and as they try to reduce labour turnover they
also create market power for the insiders. Another class of insider-outsider models, referred to as
hold-up models (i.e. Teulings and Hartog (1991)), argue that workers have the power to bargain for
higher wages because the employer has fixed costs. Whatever the source of market power, insiders
will bargain for wages that exceed market-clearing levels, as they accept unemployment in exchange
for higher wages as long as their own employment is not threatened.
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models, unemployment and the wage level are simultaneously determined and
unemployment serves to discipline workers.
Frictional unemployment emerges when the transition from the inactive to the
employed population (and back) or from one job to the next takes time and effort.
Labour turnover itself now becomes the source of unemployment. Wages play no
direct role in the equilibrating process and are usually determined along similar lines
as in bargaining models. Unemployment then serves to reduce the wage claim in
these models, yielding a wage curve. But wages and unemployment are determined
simultaneously with labour turnover and affected strongly by for example search
costs and job destruction rates.
These models and the corresponding implications for the specification of the
wage curve are discussed in more detail below. They will be referred to as the
minimum wage, the insider-outsider, the efficiency wage and the search models of
unemployment, respectively in separate subsections.
5.3.1 M I N I M U M WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
BASED ON MUYSKEN, SANDERS AND VAN ZON (2001)
Structural unemployment can emerge to absorb the excess supply of labour at the
going statutory minimum wage in equilibrium. As a statutory minimum wage is only
sensible if it is binding and since low skilled workers earn lower wages, the low
skilled wage should be set at the minimum wage. Hence a binding minimum
setsw^ = w ^ . Now unemployment simply replaces the wage as the variable that
adjusts to bring about the labour market equi l ibr ium.^ if the minimum wage is set
exogenously and never adjusted, then the normalisation chosen matters for the long-
run equi l ibr ium.^ In line with policy practice and avoiding the normalisation
239 Basically this specifies the wage curve as a discontinuous curve defined by us=0 if WS>WMW and
us=l otherwise.
"o Normalising income implies a falling price in the model that ensures that the minimum wage is
fixed in terms of total income and grows in terms of utility (at the same rate as total income and other
wage levels). Since the price index is an average of wages, this normalisation implicitly defines the
minimum wage in terms of low and high skilled wages. If the price level is normalised, however, as for
example in Acemoglu (2002a), fixing the minimum wage nominally implies that it falls relative to
marginal productivity and eventually becomes non-binding.
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problem, the minimum wage can be set directly relative to average market wages. In
a two worker-type model this implies that the minimum wage is fixed implicitly to the
high skilled wage level. 241
Figure 5.3: EQUILIBRIUM IN THE LABOUR MARKET
Minimum Wage
As long as the minimum wage is binding for the low skilled and specified in terms of
the high skilled wage, for example by setting the minimum wage for low skilled at
O)M/N*WH, the relative wage is fixed. The relative supply curve is now kinked as in
Figure 5.3 above. Below the fixed relative minimum wage low skilled workers earn
more than the minimum and supply their labour inelastically. There the minimum
wage is non-binding. Above the relative minimum wage they cannot work and their
unemployment rate is 1. Relative supply therefore becomes infinite and relative
supply is horizontal.
least in the steady state when the weights of high and low skilled labour in employment do not
change.
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One obtains for the labour market equilibrium:
(5.7)
where an exogenous labour force was assumed for convenience.***
As the relative wage is fixed as long as the minimum wage is binding, the RDA-
curve determines the steady state ratio of r?H over nt. Figure 5.4 below illustrates the
full response to an increase in the minimum wage.
Figure 5.4: STEADY STATE IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE
From the initial equilibrium at A, A' the demand for low skilled labour immediately
falls along the demand curve to B. The lower relative wage also reduces the incentive
to do low skilled complementary R&D at B' and riH/ni. will rise. This causes further
adjustment in relative labour demand and unemployment. The new long-run
2*2 A constant relative wage implies a constant relative participation rate, even if it is endogenous.
156
equilibrium is at C, C where low skilled unemployment is higher than at A and 6.^3
This implies that (low skilled) unemployment increases even further to increase
marginal productivity in the low skilled sector. Hence one returns to a steady state at
a higher unemployment level. With minimum wages this unemployment is involuntary
at the micro and macro level.
Table 5.3 below shows that the minimum wage extension can be introduced
in the labour market equilibrium conditions in Cell 8 of the synopsis table in a very
straightforward way.
Table 5.3: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Minimum Wage
Equilibrium without Competition Equilibrium with Competition
A minimum wage model, with its horizontal relative supply curve, presents the
extreme case of the trade-off hypothesis discussed in Section 1.2. All technology
driven demand shocks are absorbed by quantity adjustment alone and relative
unemployment absorbs all relative wage pressure. 244 The minimum wage differential
is, however, unlikely to explain much of the EU-US unemployment differences.
Theoretically the fact that the minimum wage is lower in the US than in Europe
"3 Note that the market size effect cannot be present as an upward sloping RDA-curve can never
intersect the now horizontal PMA-curve from above. Acemoglu, shortly mentioned in Section 1.2,
argued that a binding minimum wage for low skilled makes the employers the full residual claimant of
any productivity increases, implying that they would invest more, not less, in low skilled
complementary innovations when minimum wages rise. According to Acemoglu (2002b) the higher
minimum wage in Europe has put a brake on the market size effect and reduced the supply induced
outward shift in relative demand. The result comes from his implicit assumption that employers do not
adjust their employment levels when minimum wages exceed marginal productivity. Employment is not
on the relative demand curve. If it were, as was assumed in the model above, the value of low skilled
complementary innovations falls with higher minimum wages, implying that demand should have
shifted more in Europe.
**• Note that high skilled unemployment was assumed to be 0. It might as well have been set to some
small positive level due to for example friction.
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implies that (low skilled) Europeans will experience a higher unemployment rate.^s it
is immediately clear that higher minimum wages also predict higher relative
unemployment rates, UL/UH.^"^ AS was shown in Section 1.2, this is contradicted in
the data. In addition Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) find little evidence to suggest
that the minimum wage contributes significantly to overall unemployment levels.
These results should not come as a surprise if one realises that even of the least
skilled workers only a small fraction actually earns the minimum wage. It is therefore
not binding for many low skilled workers. A much larger fraction of workers in the US
and in particular in Europe is affected by bargaining, which is introduced in the next
subsection.
5.3.2 WAGE BARGAINING AND INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
BASED ON LAYARD, NICKELL AND JACKMAN (1991)
Minimum wages are not the only difference between European and US labour
markets. As is well documented in the literature, union bargaining extends to a much
larger percentage of the work force in Europe. Their bargaining position is
strengthened further by high replacement rates, strict firing regulations etcetera.^
This stronger bargaining position is another potential explanation for high
unemployment levels. Unemployment performs the function of reducing wage claims
by unions or individual wage bargainers. If unemployment is high the wage claim is
reduced, because the prospect of being fired when claiming a high wage is not very
appealing. If, on the other hand, unemployment is low, then wage claims can be high,
2*5 The differences in minimum wages, however, are not large enough to explain the large differences
in unemployment. The US hourly minimum wage was 5.15 dollars in 1997. In Europe it ranged
between 1.78 in Portugal to 7.23 in Luxembourg with France, Belgium and the Netherlands around
6.5. See OECD (1998) Table 2.2.
"« One should assume a given low but positive level of unemployment for high skilled workers, for
example due to friction.
"? Union coverage is 70-90% in Continental Europe. In the US only 18% of workers are covered by a
union bargain. The UK. Canada and New Zealand hold the middle ground between 38 and 67%.
Ireland is an outlier in the Anglo-Saxon group at 85%. A similar picture emerges from the employment
protection ranking in the OECD Jobs Study and replacement rates. See for example OECD (1994b,
1997) and Muhlau and Horgan (2001), Table 1. These factors all strengthen the bargaining position of
European workers.
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since one easily finds another job when f i r e d . ^ This mechanism yields a wage curve
that can be represented by an upward sloping supply curve as was suggested above.
Bargaining theory starts from the assumption that employers and employees
are not price takers in the labour market but instead bargain over the wage. Both
parties to a bargain will aim to maximise their own objective function and use all their
bargaining power to do so. Standard bargaining theory has developed the Nash-
product as a way to formalise bargaining.2"9 The outcome of a simple wage bargain
would be the solution to a maximisation problem of the form: 25°
(5.8)
where w is a parameter that represents the bargaining power of the worker, V(w) is
his value function which obviously depends positively on the wage and l~l(w) is the
profit of the employer that usually depends negatively on the wages paid.251 The
fallback positions of the employees and employers are the incomes the parties
receive when they fail to agree, vb and Flo respectively. For the employee one should
think of unemployment benefits, strike income and the like, for the employer the
fallback position is the value of firing the worker and posting a vacancy or perhaps
liquidating the firm entirely. To derive the worker's value function one must consider
his position. The worker is usually assumed to care about his expected income only.
This expected income consists of two components. The wage he bargains for, times
the probability he will continue to earn that wage, plus his 01/ts/de opt/on, the value of
being unemployed, times the probability that he loses his job. The probability of
survival in the job depends (negatively) on the wage and can be written as s(ws(/)),
the surv/Va/ funct/on of worker / of skill S. Appendix 5B shows that, if one assumes
2*8 Of course a more appropriate measure would be the unemployment over vacancy ratio, but in
wage bargaining models vacancies are usually fulfilled without friction. See for example Layard. Nickell
and Jackman (1991).
«* See Nash (1950).
'50 There are complex game-theoretical foundations for the Nash-product in many different bargaining
settings. See for example the annex to Chapter 2 in Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991).
2*1 The profits can depend positively on wages because, as was shown in Chapter 4. profits are
proportional to the wage bill. Hence if labour supply to the firm is more than inversely proportional to
wages, an increase in wages will also increase profits. Because prices reflect the wage change,
however, the utility value of profits will fall when wages increase. Higher wages therefore cause
redistribution of utility from profit earners to wage earners in the model of Chapter 4 as well.
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that all workers and firms are identical within skill groups, sets l"lo=O and assumes
for simplicity that the fallback position Vo is equal to the workers' outside option, As,
one obtains that the wage will solve:
(5.9)
It is also shown in Appendix 5B that, using identical monopolistic firms as in Chapter
4 this implies that the wage mark-up over the workers' outside option equals:
As might be expected, this wage mark-up depends positively on the bargaining power
of the worker, to, and the profit share in output, (l-a/3).252 it also depends positively
on the (negative) elasticity of the survival probability with respect to the wage, Osw.
Hence the more sensitive that probability is, the lower is the mark-up. Intuitively,
when the probability of being fired is very sensitive to the wage claimed, a worker will
settle for lower wages. The survival elasticity is the product of the (positive) elasticity
of survival with respect to employment and the (negative) elasticity of employment
with respect to wages. It is shown in Appendix 5B that the elasticity in Equation
(5.10) is a constant that depends (negatively) on the demand elasticity of labour, the
voluntary quit rate and the steady state growth rate.^3 Unemployment enters
Equation (5.10) through its impact on the outside option. As all workers were
assumed to be homogenous within skill groups, the equilibrium probability of being
unemployed is equal to the aggregate unemployment rate. If the wage bargain fails,
expected income equals that probability times benefits Bs plus (1-us) times ws, which
represents the probability of finding another job earning the market wage.
"2 The bargain redistributes the monopoly rents in product markets towards the worker, who has
some market power in the labour market.
2M The steady state growth rate basically defines an involuntary separation rate as workers have to
move from existing to new varieties.
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Substitution into Equation (5.10) and solving for wages over benefits one obtains the
wage curved"
(5.1D
where xs is a skill specific positive constant (function of constant parameters only)
that is defined in Appendix 5B. Consider the properties of the wage curve. It is easily
verified that the wage level is negative in the unemployment rate as empirical
evidence on the wage curve suggests. The same increase in unemployment will
increase the numerator by a smaller percentage than the denominator, causing the
fraction to go down. Note also that the wage tends to infinity when the denominator
falls to 0. This defines a positive level, I/JO = *s- °f unemployment that the workers
do not care to reduce any further. Finally the mark-up of wages over benefits falls to
1
its minimum at n ^ s when unemployment reaches its maximum at l.^s
1 - X s
If unemployment benefits are constant or defined in terms of the group
specific wage alone, then the equilibrium unemployment rate is independent of the
wage level and determined by Equation (5.11). As this would eliminate the short run
responsiveness of wages to unemployment, however, the wage curve would not have
been introduced properly. The problem can be avoided when benefit levels are set in
terms of both wages. Consider for example the case where benefits are a fraction of
an exponentially weighed average of high and low skilled wages:
Bs=PsWs'Vs^ Se{H,L},-S*S (5.12)
Solving Equation (5.11) for unemployment one then obtains:
"s=r ^ rsn (5-13)
* " See Appendix 5B.
^ It is shown in Appendix 56 that this mark-up will exceed 1 under reasonable assumptions.
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It can be verified that the unemployment rates are now negatively related to one's
relative wage. Using these unemployment rates in a model with an exogenously fixed
relative labour force would then generate an upward sloping relative supply curve,
where supply must be interpreted as the amount of employable labour at the relative
wage levels offered.256
Wage bargaining therefore gives rise to an upward sloping aggregate relative
supply curve. Some additional issues in bargaining structures may make that relative
supply curve more elastic to the relative wage. Unions may have skilled and unskilled
workers, leading to bargaining over the relative wage. In addition the wages of one
group affect the employment and thereby survival probabilities of the other group. As
long as the two are substitutes, as has been assumed from the outset, this will
increase the elasticity of relative supply when bargaining is reasonably centralised.^?
Table 5.4:
iBOUR MARKET(S)
FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Wage Bargaining
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
Wage Bargaining
Equilibrium without Competition • Equilibrium with Competition
( i - u >(. ^ )V
In Table 5.4 the adjustment to the equilibrium conditions in Cell 8 can be made to
introduce wage bargaining. The adjustment implies that the formal structure of the
model is not affected over and beyond what has already been discussed. The
functional form of F(.), however, is now fully specified and its parameters and
variables can be related to the bargaining process. Unemployment is now involuntary
256 The employable labour is equal to the available minus the unemployed required to reduce the
wage claim of those employed to the given wage.
25' Which implies that the union realises and cares about these second order effects.
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at the micro level only.^ss As there are arguably large international differences in the
bargaining position of workers, this is a promising extension that will be made and
analysed in detail in Chapter 6 below.
5.3.3 UNEMPLOYMENT AND EFFICIENCY WAGES
BASED ON UYARD, NICKELLAND JACKMAN (1991)
A final reason why wages may structurally fail to clear labour markets, is that
employers pay their workers more than is required to attract them to a job. Employers
may have good reasons to pay above market clearing wages. When asked they argue
that higher wages allow them to recruit, retain and motivate a more productive
workforce, when searching, selecting, training and monitoring workers is costly.^s
Consider the motivation argument. The underlying assumption of this model is
that employers cannot fully monitor their workers. The worker therefore has some
discretion in choosing the effort level he will provide. As effort affects productivity, it
also affects profits and it might pay for the employer to offer higher wages to induce
additional effort. Assume for example that workers' effort depends positively on the
mark-up of firm wages over the outside option.?e° As the outside option depends
negatively on the unemployment rate and positively on the expected wage level
outside the firm, the effort level in the firm increases in unemployment and the firm
wage relative to the wage expected outside the firm. Suppose employer/ knows that
his employees of skill type S choose effort according t o : * "
(5.14)
25* It can be argued that it is voluntary at the aggregate level as the bargaining part ies, usually unions,
trade-off unemployment for wages and choose to bargain for non-market clearing wages.
^ 9 See for example Kaufman (1984) who presents evidence f rom several employer surveys.
260 These models are known as gift-exchange models. See Akerlof (1982) and Kaufman (1984) .
261 Underlying th is funct ion one might again imagine some utility maximisat ion of the employee, in
which effort af fects util ity negatively while expected income has a posit ive impact.
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Taking the firms in the model of Chapter 4 and assuming es" replaces the exogenous
productivity parameter bs, implies that profits are given by: ^ 2
l-a0 (5.15)
ec
Maximising this expression with respect to the firm level wage, given Equation (5.14),
implies that the firm will set:
where ei(.) is the partial derivative of the effort function with respect to its first
argument, the firm's relative wage. Assuming all firms are equal implies that they will
all make the same trade-off and drive up wages in the aggregate equilibrium until
wsi/ws=l- Unemployment is now the only variable that can generate the desired
motivation for workers in the aggregate and is given by substituting ws//ws=l into
Equation (5.16) and solving:
As the effort function was assumed to be positive in both arguments, unemployment
reduces the need for high wages to motivate workers. If firms pay efficiency wages
for motivation the wage curve will therefore emerge.^ Paying efficiency wages to
reduce voluntary quitting generates a similar result. A quitting function of employees
intuitively depends negatively on both the firm's relative wage and the aggregate
unemployment rate. Assuming labour turnover is costly to the employer, he sets
higher wages to avoid quitting. As workers quit more at low unemployment rates he
^2 Hence productivity is a function of effort and effort enters the model as purely labour augmenting.
This implies that doubling effort is equivalent to supplying twice the amount of labour. Due to
diminishing returns in production, however, this does not generate twice the amount of output.
2 " This wage curve, however, is not originating on the supply side as for bargaining. The equilibrium
unemployment level equates the supply of and demand for effort adjusted labour.
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(and all other employers) will set a higher wage. Finally, when high relative wages and
unemployment both increase the number of job applicants per vacancy, then
recruiting competition among identical firms also implies that unemployment
generates the desired job queues in equilibrium.^* Like bargaining models,
efficiency wages may therefore justify introducing a wage curve and the
corresponding upward sloping relative supply curve.
Table 5.5: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Efficiency Wages
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
C l»: , , , . . O r 'OR/SKILL
ABOUR MARKEt(s)"
1
8
Efficiency Wages
£(w / w . , u . ) - = —-—2- => us solves E ( l u . ) - — - — —
Equilibrium without Competition Equilibrium with Competition
R_+R^=R' i * „ = »»
L ° = (1 -u«)L^' - R' f-»° + "» + "o = (1 -U«C-H"
Table 5.5 above illustrates how efficiency wages, in this case motivated by the effort
model, generates a wage curve that can be introduced in the model. There is a lot of
empirical evidence supporting efficiency wages theory. Capital-intensive firms with
high profits pay higher wages, as do large and unionised ones. Productivity
differences, compensating differentials and wage bargaining all fail to explain these
inter and intra industrial wage structures.?^ Efficiency wages models may also have
some explanatory power when it comes to the international patterns of
unemployment and wage inequality that this part aims to explain. The large
international differences could be explained when effort, quitting and recruiting
functions differ sufficiently between the US and Europe. European workers could, for
example, be much less sensitive to unemployment in a motivation model, as job
protection and high unemployment benefits reduce the possibility and severity of
* • See Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Chapter 3 for the formal proof.
2«5 ibid, Table 1.
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losing your job. Similarly, European employers could have to offer much higher wages
to attract a queue of applicants as the generous social benefits system reduces
people's incentives to apply for any job.
There is little empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, but the possibility
presents an interesting research agenda for the future. As evidence is scarce at the
moment, however, and because international differences are probably too large to
rely heavily on efficiency wages for an explanation, the implications of efficiency
wages are not pursued further in this thesis. Chapter 6 will focus on the bargaining
model instead.
5.3.4 FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND SEARCH
BASED ON DAVIDSON (1990)
Friction unemployment emerges when the transition from unemployment or an old
job to a new one requires costly search on behalf of both parties in the labour
market. The focus in search models is therefore mainly on the flows in the labour
market. Figure 5.5 illustrates the flows in the labour market.
Figure 5.5: FLOWS IN THE LABOUR MARKET
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The labour market is in fu// stock equilibrium when all stocks remain stable relative to
the total population, hence when the sums of outflows equal the sums of inflows in
each stock. Defining /V, U, and P as the stocks of employed, unemployed and inactive
persons, the flows can be expressed as a fraction of these stocks. The flows out of
employment are voluntary quits or involuntary dismissals.
Of those leaving their current job, qN, some may find a new one immediately,
oN, for example when there is on-the-job search. Some may withdraw from the labour
force altogether, rN, and some will experience a spell of unemployment, sN. Those
unemployed may flow back into employment, mti, or withdraw from the labour force,
dU, whereas the inactive population may enter the labour force through
unemployment, vP or directly acquire a suitable job, eP.^e The full stock labour
market equilibrium is then characterised by:
oN + sN + rN = qN = mU + eP + oN
mU + dU = vP + sN (5.18)
rN + dU = eP + vP
Defining the labour force, LF = N + U , and the unemployment rate, u = U / LF, it can
be shown that the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:^?
vr
u*= e±^- (5.19)
Empirical research has shown that the matching rate, m, and the (involuntary)
separation rate, s, have the most profound impact.^ Search models have therefore
focussed on explaining these flows in particular. Some early work on job search
models was done by Stigler (1961) and McCall (1970) and with the contributions by
Diamond (1981, 1982, 1984), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984a, 1984b)
2»5 Natural and demographic in- and outflows such as immigration, emigration, births and deaths may
affect the size of all stocks, including the total working age population. Such flows, although potentially
important empirically, are not relevant here. The equilibrium conditions are easily adjusted to such
exogenous in- and outflows.
* " It was assumed that the retirement rate r is equal to the withdrawal rate d. See Appendix 5C.
268 See Davidson (1990).
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this approach to the unemployment problem took up root in mainstream labour
economics.^ in these contributions, jobs are viewed as the result of active
searching on behalf of supplying and demanding parties in the labour market. An
underlying 'matching technology' is introduced to describe how search results in
employment. As Davidson (1990, p. 32) puts it: Tn/s techno/ogy may be wewed as a
product/on funct/on w/tri job/ess workers, trie/r search effort, vacanc/es and trie
searcri effort of firms as trie /npt/ts and jobs as trie output." Formally one could write:
(5.20)
where U/V is the number unemployed per vacancy and sex is the search effort of
unemployed, x=U, and firms, x=V, respectively. Intuitively the matching rate is
positive in all arguments. Obviously wages are an important variable in stimulating
workers and firms to search. But note that in these models wages do not equilibrate
the labour market. Jobless workers search for vacancies. Once one is found, they
bargain over the wage and, assuming that they agree, production starts, generating a
surplus that is shared between the worker and the firm. Hence wages are determined
in pretty much the same fashion as in the insider-outsider models presented above.
Unemployment, by reducing the workers outside option, again puts a
downward pressure on wages and the wage curve will emerge. The aggregate or
average wage levels usually play a role in endogenously determining the search effort
on both sides of the market. High wages will induce workers to search harder. This
generates a wage curve on the supply side as higher search effort would reduce
unemployment by increasing the matching rate for given separation rates."° But as
employers will reduce their search efforts and aggregate unemployment falls relative
to the vacancies, the effect on matching is compensated for and as higher wages
imply that fewer jobs will generate a surplus, unemployment must rise in
equilibrium.?™ For given separation rates, this implies that the search model of
unemployment can be represented by an upward sloping supply curve. In addition to
269 see Davidson (1990) and Pissarides (1990, 2000) for excellent and more complete overviews of
this literature.
2™ These are usually assumed to be insensitive to wages.
* " This is the normal shift along the demand curve.
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the usual bargaining parameters, however, now the elasticity of the workers' search
intensity to the wage level will have an impact.
Equilibrium unemployment is also determined by separation rates. Search
models of unemployment usually assume that separation is random and a job is
destroyed at a positive probability in each period. The separation rate, s, itself is
usually exogenous and invariant in the wage level but sometimes made to depend on
other variables in the model. In the latter case these other variables and the
sensitivity of the separation rate with respect to these variables will enter the
specification of the upward sloping supply curve. As is shown in Aghion and Howitt
(1994) the separation rate can for example be set equal to the rate of innovation in a
quality ladder model of product innovation. They show that in a steady state
equilibrium the number of jobs that is destroyed each period is equal to the number
of new jobs created, which in their model is equal to the rate of product
innovation.^? Similarly, in the model of Chapter 4, the rates of high and low skilled
job destruction could be set equal to the rates of innovation in these sectors. As can
be verified in the firm's labour demand equation in Cell 4 of Table 4.1, the demand
for labour at firm 7" falls in proportion to the number of firms in its sector. Hence firms
will continuously shed labour at a rate that is equal to the rate of (sectoral)
innovation. This implies that one can write:
(5.21)
In terms of modelling implications search unemployment is therefore of a different
breed altogether. It results in unemployment being the unintended side effect of job
turnover, which can be directly related to technical change and the resulting
reallocation of labour. The search model of unemployment suggests an adjustment
to the labour market equilibrium conditions as presented in Table 5.6.
"^ They assume one firm employs one worker and as is usual in quality ladder models, each quality
improvement implies one firm replaces another, creatingjob destruction and creation.
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Table 5.6: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Search Unemployment
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
ADEXES SECTOR/SKILL
LABOUR MARKET(S)
Ss = ^ / " .
= > u« = •
Equilibrium without Competition Equilibrium with Competition
(1 -OJL; . w , ' o , ' n I / '
Note that unemployment is now, as before, a decreasing function of the wage level
and consequently relative supply is upward sloping in the relative wage. Through the
separation rate, however, relative supply is now also decreasing in the relative
innovation rates in the model.*" The friction unemployment models thereby suggest
some additional parameters that may help explain international differences in
unemployment. Notable ones are the sensitivity of search intensity to wages and the
efficiency of the matching technology captured by parameters in M(.).
The aim of this chapter, however, is to find the extensions that help explain
relative unemployment dynamics at high and low levels in Europe and the US
respectively, while reconciling these observations with rising relative wages in the US
only. As separation rates are equal for both skill levels in the steady state and higher
for high skilled in the transition after a new general purpose technology is introduced,
friction unemployment would counterfactually predict equal or lower relative
unemployment rates in the US at higher levels ceteris paribus. Eliminating that
channel from the friction unemployment model basically reduces it to a matching
model in which wage bargaining establishes the relationship between wage and
unemployment levels. Therefore friction unemployment will not be considered
further.
2 " In the steady state these innovation rates are equal and while generating unemployment, they do
not explain different unemployment rates.
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5.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter introduced an extension to the model that allows one to analyse theimpact of quantity adjustments in the labour market. This extension is required
for two reasons. First, such quantity adjustments, caused by participation and
unemployment responses to relative wage shifts, may cause feedback effects on
technical change and interfere With the mechanisms explaining wage divergence in
the US identified in Part I. Second, with this extension the model predicts
participation and unemployment dynamics, which can be confronted with the stylised
facts on the US and EU presented in Chapter 1.
The extension was made in general terms in Section 5.1. Two subsequent
sections then presented several rather standard and definitely mainstream models
of labour supply and unemployment, respectively. It was shown that all these models
can explain the existence of an upward sloping aggregate relative supply curve.
Moreover, the specification of that upward sloping relative supply curve, or rather,
the endogenisation of participation and unemployment rates, leaves the rest of the
model intact and provides a simple and tractable way of analysing the most
important impact of introducing the labour-leisure trade-off, minimum wages, wage
bargaining, efficiency wages and finally labour market frictions. It was also argued
that the wage bargaining interpretation holds most promise for addressing the
divergent labour market trends in the OECD. Focussing on that interpretation the next
chapter will analyse and simulate the extended model numerically to check for the
predictions and implications of endogenous unemployment.
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CHAPTER 6:
THE MODEL EXTENDED
In Chapter 5 it was shown that the model can be extended to include voluntaryand involuntary unemployment by introducing a wage curve. The aim in thischapter is to evaluate the impact of this extension in terms of its contribution to
explaining observed differences in relative wage trends and unemployment levels. As
the general model has no closed form analytical solution this requires a numerical
simulation approach and further specification of the labour market is required. 274
The first section of this chapter therefore presents a parameterisation of the
wage curve, based on Gregg and Manning (1997). Of course in general the
specification of this curve and the interpretation of its parameters depends on the
underlying theory of unemployment or non-participation. The Gregg and Manning
specification is empirically inspired and Section 1 shows that its parameters can be
interpreted in terms of various underlying theories.
In Section 2 the extended model is analysed numerically. As in Chapter 4 this
requires careful estimation and calibration of the new parameters. The focus will be
on the wage bargaining interpretation of the wage curve. Chapter 5 has concluded
that this interpretation holds most promise for explaining the differences between
Europe and the US. To illustrate that an endogenous participation interpretation
would not yield very different results, the evidence for that interpretation is presented
in footnotes.
The numerical analysis shows that, under the specifications chosen and in
light of the evidence on the parameters, endogenous unemployment adjustments
have a very limited moderating effect on relative wage developments. The observed
differences in relative wage trends in the US and EU can therefore not be attributed
^'* In this chapter "the model" refers to the moderate PLC version of the model for low and high values
of y. As was argued in Chapter 4 these two versions allow one to illustrate the market size effect and
product life cycle dynamics that were identified as the prime sources of technology driven demand
shocks.
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to differences in labour market institutions. Unemployment and participation rates,
however, are very sensitive to the parameters of the wage curve. These results
suggest that US wage inequality is technologically determined, whereas European
high unemployment levels are largely due to inflexible labour market institutions.
Relative wages do remain sensitive to changes in the skill composition of the
working age population and the labour force. Hence relative wage dynamics are
driven primarily by what Tinbergen (1975, p.79) referred to as the "race between
educat/on and techno/ogy". The model of Chapter 4 already established an
endogenous link from education to technology through the labour market. The
endogenous education extension to the model was mentioned only briefly in Chapter
5 and remains an interesting issue for further research. In this chapter the focus is
on relative quantity adjustment through unemployment changes.
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6.i A SPECIFICATION OF THE WAGE CURVE
This section presents a specification of the wage curve due to Gregg and Manning(1997). This specification can be interpreted as introducing endogenous
participation and involuntary unemployment into the model. The Gregg and Manning
paper analyses the implications of skill biased technical change on the labour
market. After deriving a simple relative demand curve that is assumed to shift in
favour of the high skilled, they introduce a wage curve. They argue that, in addition to
unemployment, the wage of the other skill-group also determines the wage that
workers bargain for. Thus relative wages are linked directly to the unemployment
level of both skill groups and by implication relative supply is a function of the relative
wage. Their specification of the wage curve is empirically inspired and they present
various arguments to justify its functional form. As some of their arguments are
linked to endogenous participation and some to wage bargaining theory, their
specification can be thought of as an attempt to capture the essence of both.
In line with the arguments offered in Subsection 5.2.2 they suggest that the
wage is set as a mark-up, M(.), over the value of unemployment, us:^s
Ws=/W(Us)*Us (6.1)
They then propose to set the latter equal to a replacement rate 0<ps<l times the
average wage:
U » = P H W ^ W ^ - * " and ^ = P i W , * ' w ^ (6.2)
where 0<5s<l sets the exponential weights of the two
^ " This may be the replacement rate of unemployment benefits or of the reservation wage over
average wages. See Table 6.1.
" * Gregg and Manning (1997) refer to this average wage as the "reference wage".
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As was shown for the bargaining model in Subsection 5.2.2, they assume that:
• < 0 lim/vf(Uj) = 0)50 lim /vf(Us) = °° (6.3)
U,Tl " s i "SO
where mso is a parameter in the mark-up function that defines the minimum mark-up
required for workers to accept a job. By the definition of the reservation wage one
therefore obtains:
A statutory minimum wage, the value of leisure or the option value of unemployment
might underlie the parameter mso in a model of unemployment.^" Appendix 6A
shows that utility maximisation on behalf of individual workers can also underlie the
specification of the wage curve as in Equations (6.1)-(6.4). In that case non-labour
income or social security benefits determine the minimum mark-up in Equation (6.4).
Gregg and Manning do not suggest any further interpretation of this parameter nor
present a specification of the mark-up function as they focus on the implications of
introducing the other group's wage in the wage curved To evaluate the impact of
voluntary and involuntary unemployment in the model, however, a full specification of
the mark-up function is required. A specification that satisfies the properties of
Equation (6.3) above is:^9
(6-5)
2 " The minimum wage puts a floor in the labour market, typically at above unemployment benefit
levels. Anything a worker requires for giving up his unemployment status will cause mso to exceed 1.
s's They do suggest that the mark-up function has a constant elasticity with respect to unemployment
by estimating an equation: log(WsJ = a,, +a, logfi/ j + ajoglw^ J + otjIogfw s,) + 0X, +v., where vis the
error term, /3X is a vector of control variables and i indexes an individual, S skill and t time.
279 Obviously there are many others. This specification was chosen for convenience and the availability
of empirical evidence on the parameters, both for the endogenous supply and wage bargaining
interpretation. This evidence is presented in the sections below.
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In this specification uso can be interpreted as the level at which unemployment
becomes ineffective in reducing the wage claim in the bargaining model.^o if
Equation (6.5) is to represent the labour supply decision as in Section 5.2, then uso is
a level of inactivity that workers are unwilling to give up, regardless of the wages
In a bargaining context, es (>O) is the elasticity of wages with respect to
effective unemployment, us-uso. In the context of endogenous labour supply, this
elasticity is inversely related to minus the elasticity of labour supply and can be
linked to the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption.*^ Both
interpretations bring this parameter close to routinely estimated elasticities, which
facilitates the numerical specification of this important parameter below.
The wage curves are now given by:
1 - " H O
J- —
; (6.6)
1-8,
These wage curves are easily rewritten as standard labour supply curves where the
supply of skill level S depends positively upon the relative wage. Figure 6.1
illustrates those supply level curves. Note that wage inflexibility enters the model by
setting very low values for es. In that case shifts in unemployment have a limited
effect on the wage levels until unemployment approaches the lower bound i/so. In the
28° There are several reasons why this parameter may be positive. Empirical research, for example by
Nickell (1987), has shown that for example long-term unemployment is less effective in putting a
downward pressure on wage claims. In the bargaining model of Chapter 5 the acceptable
unemployment level was shown to be positively related to the profitability of firms, bargaining power
and labour turnover. Intuitively this is the case, because they increase both the gains from accepting
unemployment and the market power of workers and reduce the threat of unemployment respectively.
The acceptable unemployment level was also negatively affected by the elasticity of survival with
respect to employment and the discount rate. See the definition of uso =xs in Appendix 5B.
* " As their total available time is usually normalised and might as well be considered net of this
inelastic amount of leisure consumed, this parameter can then be set to 0 without loss of information.
^2 See Appendix 6A. Due to the income effect these parameters may then actually be negative. In that
case the higher relative wage reduces relative supply. As was argued in Chapter 5 this property is very
unlikely to arise when labour supply is aggregated over many individuals.
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limit the standard labour supply curves will be kinked and horizontal until
employment reaches (1-i/so) Ls* where supply curves have a vertical asymptote.
Figure 6.1: LABOUR SUPPLY LEVEL CURVES
Now consider the implications for the aggregate re/at/Ve labour supply curve. Given
the curves in Figure 6.1, the relative supply curve has an S-shape around the vertical
exogenous maximum labour availability curve, given by (1-UHO)LH7(1-ULO)/-I.* as in
Figure 6.2 below. This shape can be verified by substituting for unemployment and
using Equation (6.6) to write relative aggregate labour supply as:
l - ( (WH/wJ*»-*nv,pJt»~ ( I - U
!-((*„/wJ
(6.7)
Note that Equation (6.7) has a positive intercept, is upward sloping over its entire
domain and has a horizontal asymptote at the relative wage level that reduces the
denominator to 0. This implies the relative supply curve must be S-shaped. It can
also be verified in Equation (6.7) that for every relative wage level between an upper
and lower bound there exists a unique relative supply.
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Figure 6.2: EQUILIBRIUM IN THE LABOUR MARKETS
The upper and lower bounds are reached when the unemployment of one group
approaches 1.283 At those relative wage levels the relative supply falls to 0 or
becomes infinite.
Consider again the case of extreme wage inflexibility where one has nearly
horizontal supply level curves that become near vertical at (l-uso)Ls*. In that case the
relative supply curve will be horizontal up to and beyond the relative exogenous
availability. This, however, also implies that the relative supply curve becomes nearly
vertical at the original exogenous relative availability. In that section of the relative
supply curve, large changes in relative wages are required to generate small changes
in relative (un)employment. The reason for this rather peculiar result, a near vertical
section in an otherwise horizontal relative supply curve, is that both individual supply
curves were assumed to have a vertical asymptote. This vertical section of the
relative supply curve may explain why the trade-off hypothesis fails to explain the
data. As any equilibrium that has significant employment of both skill types will be
found close to the original relative exogenous availability, the trade-off between wage
283 Ag was mentioned in the figures, the upper bound is given by w^/vv^ = ( m ^ ) " " " , the lower
bound by »„ /w< = (m^p,,)" ' ° '. It is argued that both terms in brackets are likely to be smaller than
1, which implies that the lower bound is smaller and the upper bound larger than 1.
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inequality and unemployment is unlikely - ironically the more so in countries with high
wage inflexibility. Hence if workers, implicitly or explicitly, bargain over relative rather
than absolute wage levels, the trade-off between relative wage stability and high
unemployment levels does not exist.^
Now consider how the interaction with technological change is affected.
Chapter 5 already indicated that, as long as F(.) is upward sloping in relative wages,
the PMA-curve needs to be adjusted but retains its concave, upward sloping shape.
For the model specifications that do not have competition over high skilled labour
between production and R&D, this implies that the model still has a stable
equilibrium, where the RDA-curve intersects the thus adjusted PMA-curve from
above.^ ss in Figure 6.3 below these curves, adjusted for the wage curve, are
presented graphically.
Figure 6.3: THE EXTENDED MODEL
^ It should be noted here that a trade-off does exist between wage and unemployment /eve/s.
285 in general multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. It is possible for the RD.A (of type II) to intersect
the adjusted PMA more than once and the model may even have 2 stable equilibria. The moderate
PLC model, however, will not generate multiple stable equilibria. As numerical simulations will
generally not converge to an unstable equilibrium, the issue is less relevant and will be dealt with in
the footnotes when it is required.
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Given technology, HH/HL, the right panel determines the relative wage and relative
unemployment rates simultaneously, in a point such as A. But the model is not in
steady state equilibrium at A. The left panel shows the familiar RDA-P/WA diagram.
The PMA-curve essentially captures the labour market equilibrium in the right hand
panel for various levels of n^/ru. So in the short run the economy is always on the
PMA-curve, in point A'.^e As was shown in Chapter 4, when that point lies below the
RDA-curve, nf/r)L will rise, indicated by the white arrows. It should be noted that
relative demand is conditional on technology, in this case on n^/riL. A higher n^ni.
intuitively increases the demand for high skilled workers at every relative wage and
therefore would shift the curve to the right. Induced innovation thus shifts the
demand curve in the right panel until in the long run relative wages, relative
employment rates and nn/riL all stabilise in points 8 and 6'.
Competition over high skilled workers between manufacturing and R&D
considerably complicates the mathematics but not the principles involved. As in
Chapter 4, it requires the equality of the marginal value product of labour in
manufacturing and R&D. Appendix 4A shows that the solution can be computed
when labour supply is exogenous by numerically solving a single equation for HH/HL.
The same procedure will yield a solution here, as the RDA-curve can be used in
Equation (6.7) to write the previously exogenous relative supply as a function of
As in Chapter 4, competition over high skilled labour does not affect steady
state results and by the calibration of the discount rate its impact is also
quantitatively limited in the transitional dynamics.*^ Both steady state and
transitional dynamics analysis in the moderate product life cycle model requires full
numerical specification and simulation, as analytical solutions do not exist in the
moderate product life cycle model.
286 Note that the S-shape carr ies over to the PMA-curve. In the f igure a type I RDA-curve was drawn as
it guarantees tha t the model has a stable steady state equi l ibr ium. For the type II RD/4-curves, a
unique equi l ibr ium is not guaranteed. See Section 6.2.
287 j o obtain the equat ion one should solve Equation (6.6) yielding unemployment as a funct ion of
relative wages. Using the RDA-curve to write that expression as a funct ion of n t / r i i . subst i tu t ing one
minus tha t expression t imes avai lable labour for both Ls* in Equation (4A.34) yields the steady state
condi t ion.
™ By cal ibrat ing the model such tha t a mere 1.2% of the labour force is in R&D, the relative
employment levels in manufactur ing are hardly af fected.
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6.2 THE IMPACT OF THE WAGE CURVE
In the previous section it was shown that the Gregg and Manning (1997)specification of the wage curve yields an S-shaped aggregate relative labour supply
curve. The upper and lower bounds imply that relative wages must move within a
limited but still potentially wide band. The slope of the curve determines how
exogenous shocks translate into relative wage and relative employment adjustments.
The trade-off hypothesis, discussed in Chapter 1 and often offered as an explanation
for relative wage stability in Europe, claims that the band is narrower and the slope is
flatter in Europe than it is in the US. Although Chapter 1 has already dismissed the
trade-off hypothesis based on the absence of predicted relative unemployment
responses, the present model extension allows one to carefully trace that failure to
the wage curve parameters by investigating the evidence available on their values in
Europe and the US.
The first subsection below concludes from the available evidence on these
parameters that the re/at/Ve supply curve in the mid 70s was not that different,
causing the trade-off hypothesis to fail. In the process the baseline numerical values
for the parameters in the model are obtained. The baseline simulations illustrate that
the introduction of the wage curve hardly changes the relative wage response to a
given increase in the relative availability of skilled labour. As unemployment is linked
to relative wages through the wage curve, however, that also implies that the
baseline fails to reproduce stylised facts on unemployment. This requires one to
seriously consider the possibility that the wage curve was misspecified. A calibration
exercise in the second subsection, however, illustrates that stylised facts on relative
wage and unemployment dynamics can easily be reconciled within the model when
empirically justifiable shifts in the wage curve parameters are considered. From this
analysis it can be concluded that, while differences in unemployment dynamics can
easily be attributed to diverging labour market institutions, labour market rigidity has
not prevented relative wage changes in Europe. Relative wage stability in Europe
indicates that relative demand, and thereby the technology driving it, moved more in
line with relative supply than in the US.
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In the final subsection it is shown that the endogenous technology response to a
more moderate relative availability shock and the lagged adoption of a new general
purpose technology both reduce the relative demand shifts that emerge in the model.
In a numerical simulation it is shown that a slower and more gradual increase in
relative availability allows for technology to respond and relative demand to keep up.
The initial relative wage drop and consequently the subsequent rise in relative wages
are smaller when the growth.rate of relative availability is reduced. Still, in this
experiment, the pattern of long-term wage adjustments is fully determined by the
degree of diminishing returns in innovation, captured by the value of y, as was the
case in Part I.
The existence of the product life cycle may cause the development of a
general purpose technology to be quite different in terms of its impact on relative
demand, than the adoption of that general purpose technology after a few years of
development. In the latter case the initial shock to product innovation is smaller, the
subsequent shock to process innovation larger, due to knowledge spillovers. In
calibrated simulations it is shown that the observed European and US relative wage
trends can be reproduced when the general purpose technology introduction or
adoption is modelled as a composite shock on the innovation productivity
parameters.
6.2.1 A NUMERICAL EVALUATION OF THE TRADE-OFF HYPOTHESIS
The interpretation of the parameters in the wage curve is presented for the wage
bargaining and the labour/leisure model in Table 6.1 below. As Chapter 5 has
already concluded that the wage bargaining extension holds most promise in
explaining US-EU differences, the focus will be on the former and the evidence
regarding the latter is presented in the footnotes. Observation, estimation and
calibration can be used to obtain the numerical values for these parameters and
variables. Before turning to the latter, consider the stylised facts that the model is
required to explain. First recall that the skill availability shocks were quite
comparable throughout the OECD.
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Table 6.1:
PARAMETER/VARIAS
INTERPRETATION OF PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES
DESCRIPTION/INTERPRETATION
WHERE S-(H. I )
H P WAGE UAA|R|^^^H
Hourly wage for skill group 5.
Unemployment rate for skill group S.
Ineffective unemployment level. For
example equal to long-term
unemployment.
Elasticity of wage level to effective
unemployment rate, which equals the
elasticity of the wage to
unemployment after correcting for
long-term unemployment.
Mark-up of reservation wage over
unemployment benefits.
Replacement rate of unemployment
benefits over reference wages.
Exponential weight of own and other
groups wage in reference wages.
Hourly wage for skill group S.
Inactivity rate or one minus
participation rate, measured as
hours of labour supplied
divided by hours available.
Minimum hours of leisure
never supplied.
Elasticity of wage level to
inactivity rate which equals
minus one over the elasticity of
supply to the wage level times
the average inactivity rate.
Mark-up of reservation wage
over social security benefits.
Replacement rate of social
security benefits over
reference wages.
Exponential weight of own and
other groups wage in reference
wages.
In the model these shocks are exogenous and originate in educational policies and
demographic developments. The data for the US were presented in Chapter 1 and
show a strong upward trend in the relative availability of high skilled workers. This
increase was particularly strong in the mid 70s. Acemoglu (2002b) attributes this to
large cohorts of Vietnam draft avoiding college graduates entering the labour market.
In Europe the availability of high skilled workers also increased, arguably by the same
magnitude over the entire period. In Europe this was due to relatively large post-war
babyboom cohorts entering the labour market, increasing the average educational
level more gradually than in the US.
Now consider the endogenous variables. Recall from Chapter 1 that the
relative wage dropped from 1.4 in the mid 70s to 1.3 in the early 80s and then rose
to about 1.6 in the early 90s in the US. Over the same period it remained stable in
most continental European countries with the UK and Ireland holding an
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intermediate position.289 Most of the OECD shared similar trends in the relative
participation of high and low skilled workers. Overall labour force participation
measured in persons remains quite stable in most OECD countries and hovers
between 85 and 90% in the US and UK, around 80% in Germany and 75% in
France.^o This does not imply that relative participation remained stable. The large
shifts between the skill groups, however, are remarkably comparable across the
OECD. In the OECD Jobs Study. (1994a) it is shown that participation ratios rose by
20% from about 1 in 1970 to about 1.2 in 1990 in the US.^* Over the same period it
rose by 25% from 1.2 to 1.5 in France. For both countries most of the rise occurred
over the 70s and stabilised over the 80s. The relative stability of this ratio at around
1.03 over the 80s in Germany and the UK suggests that relative participation rates
rose over the 70s and stabilised in the 80s throughout the OECD.292
Trends are quite different for involuntary unemployment. In the early 70s
unemployment was higher in the US than in the EU. Over the following decade
unemployment increased on both sides of the Atlantic, but Europe overtook the US
towards the end of the 70s. By 1979 unemployment rates had risen to between 2-3%
and 5-8% for high and low skilled respectively on both continents. Over time high
skilled unemployment rates went up to 3-4% in the US and Europe respectively in
1984. Over that same period the rates rose to 12-16% for the low sk i l led .^
European unemployment then continued to rise to levels about one and a half times
the US levels that had fallen back to their 1979 levels by the end of the 80s.
As Chapter 1 has shown, however, relative unemployment consequently
developed similarly on both sides of the Atlantic, despite the marked differences in
2 ^ Due to problems with internat ional consistency in educat ional classif icat ions observed relative
wages can be qui te di f ferent f rom 1.4. Wage stabil ity is stylised by assuming the relative wage
remains about 1.4 for Europe over the 80s . One can interpret th is as normal is ing educat ional
classif ication systems such that a high ski l led worker is def ined as one earning 1.4 t imes the wage of
an unski l led worker in 1 9 7 5 . As a parameter was cal ibrated to obtain this result, it is a rather arbitrary
value. Assuming an equal s tar t ing posit ion for the US and EU faci l i tates the compar ison of s imulat ion
results.
290 gee OECD (2002) Labour Force Statist ics. Pencavel (1986) presents part ic ipat ion rates for several
countr ies s t retch ing back as far as 1 8 9 0 and concludes that in the long run overall part ic ipat ion rates
are remarkably stable.
291 The part ic ipat ion ratio is def ined as the ratio of high over low ski l led part ic ipat ion rates.
232 The similari ty in part ic ipat ion t rends indicates that they have litt le to add in explaining di f ferent
relative wage developments.
2w See OECD (1994a) .
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level. It rose over the early 80s and then declined again.^s" The underlying trends
only start to diverge in the mid 80s. In the US the recovery in the late 80s and early
90s brought both unemployment rates down. But low skilled rates fell faster than
high skilled ones, causing relative unemployment to fall. A similar pattern was
observed in the UK but at later stage, as overall unemployment rates dropped below
5% only towards the end of the 90s.295
Because the US and Europe started out at comparable levels of
unemployment in the mid 70s, it is justified and convenient to calibrate both to a
common starting position. Stylising the data discussed above, Table 6.2 suggests to
set high skilled unemployment at about 1.5%, whereas low skilled unemployment is
set at some 5% of unemployment for calibration purposes at a relative wage of 1.4.
Table 6.2: SUMMARY OF STYLISED FACTS
VARIABLE
Mid 70s
1.4
0.015
0.05
Early 80s
1.3
0.03
0.12
COUNTRY/
Early 90s
1.6
0.03
0.10
PtKiOD
Mid 70s
1.4
0.015
0.05
Early 80s
1.4
0.04
0.16
Eaii> 90s
1.4
0.05
0.15
In Europe relative unemployment rates initially rose due to a strong increase in low
skilled unemployment, which stabilised at the high level. Relative unemployment
came down as high skilled rates went up further to about 5%.296 Table 6.2 presents a
summary of the stylised facts on unemployment and relative wage dynamics. The
model will be calibrated to reproduce these stylised facts.
Now consider the parameters of the wage curve. Under the specification of
the wage curve in Equation (6.6) it is the effective unemployment rate, us-uso, that
2** Recall that, following custom in the literature, relative unemployment is defined as UI/UH.
*« See OECD (2002b).
29* A notable exception is Germany where reunification first caused both unemployment rates to fall as
in the US. By the mid 90s, however, Germany too joined the European high unemployment level club.
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reduces wage pressure.^ Nickell (1987) finds that rising long-term unemployment
compensated for a lot of the downward pressure exerted by higher unemployment in
the period 1957-1985 in Britain. According to Bean (1994) this is the case in the rest
of Europe as well.
Long-term unemployment can therefore be regarded as ineffective and this
provides an interpretation of i/so- On average between 5 and 10% of the unemployed
remained unemployed for more than a year in the US over the entire period under
consideration. In contrast, Germany, France and the UK have experienced much
higher long-term unemployment shares between 30 and 50%.298 Long-term
unemployment is and has been concentrated among the low skilled both in the US
and EU over the entire period under consideration.*^
Taking the mid 70s as the baseline situation implies using long-term
unemployment rates at about 5% and 10% for the high and low skilled respectively
for the US. As overall long-term unemployment hovered around 20% in France at that
time, the only country in the EU for which the OECD (1994a) presents data, 15 and
30% were used for high and low skilled labour in Europe. The subsequent rise in long-
term unemployment over the 80s must be interpreted as an exogenous shock to the
model as the duration of unemployment has not been endogenised. It can be verified
in Equation (6.6) that this shock will, all else equal, drive up wage levels and
unemployment rates. It might therefore also affect relative unemployment and
relative wages in the short and long run and explain part of the unemployment
divergence between the US and EU.^ oo
Evidence on the elasticity of wages with respect to effective unemployment
rates, es, can be found in the empirical literature on the wage curve. The wage curve
has been estimated for many countries including the ones of prime interest here, the
297 The minimum inactivity level, uso can be normalised to 0 for both skill levels when a labour-leisure
model underlies the wage curve.
*>8 see OECD (2003a) and Gazeley and Newell (1999).
2^ Reliable data on relative long-term unemployment rates by skill were unavailable for the countries
and period under consideration. Bollens (2001) presents a figure for 1997 for the EU. That shows the
incidence of long-term unemployment for the low skilled labour force is about 3 to 4 times as high as
that for high skilled. As normal unemployment rates are about 2 to 3 times higher for low skilled, this
seems to suggest that the incidence of long-term unemployment among low skilled unemployed is
between 1 and 2 times higher than that of the high skilled. This sets a range for sensitivity testing.
**> Its impact on relative wages is negligible as long as the long-term unemployment shock is
introduced symmetrically.
187
US, Germany, France and the UK. Usually the studies in this field run a regression of
the form:
log w,« = «o + «i log(u«) + 0X*i + "« (6-8)
where / indexes individuals or groups, c indexes a country or region and t indexes
time, a i is now the elasticity of the wage level to changes in the unemployment rate.
Typically empirical studies find a negative coefficient of between -0.01 and -0.2. See
for example Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994). Their results suggest that
Europe is closer to the upper end of the range although t-statistics are quite low,
implying that they are not significantly different from the estimates for the US.
The empirical evidence presented in for example Card (1995), Gregg and
Manning (1997), Johansen (1999), Black and Fitzroy (2000) and Kingdon and Knight
(2001) suggests that the elasticity should indeed be negative and lies significantly
below 1. Guichard and Laffargue (2000), using a panel of OECD-countries, make a
case against international differences in this elasticity. Card (1995), Johansen
(1999), Bartik (2000) and Black and Fitzroy (2000) find evidence that low skilled
wages are about twice as responsive to changes in unemployment than high skilled
wages. Nickell and Bell (1995) and Gregg and Manning (1997) on the other hand
find that this elasticity is quite similar between skills.^* All studies suggest a very low
and similar value for both skill groups throughout the OECD.
Note, however, that in the specification of the wage curve in Equation (6.6) es
is the elasticity with respect to the effect/Ve unemployment rate. Hence the estimated
elasticities must be corrected for the differences in long-term unemployment rates if
they are to provide an adequate value for es in the numerical simulations below. The
unemployment elasticity of wages is now given by:
(6.9)
Us - U c
3w Nickell and Bell (1995) find -0.05 and -0.06 for low and high skilled respectively. Gregg and
Manning (1997) introduced relative wages in their specification of the wage curve and estimate
values of -0.04 and -0.02 respectively, but these estimates are not significantly different from each
other.
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Hence the elasticity with respect to effective unemployment must be set equal to:
fis=("so/"s-l)°<i (6-10)
where oti is about - 0 . 1 , the coefficient estimated in Equation (6.8) above. Long-term
unemployment was a low (5-10%) and similar share of total unemployment for both
skills in the US throughout the period under consideration, so the required correction
is minimal and £s is set equal to (minus) the estimated elasticities at -0.1 for the
US.3°2 The high long-term unemployment rates in Europe, however, call for a
downward adjustment of this parameter for the EU. Averaging long-term
unemployment over the period under consideration, the elasticity with respect to
effective unemployment might be set to 0.75 and 0.5 times the estimated elasticity
of wages to unemployment, for high and low skilled workers respectively.^ This
reduces the elasticity of wages with respect to effective unemployment for both skill
levels relative to the US and reduces that of low skilled workers by more.
Wage levels, both in the US and EU, therefore hardly respond to changes in
unemployment.3°" By implication both relative supply curves are very flat. Indeed, as
was argued above, when the elasticity approaches 0 the supply curve will become
perfectly elastic at the upper and lower bound with a vertical section at (1-L/HO)LH*
/(l-U[.o)U*.3°5 As observed unemployment rates are much closer to uso than to 1,
however, the calibrated equilibrium will lie on the almost vertical section of the
relative supply curve.
The lower elasticity for Europe, although consistent with the commonly
accepted observation that European workers have to accept more unemployment to
offset wage reductions, also causes the relative supply curve to be steeper around
the equilibrium than in the US. For the relative supply curve to enforce wage stability
3°2 Correcting for the differences in long-term unemployment partially reverses the higher elasticities
found for low skilled.
3°3 The correction is based on an average long-term unemployment rate of 25 and 50% of total
unemployment for high and low skilled, respectively. Such a correction would not be warranted if
parameters are given a labour/leisure interpretation.
3M It is likely that this was the case for different reasons. The US is close to its natural rates of
unemployment, whereas in Europe institutional rigidity and long unemployment duration play a role.
305 At the upper (lower) bound the low (high) skilled will switch from supplying 1-uso to 0.
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in the face of demand shifts it is therefore required that the upper and lower bound
are much closer together in Europe. The upper and lower bounds to the relative wage
are given by:
(6.11)
Therefore consider the evidence on the parameters in Equation (6.11). As was shown
in Chapter 5, a wage bargaining context implies that the mark-up is defined relative
to the unemployment benefit level, PjWs^w.j*"**. As benefit levels are usually linked
to average and own wage levels, the exponential weights, 5s, may differ in the
reference wagcwj^w^'"**, for high and low skilled workers. But hard evidence on
these parameters is difficult to obtain as little empirical research has been done.
Gregg and Manning (1997) provide an estimate of the wage curve for the UK.
Their results suggest that both wage levels are important to both skill types. They find
5H=0.46 and 5L=0.71. AS is intuitively plausible they thus find that the weight of low
skilled wages is larger for high skilled than the weight of high skilled wages is for the
low skilled. Still it is remarkable that their estimate of 5H is actually below 0.5. They
argue that this can be attributed to the large share of low skilled in their sample. If
benefits are set relative to average rather than own group wages, than through
average wages the low skilled labour share pushes the estimated weight on high
skilled wages down.
As high skilled workers constitute a larger share of the workforce in Germany,
the US and France, all three are likely to have a larger 5H and smaller 5L, although
decentralised bargaining structures in the US may reduce this effect.^ But since
comparable estimates are not available for Germany, France and the US, the Gregg
and Manning estimates are used below. Relatively wide bounds for the sensitivity
so* A similar argument applies in the labour/leisure interpretation of the model. To the extent than
non-labour incomes, incomes foregone, household income and the value of home production vary with
the own and average wage level, the exponential weights may vary. As the entire domain is checked in
the sensitivity analysis, these parameters are adequately considered.
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analysis are set to avoid numerical specificity. The domain is {0,1} for both
parameters and the numerical results will be tested for robustness on that interval.
The replacement rate, ps, which reduces the reference wage to the
unemployment benefit level, can be related to the data on measured replacement
rates. The OECD (2002a) presents an average replacement rate of unemployment
benefits over average wages, its so-called summary measure of benefit entitlements,
for the period 1961-1999 and the entire OECD. These replacement rates range
between 10% for the US to about 50% for the Netherlands, with Germany and France
hovering around 30% and the UK at around 20%. Over time these replacement rates
rose in France and the Netherlands, remained stable in the US and fell for Germany
and the UK.
The replacement rate, however, also varies a lot with income. High-income
groups typically have lower replacement rates. In 1999 at 100% of the average
production worker wage, replacement rates are around 50% for the US and as high
as 80% in France. The OECD summary measure is an average replacement rate over
four income levels, which implies that higher income levels have far lower
replacement rates. Consequently one should set p<. > p«. In addition the evidence
suggests that the European replacement rate is about 1.6 times that of the US for
low skilled and possibly more for high sk i l led.^
Ceteris paribus this higher replacement rate lowers the upper bound and
increases the lower bound of the relative supply curve as would be required for
obtaining stable relative wages. Whether these differences show up in the upper and
lower bound relative wages, however, also depends on the minimum mark-up, mso,
over unemployment benefits that workers require for leaving unemployment. This
parameter is unobservable and is used to calibrate the model to historical
unemployment levels in the US and EU. Given the other parameters, Equation (6.6)
defines a direct relationship between the relative wage and both unemployment
levels. Hence these two parameters can be calibrated to generate realistic
unemployment rates in the baseline.
Benefit entitlements do not fall as quickly as in the US.
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However, as the parameter mso is calibrated and appears multiplicatively with the
replacement rate in the specification of the wage curve, the level of ps has no impact
on the upper and lower bounds as such and will only affect the calibrated value of
mso.3°® As the value of the replacement rate is entirely inconsequential it can be set
to 0.65 to ensure that mso always lies above 1, which is desirable for theoretical
6.3 below presents a summary of the numerical specification.
Table 6.3: NUMERICAL SPECIFICATION OF PARAMETERS
PARAMElr
I
UHD
p«
PL
£ H
•^^
^ H | mLo
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H ao
OL
• ' > ' : t , . '..'. l " j ' u • •
0.1*ut 0 .3*UL
0.65 0.65
0.65 0.65
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.075
0.05
0.5
0.7 0.7
Calibrated to get
UH=0.015
Calibrated to get
ui=0.05
Calibrated to get
RR+RD=0.012*
((1-OH)LH*+((1-UL)U-)
Calibrated to get
Gnl=GnH=Gn=0.03
3 R
Calibrated to get
WH/WI.=1.4
1
OECD (2003a)
See Text
See Text
0.01-0.2
0.01-0.2
Gregg and Manning
(1997)
Gregg and Manning
(1997)
NA
NA
0.02-0.92
NA
NA
NA
Normalised
SENSITIVITY TEST
RANGE
L'.L' i. L'. 1
0.01-0.2
0
0
0.01-0.2
0.01-0.2
0-1
0-1
+/-50%
+/-50%
+/-50%
See the
GPT-experiment
below
Seethe
GPT-experiment
below
+/-50%
Normalised
3o» In addition the sensitivity of the model to these parameters is equal and no separate sensitivity
test is required.
**> Setting it higher reduces mso proportionally such that the product is constant. The product is
generally smaller than 1 as all calibrated values for mso lie below 1.5. The same applies to the
labour/leisure interpretation, as this parameter is then interpreted as the replacement rate of social
benefits over some reference wage and also enters multiplicatively with a calibrated parameter.
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Having set the parameter values, the model can now be simulated numerically to
analyse its predictions regarding relative wages and unemployment rates. Figures
6.4-6.5 below present the baseline simulations for the moderate PLC model with low
and high y respectively.
Figure 6.4: SIMULATION OF RELATIVE SUPPLY SHOCKS FOR US AND EU
Strong Diminishing Returns in R&D (y=0.4)
Wages
As in the simulations of Chapter 4, the relative availability of skilled labour was
increased by 100% over a relatively short interval from period 50 to 80. The bold
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1lines represent the results from Chapter 4 (without a wage curve) for reference. The
thin lines were generated with a wage curve as specified above, where black
represents the US and white the EU.^°
Figure 6.5: SIMULATION OF RELATIVE SUPPLY SHOCKS FOR US AND EU
Weak Diminishing Returns in R&D (y=0.9)
Base Line US
3i° The only differences at this point being that for the EU-case long-term unemployment was allowed
to rise and the elasticity in the wage curve was adjusted downwards to account for higher average
long-term unemployment rates. The two cases can therefore also be used to illustrate the sensitivity of
the model predictions with respect to uso.
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In the top panels it can be verified that relative wages closely follow the original
results. This indicates that, as has been predicted, the demand curve intersects
relative supply in a relatively vertical section.^" The supply shock shifts the relative
supply curve to the right causing wages to drop. As the endogenous technology
response materialises, demand shifts out and relative wages recover. The strong
market size effect in Figure 6.4 pushes relative wages beyond their baseline value.
The strong increase in European long-term unemployment rates stabilises relative
wages somewhat, but has a very limited impact.
Table 6.4: ELASTICITIES WITH RESPECT TO WAGE CURVE PARAMETERS 3 "
SHORT TER*. b:LADY STATE
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H /TIHOPH
^EK^fl miopt.
^ ^ ^ H /tut.
• _
6H
5L
1 £iitul
0.0134
0.0544
0.1120
-0.3621
0.0342
•0.0807
0.0004
-0.0027
1.461
-1.770
-5.780
9.187
-3.024
2.428
-0.047
0.085
1.759
-0.267
14.500
2.023
4.484
0.413
0.050
0.013
As for y=0.4
Q.0027
0.0108
0.0239
-0.0830
0.0071
-o.oiegn
0.0001
-0.0006 ^
-0.0036
-0.0141
-0.0322
0.1261
-0.0094
0.0229
•0.0001
0.0007
1.52S
-2.020
-6.060
14.080
-3.165
3.050
-0.050
0.103
-1.569
-2.170
-6.237
18.430
-3.250
^ 3.466
•0.516
0.113
1.815
-0.054
15.600
0.425
4.660
0.085
0.051
0.003
1.850
0.071
16.330
-0.607
4.775
-0.113
0.053
-0.004
3" Which is the result of calibrating the model to generate observed unemployment rates, which
forces the relative employment rate, (1-UH)/(1-U0. to lie close to 1, and hence close to the vertical
section in the relative supply curve.
312 Appendix 6B presents the sensitivity analysis as announced in Table 6.2. In this table all
parameters were shocked by 10%. In the appendix the impact of setting parameters to the minimum
and maximum of the sensitivity testing range is evaluated.
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Table 6.4 shows that the full model in general and relative wages in particular are not
very sensitive to the parameters of the wage curves, both in the short run (given
technology) and in the steady state.^ The elasticities in Table 6.4 were computed
numerically by shocking all wage curve parameters individually by 10% while keeping
all other parameters at the values given in Table 6.3. The computed elasticities never
exceed 0.4 and for most parameters they lie below 0.1. The fact that for example the
signs on OIHOPH and DILOPL are reversed, implies that shifts in replacement rates in
the same direction, such as observed in Europe above, hardly have any impact on
relative wages as the two effects cancel. For low values of y the sign of the long-run
effect is the same as in the short run but the elasticity is significantly lower, indicating
that an endogenous technology response partially offsets labour supply shocks.
That sign changes with the introduction of the strong market size effect
(y=0.9), creating the counter-intuitive result that positive wage pressure shocks
cause the wage of the group involved to decline relative to their colleagues. As wage
pressure shocks make a given type of labour artificially scarce, that result is what
one would expect from the strong market size effect. Still the effects, as for the more
intuitively plausible weak induced innovations model, are quantitatively limited.
The only shock on the supply side that really matters for relative wages seems
to be the exogenous increase in the availability of skilled workers. This conclusion,
although to some perhaps suspect and disappointing, is very much in line with
results obtained by for example Gregg and Manning (1997), who claim that
educational policy is much more important in driving relative wages than labour
market institutions. Given the limited impact of wage bargaining, it will not come as a
surprise that the mechanisms identified in Chapter 4 still work more or less
unaffected in the extended model as well. The US relative wage behaviour can still be
reproduced as the permanent impact of the strong market size effect, the temporary
impact of introducing a new general purpose technology or a combination of the two.
This does not mean that labour market institutions do not make a difference. The
elasticities on relative unemployment and the unemployment levels are very large by
comparison, even in the long run. Note also that the sign of the effect on relative
3" Only the results for the moderate PLC model with competition are presented here.
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unemployment is the same for the short- and long-term, even with the strong market
size effect.^* This implies that an increase in the wage pressure of one skill group,
regardless of the impact on its relative wage, will always increase the unemployment
rate of that group relative to that of the other. The high elasticities also indicate that
wage pressure shocks primarily affect unemployment and hence are the prime
suspect for explaining the observed differences in unemployment levels.
As relative wages are negatively related to unemployment rates by the wage
curve, the relative unemployment rate, defined as the ratio of low over high skilled
unemployment, will follow the pattern of relative wages closely when wage curve
parameters are stable. In the lower panels of Figures 6.4-6.5 the predicted impact of
the relative availability shock on relative unemployment is illustrated. The trade-off
introduced by the relatively flat wage curves (low es) generates large predicted shifts
in relative unemployment rates. This effect is most pronounced in the European
(almost) constant returns to scale (y=0.9) speci f icat ion^ But even without the
strong market size effect and European style increases in long-term unemployment
rates, the wage curve extension predicts an initial drop, followed by a rise in relative
unemployment rates. Such shifts, as was shown in Section 1.2, are clearly
counterfactual and the interaction between technology and the labour market fails to
explain unemployment dynamics on either continent. To reconcile stylised relative
wages and unemployment levels of Table 6.2 in the model, some significant shifts in
the wage curve parameters must be introduced.
3" For the level of unemployment these signs may differ.
3^ 5 Note that in Figure 6.4 the line representing Europe has not reached a new steady state in period
95. In fact, the strong rise in long-term unemployment that distinguishes it from the US case causes
the long-term stability of the model to collapse entirely. The PMA-curve simply rotates out of range for
the concave upward sloping RDA-curve in this specification. Consequently relative wages grow to
infinity as the low skilled wage falls to 0 and similarly, and more exaggerated, relative unemployment
explodes as relative wages rise.
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6.2.2 RECONCILING UNEMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS AND RELATIVE WAGE TRENDS
The simulations were generated under the hypothesis that the parameters of the
wage curve remained stable at their baseline levels. That generated counterfactual
predictions for unemployment in both the US and Europe. From that observation two
conclusions are possible. The bargaining structures and wage determination have
not remained stable over time and between the two regions or the wage curve has
been misspecified.
Assuming the wage curve was not misspecified, the sensitivity analysis
suggests that unemployment in general and relative unemployment in particular has
been driven by shifts in wage curve parameters. It was already argued that diverging
long-term unemployment experiences are part of the story, but in addition the
Reagan and Thatcher Administrations in the US and UK clamped down on union
power while in Continental Europe they remained key players in the labour market. In
addition over the 80s replacement rates in Europe increased, whereas in the US and
UK they fell significantly, in particular at the lower ends of the pay sca led
Such developments seriously affected the bargaining position of workers and
cause diverging trends in wage pressure. To verify that the wage curve in its current
specification can reproduce the stylised facts, the mso parameters were recalibrated
to reconcile the predicted unemployment and relative wages with those presented in
Table 6.2. The results are presented in Table 6.5. The computed parameter changes
can be interpreted as the combined effect of exogenous shifts in replacement rates
on the one hand and union bargaining power on the other.3^ The table shows that
wage pressure should have increased for both skill levels in the late 70s by some 5-
7% in the EU, whereas in the US the high skilled experienced a modest 3% wage
pressure increase while low skilled wage pressure rose by some 14%.
3»s See for example OECD (1994b), Table 8.B.I.
3i7 See also Appendix 5B, where union power was identified as one of the parameters that defines
mso. Union bargaining power is obviously not directly observable. Union density dropped significantly
throughout the OECD. but bargaining extension laws still ensure coverage is high in Europe (over 90%
in France and Germany versus less than 20% for the US with the UK at 50% in the middle, see Nickell
et al. (2003), Tables 4 and 5).
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VARIABLE
Table 6.5: THE REQUIRED WAGE PRESSURE SHOCKS
COUNTRY/ PERIOD
Mid 70s
1.4
0.05
Early 80s Earl, 90s
1.3 1.6
0.05
1 1 99Q1K1 19005 -"-"=>•">l.iyUUS (+33%)
0.015
0.1
1.02044
0.05
0.03
0.1
1.16572
(+14.2%)
0.12
0.05
1.36363
(+10.9%)
0.03
0.1
1.05126
(-9.8%)
0.10
i
Mid 70s Earlv 80s
1.4 1.4
0.15
1.31261
0.015
0.3
1.17701
0.05
0.2
1.40701
(+7.2%)
0.04
0.5
1.24107
(+5.4%)
0.16
IVifiv OOs
1.4
0.3
1.4173
(+0.7%)
0.05
0.6
1.21829
(-1.8%)
0.15
Union militancy may have been a factor in explaining this pattern while the
acceleration in the availability of college graduates might have dampened the
upward trend in wage pressure in the US for high skilled. Over the 80s the general
recession, de-unionisation, Reaganomics and Thatcherism caused wage pressure to
drop for the low skilled in Anglo-Saxon countries. High skilled wage pressure,
however, might have increased, as the new general purpose technology increased
their bargaining power.
In Europe there were some further - but very modest - changes in wage
pressure over the 80s as union power and replacement rates remained high.^s Such
shifts in wage pressure would make observed relative wage behaviour consistent
with observed unemployment levels and explain the latter given the former. To the
extent that introducing such shifts is justified empirically, the wage curve is not
seriously misspecified. However, relative wages remain to be explained endogenously
and wage stability in Europe still requires an explanation. The next subsection will
argue why it is likely that relative labour demand evolved more gradually and more in
line with supply in Europe.
3i8 Note, however, that wage pressure is already significantly higher in Europe than in the US in the
mid 70s as well. This is primarily due to the fact that replacement rates were set to 0.65 for both skill
types and continents. The higher levels of mso thus primarily reflect differences in replacement rates.
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6.2.3 ADJUSTMENT SPEED AND ADOPTION LAGS
In Section 1.2 two hypotheses were put forward to explain relative wage stability in
Europe. First an endogenous innovation version of Tinbergen's (1975, p.97) "race
between educa(/on and tecnno/ogy" was presented. It was argued that endogenous
technology responses could offset gradual increases in the relative availability of
skilled labour more effectively than sudden shocks. A second hypothesis relied on
the product life cycle and attributed more gradual demand shifts to (endogenous or
exogenous) lags in adoption. The feasibility of both can be illustrated in numerical
simulation experiments. First consider the impact of a more gradual increase in
relative supply. Doubling the interval over which relative availability increases
exogenously by 100% yields a relative wage response that is much more moderate.
Figure 6.6 below presents the results in a graph. The upper panel shows the relative
wage response. The lower panel (next page) presents the explosive (thick) and more
gradual (thin) relative availability shock.
Figure 6.6: THE RACE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND EDUCATION
Upper Panel
200
Figure 6.6 (Continued): THE RACE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND EDUCATION
Lower Panel
The thick lines were reproduced from Figures 6.4 (black) and 6.5 (white) for
referenced The thin lines now present the corresponding relative wage response to
a more gradual relative availability shift in the same model. As should be expected,
the steady states are identical but in the transition the endogenous technology
response reduces the required relative wage shifts for the model with and without
the strong market size effect.
The absence of the Vietnam draft and the more gradual entry of post-war
babyboom cohorts in the labour market, may exogenously explain the more gradual
increase in the relative availability of skilled workers in Europe. To the extent that
educational policy was responsible, it contributed to the stability of relative wages.
Gregg and Manning (1997) indeed concluded from their analysis that it did much
more so than the usual suspect, institutional wage rigidity. The simulations show that
their result is even more pronounced when technology is allowed to respond
endogenously to relative availability shifts. But although the model predicts a more
stable relative wage, this hypothesis takes a rather closed economy approach, as the
3" Figure 6.5 presents the model without adjustment for higher long-term unemployment rates to the
elasticity of the wage to unemployment and long-term unemployment rates remain constant over time.
This was done to avoid the instability in the y=0.9 case. It has been verified, however, that up to the
point where the simulation breaks down numerically, the pattern is similar to those presented above.
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technology response in Europe is supposedly driven entirely by domestic availability
shocks and is not affected by events in the US. In addition, the predicted pattern of
wage adjustments still mimics that in the US, whereas some European countries saw
stable or even falling relative wages. Clearly more moderate availability shocks
cannot be the entire story and the lagged adoption hypothesis is more promising on
both accounts.
To illustrate the lagged adoption hypothesis one would ideally combine the US
and EU economy in one model and specify their trade and technology ties explicitly.
The 'new' goods in the US, and the knowledge they embody, would then also be
(partially) available for European R&D. Such extensions, however, require quite some
issues to be considered.^ A useful shortcut for analysing the impact of such
spillovers on European labour markets is to analyse the impact of exogenous
changes in a« and ao- As these parameters enter the model multiplicatively with the
knowledge stocks, see Cell 7 in Table 4 .1 , any changes in them can be interpreted as
exogenous knowledge spillovers that originate outside the model. Because only the
ratio of the two parameters seriously affects the model, the value of ao can be
normalised to the calibrated values for the baseline simulation.
One can now compute the knowledge spillovers that predict the relative wage
levels for a given shock to the relative availability of skilled labour. Recall that a
similar yet cruder experiment was suggested to represent the introduction of a new
general purpose technology in the US in Chapter 4. Figure 6.7 presents the results.
The thick lines represent the predicted relative wage response in the absence of
knowledge spillovers. These were already presented in Figures 6.4-6.6. The thin lines
represent the stylised relative wage behaviour in the US (white) and EU (black),
respectively. The lower panel shows the sequence of shocks on a*? computed to keep
the relative wage at that stylised level in every period. As is clear from the upper
panel, the response to a supply shock depends crucially on the degree of diminishing
returns to labour in the R&D sector.
320 Assuming for example also trade in goods implies that prices are equal and through the factor
price equalisation theorem wages will also converge. Non-tradables could be introduced to deal with
this counterfactual prediction, but these issues are better left for further research after this chapter
has established that international knowledge spillovers are important.
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Figure 6.7: GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
US y=0.4 EU y=0.4 -—»— US y=0.9 EU y=0.9
The spillover was calibrated with strong (dot) and weak (triangle) diminishing returns
to scale in innovation. It can be verified that the required shock is smaller when
diminishing returns are weak and the strong market size effect exists. The largest
shock is required to get the weak induced innovation model to reproduce stylised
relative wages for the US.
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Reproducing perfectly stable relative wages requires a smaller shock, which can be
interpreted as the loss of information as the general purpose technology spills over to
Europe or, and more intuitively plausible, as a simultaneous increase in the spillover
to low skilled complementary process innovation due to lagged adopt ion.^ The
product life cycle explanation argues that a new general purpose technology makes
product innovation more productive immediately. Due to the lag in adoption,
however, the productivity of development will also increase in the EU. Hence a«/ao
will rise in Europe, but not as much as it did in the US. In that case the model without
the strong market size effect can be calibrated to yield stable relative wages under a
rising relative supply.
Stable wages in the model with the strong market size effect would imply that
a« first rises but eventually falls relative to ao, which is quite an extreme assumption.
It should be interpreted as Europe not being able to grasp the fundamental principles
of the underlying general purpose technology and only adopting it through developing
low skilled labour intensive production processes for products already on the market
in the US. This might be a more adequate description of technology spillover to third
world countries.322
The shifts in the labour market parameters calibrated above, can now be
added to generate the observed patterns of relative unemployment. In the early 70s
wage pressure increased in the US for low skilled and in the EU for both. With the
recession of the 80s low skilled wage pressure dropped in the US, but in the EU
much less so as social security entitlements, high replacement rates and long-term
unemployment kept the pressure up. High skilled increased their bargaining position
in the US as they could start cashing in on the new general purpose technology.
In Europe pressure remained high and rising long-term unemployment
reduced the effective downward wage pressure from unemployment. This caused
high levels of unemployment in the EU, whereas especially the low skilled
unemployment rate dropped in the US. As unemployment dynamics, even in Europe,
hardly affect relative wages, this extension does not affect the interaction between
" i Recall that a« should be interpreted as ai?/ao as ao was normalised.
3 " in developing countries low R&D intensities might also make the assumption of (almost) constant
returns to scale in R&D less problematic. Empirical evidence, however, is lacking to substantiate such
claims at this point.
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relative skill availability, relative labour demand and innovation. Consequently it can
be concluded that relative unemployment and relative wages are unrelated in the
model, although the wage curve, a robust empirical relation between wage and
unemployment levels within skill groups, might have suggested otherwise.
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6.3 CONCLUSION
In this chapter the aim has been to evaluate an existing and some newly formulatedhypotheses on the US-EU differences in relative wage and unemployment
dynamics. It was shown that the trade-off hypothesis could not explain relative wage
behaviour under realistic parameter settings. This might strike one as odd, as the
correlation between wage stability and unemployment rates is very obvious and the
trade-off hypothesis provides a simple and intuitive explanation for that correlation.
Of course that makes one weary and the possibility of misspecification, either of the
wage curve in this part or the interaction between technology and labour demand in
the previous one, must be considered. It should also be noted that the calibration of
the model on relative wage and unemployment levels rather than, for example, their
growth rates, might have driven the results to some extent. Further research is
required to address these issues.
Keeping in mind these qualifications, however, the chapter did explain why
things might not be as obvious as they seem. In the context of the extended model,
institutional differences allow both high and low skilled European workers to bargain
for higher wages. This implies that they both suffer higher unemployment levels than
their American colleagues. Relative wages cannot be stabilised by that mechanism,
however, as that would require unemployment to seriously affect re/at/Ve
employment. As both groups' unemployment rates are much closer to 0 than to 1,
even in the EU, their relative employment rate is always close to 1 and relative supply
will be close to the relative availability of skills. Relative wages will then still be
sensitive to relative availability shocks and the endogenous technology responses
affecting relative demand. Analytical and numerical analysis has shown that this
conclusion can be squared with the evidence and unavoidably follows from the
assumptions made in modelling the interaction between technology and labour
demand in Part I and introducing the wage curve in this part.
To reconcile international differences in relative wage developments the
model suggests that one must look at differences in innovation and relative labour
availability. Two alternative hypotheses, a more gradual relative availability shock and
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lagged international technology spillovers, proved effective in explaining different
relative wage dynamics. Given relative wages, the unemployment dynamics seem to
be driven by the differences in labour market institutions. That gives rise to the
conclusion that there is no trade-off. It is the interaction between the relative
availability of skills and technology that drives the relative wage. Unemployment
differences are largely due to institutional factors. Low unemployment and rising
wage inequality are a coincidence in the US as are high unemployment levels and
wage stability in Europe. The policy implications of that conclusion are significant.
American policy makers can tackle their huge poverty problems without
having to fear European unemployment levels, whereas in Europe unemployment can
be addressed without accepting US inequality.^ What policy makers on both sides
of the Atlantic should be made aware off, however, is the fact that labour market
policies, income policies, science and technology policies and educational policies
will all interact. That interaction and its policy implications will be dealt with in the
final part below.
"^ That implies that relative poverty need not be a concern. Of course the absolute wage levels of the
low skilled should also be a concern. These may drop below acceptable levels when social security is
completely abandoned.
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PART III:
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
In the previous two parts the aim was to explain the 'natural' interaction betweentechnical change and the labour market without explicitly considering the role ofgovernment. In Part I the effects of labour market shocks on technological change
(the market size effect) and of technology shocks on the labour market (life cycle
effect of a general purpose technology) were analysed. It was concluded that wages,
through profits, are the key transmitter of such shocks. In Part II wage rigidity was
shown to affect the transmission mechanism only marginally, mostly because if both
wages are equally rigid, relative wages are still flexible, be it at high unemployment
levels.
This final part turns to the implications of and for policy in general and
taxation, labour market and science and technology policy in particular. It will
evaluate the effectiveness of policy instruments in light of the interactions between
technology and the labour market and investigate whether feedbacks through the
government budget reinforce or dampen the shocks. The analysis is presented in one
single chapter that will discuss the aims, introduce the instruments and analyse the
impact of policy in the model. The chapter concludes with some suggestions to
improve the position of the low skilled in the US and the unemployed in Europe. Its
contribution to the debate on policymaking is the idea that policy areas are linked
and goals can be conflicting. If this part provides insufficient arguments to cause
politicians to revise, than at least they should cause them to reconsider their
technology, labour market and income policies.
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CHAPTER 7:
THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MODEL
The analysis of policy serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, policy may helpexplain observed facts. On the other, as the model hopefully helps one tounderstand a relevant part of reality, policy advice summarises the
implications of that understanding. A common and straightforward way of doing both
is to analyse the impact of changes to exogenous variables in the model that to some
extent are under the control of policy makers in the real w o r l d . ^
Based on the analysis so far one could for example conclude that
unemployment benefits drive up the outside option of employees and thereby drive
up wages and cause unemployment. As was argued above, this helps explain the
different unemployment levels between the US and Europe. The obvious policy advice
for Europe would be to lower unemployment benefits as many have indeed
advocated.^ As unemployment benefits have been treated as exogenous variables
in the model, analysing such policies is equivalent to the sensitivity analyses that
were conducted.
Likewise, and perhaps more original, the experiments on parameter a«
indicate that, to combat wage inequality, it would be a good idea to subsidise low
skilled complementary process R&D when a new general purpose technology is being
introduced. However, such policy analyses overlook the fact that the government is
part of the economy and should be analysed as part of the model. In this chapter the
aim is to take the analysis of policy some steps further. The first step is to assume
that the government finances all expenditures out of taxes. Through the tax system
" " See for example Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).
"5 See for example the OECD (1994b). The OECD suggests many more ways in which the benefit
system can be improved in terms of its impact on unemployment. A tight benefit administration and
limits to the duration are examples of suggested labour market reforms. In the model the benefit level
captures the value of being unemployed, which includes such aspects as duration and administrative
hassle.
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such financing constraints may strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of any given
instrument in achieving a policy goal. The next step is to analyse if and how
instruments, aimed to for example stimulate economic growth, may help or hinder
other instruments aimed to achieve other goals, such as income redistribution and
unemployment reduction. Trade-offs and double-edged swords may exist. It is
important to identify them before switching to normative analysis in which the policy
implications are formulated.^
The first section addresses the goals, instruments and constraints for the
government. Then in Section 7.2 the model is extended with a government that is
financially constrained and has several instruments to raise taxes and implement
policy. In Section 7.3 the focus is on trade-offs and double-edged swords in current
policies. Section 7.4 formulates the policy implications and concludes.
328 Still the analysis is several steps short from the most sophisticated policy analyses. In a further
step the government can treated as a rational agent in the model who - given its competing aims, the
limited number of instruments to achieve them and fully aware of the structure of the model -
maximises his performance. This is the way in which for example the models of inflation in Walsh
(1998) introduce government. Taking the analysis of government one step further still, there is the
literature on political economy. See for example Persson and Tabellini (2000). In that literature
politicians are assumed set policy to maximise the probability of their re-election. Hence the
government's priorities become endogenous. These extensions will not be considered further.
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7.i AIMS, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
One cannot fruitfully formulate policy advice without some agreement on the aimsof policy. In reality a political process underlies the policy aims and frequent
adjustments are made.327 To avoid being caught in the complexities of politics this
chapter will focus only on the big issues and assume that there is agreement. Goals
like steady and sustainable economic growth, full employment and an equitable
distribution of wealth and income rank among the top priorities of governments
throughout the OECD.
It is a well-known fact that the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries
tend to put more emphasis on the former two than on the latter and consequently
put more faith in the market, whereas continental European countries stress the
latter goal and seem willing to accept lower rates of growth and unemployment. The
political and historical processes behind these priorities will not be modelled here,
even if it were possible to do so adequately.328 The analysis in this chapter treats
them as given. As the model only distinguishes two groups of workers, the goal of
equity must be interpreted as keeping relative wages at a level that yields a fair
return, r*. on investments in education, but no more. The goal of full employment can
also be interpreted as keeping unemployment as close as possible to a low target
level, IT.
Stable sustainable economic growth can be interpreted as stimulating a
stable rate of product innovation, that ultimately determines the rate of economic
growth in the long run. The government will aim for a target growth rate, r.329
32? Persson and Tabellini (2000) model this process.
32* Some efforts are even made in this area. Alesina and Angeletos (2003) for example make an
attempt at explaining the different attitudes towards income redistribution in a model where attitudes
towards fate interact with the democratic system to generate self-reinforcing equilibria.
329 A representation of these goals and the exogenous prioritisation is given in the objective function:
where it can be verified that the government would want to minimise this function and equity, full
employment and economic growth have weights rji, 172 and 1- /71-I2 • respectively. The use of objective
functions for governments is widespread in the monetary literature. See for example Walsh (1998).
Without uncertainty the objective function is merely a convenient tool to represent the policy goals.
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In pursuing their aims governments have a wide array of instruments. A first
categorisation of these instruments, often used in environmental policy analysis, is
market-based versus command and control instruments.^ The former are
instruments that change relative prices but leave the optimisation problem of other
agents in the model intact. One could think of taxes, wage-subsidies, excise taxes,
import tariffs, R&D subsidies etcetera. These instruments may affect the outcomes
but not the way people choose their behaviour. The latter are much harder to model
and would imply changing the optimalisation problems by adding constraints to other
agents in the economy in ways that help the government to achieve their goals. They
include for example import-quota, quality and sanitation regulation, active labour
market policies, government R&D and so on. Needless to say it is quite an involved
operation to model the implications of such instruments. In addition the changes to
the model would be specific to every single policy one would like to consider. Hence
the analysis in this chapter will consider only market-based instruments.
As the number of market-based instruments is limited to the number of
markets, the model allows for taxes and subsidies on final products, factors of
production and innovations. One additional policy instrument that was already
introduced as an exogenous variable in Chapter 6, are unemployment benefits. The
government provides social security to insure workers against sudden income
losses.^i The generosity of the social security system, to some extent a policy
instrument, was already identified as one of the key explanatory variables in the
trans-Atlantic unemployment differences.
Note at this point that all policy is conducted exclusively through transfer
payments. This brings one to the constraints the government has to consider when
setting market-based instruments to achieve its goals. Social security and subsidies
require financing. This financing is obtained through taxation, which in itself is also a
policy variable.
330 See Siebert (1998).
M I This additional aim must be introduced in the objective function in Footnote 329. Else the
government would choose to abandon the system as it causes unemployment and has negative
consequences for growth. The objective function could for example be augmented by adding a factor
that is positive in the share of the population below some pre-defined poverty line times the distance
to that poverty line.
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The key constraints on government policy are thus an economic and a financial
one.332 The financial constraint is required to ensure that the government can
maintain the level of transfer payments. A balanced budget constraint is therefore
imposed in the m o d e l . ^ The economic constraint is merely the way the "world", in
which the government operates, works. The behaviour of consumers, producers and
innovators in the economy is fully specified and perfectly predictable in the model.
Hence the government is constrained by, i.e. must consider, the predictable
responses to policy changes.
332 Obviously there can also be technical, polit ical, social, legal or ethical constraints, but those are not
explicitly model led here and cannot be addressed.
333 Lenders would require a return that translates in higher taxes in the future. As the required return
equals the return on innovative investments, consumers are indifferent about postponing the tax bill
and paying taxes today. Meanwhi le the deficit may crowd out innovative investments by increasing
interest rates.
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7.2 INTRODUCING THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MODEL
In the previous section taxes, subsidies and unemployment benefits were identifiedas the instruments of policy. It is relatively straightforward to introduce the market-
based instruments, taxes and subsidies, market by market, by adjusting the
corresponding cells of the model's formal synopsis Table 4 .1 . Table 7.1 illustrates
how that table is affected by introducing various taxes and subsidies.
In the top two cells are the consumers. They can be taxed by levying a
consumption tax. Section 1.3 has shown that most industrialised countries have a
consumption tax in one form or another. Value added taxes, excise taxes,
environmental charges etcetera drive a wedge between consumer and producer
prices. Although in the real world these taxes are often set to promote or discourage
the consumption of one good rather than another, it is unheard of that consumption
taxes discriminate between otherwise equal goods on the basis of the skill level of
the labour used in production. Hence it is reasonable to assume that the
consumption tax rate is a flat tax, levied on all products in the model. It is
mathematically convenient to introduce this tax as a mark up over consumption
prices. Hence in the model consumers pay rp(i) with r > l , whereas producers receive
only p(/) per unit of good /. This leaves price setting by producers unaffected. The
government in additional Cell 4 now receives a constant share of total expenditure:
T = (r - (7.1)
In the next two cells are the producers. They make profits and pay wages to their
employees. At this level one could thus introduce corporate and labour taxes.
Consider the latter first. As Section 1.3 has shown, labour taxes including social
security contributions are a very common and important means of generating
revenue in industrialised countries. In addition it was argued that labour taxes are
used to redistribute income from high to low income earners. As income is (perfectly)
correlated to skill in the model, it would be natural to introduce a separate tax rate
for high and low skilled.
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Table 7.1: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL ^
The Government
AGENT(S)
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« • • ;
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1
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r )
^^ In Cell 1 t and r obviously represent time. In Cells 2-7 the symbols represent labour and
consumption taxes, respectively. Note also that only the no competition product life cycle specification
is presented in Cells 6 and 7 and Xswas defined in Footnote 171 below Table 4.1 as:
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Table 7.1: FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL ^
The Government
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3w In Cell 1 t and T obviously represent time. In Cells 2-7 the symbols represent labour and
consumption taxes, respectively. Note also that only the no competition product life cycle specification
is presented in Cells 6 and 7 and Xswas defined in Footnote 171 below Table 4.1 as:
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Assuming that workers care about after tax incomes in bargaining or deciding to
participate, the easiest way to introduce the income tax is to add the tax to marginal
labour costs. This implies that firms pay fawn or ti.WL per high and low skilled unit of
labour employed, where to, t(.>l should be interpreted as 1 plus the average tax rate.
Consequently labour tax income from manufacturing is equal to:
7 = (t, -IKL,"+(t»-l)w«C (7.2)
Progression in the tax system implies that the average rate is an increasing function
of the gross wage level. To capture that progression, the tax rate should be set in
function of the wage level. Consider the tax function:
(7-3)
where f^Ws'' is the average tax rate. Parameter to shifts the level of the labour tax,
whereasti>0 determines the degree of progression in the tax sys tem.^ These
parameters can be considered the relevant policy instruments.
Corporate taxes, like consumption taxes, typically do not discriminate between
producers on the basis of the skill level of their employees. Hence a uniform tax rate
would be in order. As all corporate income or profits are used to repay the initial R&D
investments in the model, uncertainty on future corporate tax rates adds to the
uncertainty of after tax returns to R&D investments and there is a strong argument
for keeping these rates constant .^ But if these rates are assumed constant and
uniform, they merely reduce the value of a firm from discounted flow of pre- to after
335 The marginal tax rate is given by t,t,,w,.' ' . The elasticity of average taxes with respect to after tax
income is now given by t i . Both average and marginal tax rate are given here with respect to after tax
income. In the literature it is more common to express these rates in terms of the pre-tax wages, but
that complicates the mathematics without qualitatively changing the results. In principle t i could
exceed 1 . but that would imply that doubling the income level more than doubles the average tax rate.
Tax systems are unlikely to be that progressive.
336 As the model has no uncertainty, this aspect is not captured by it. Unpredictable corporate tax
rates would thus introduce uncertainty where it was assumed away for simplicity.
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tax profits and corporate taxes could be introduced in the model as a tax on
patents/innovations.^
This brings one to the third group of agents in the model, the R&D sectors. As
governments typically would consider subsidising R&D, the net effect of corporate tax
and R&D subsidy would be some fraction on the value of innovations in the model. As
R&D subsidies may be targeted at one rather than the other type of innovation, two
rates should be introduced here as well. Table 7.1 introduces the subsidies on R&D
as additional income to the R&D sector in Cell 7. Hence the value of an innovation to
the producer in Cell 6 need only be VH or n , while the R&D firms receive OHVH or OLVI
in Cell 7. It can be seen that subsidisation and taxation are in fact two sides of the
same coin as one now merely assumes Onand OL <1 to have a tax on innovation. The
costs of this scheme are given by: " ^
I = (o« - l)riv« + (o, - l ) / \ v , ' . (7.4)
In addition the government will usually levy an income tax on those working in the
R&D sector. As the key input in R&D is labour, their incomes are treated as other
labour incomes, using the same labour tax rule in Equation (7.3).
Table 7.1 is continued below. In Cell 8, unemployment is introduced into the
labour market equilibrium conditions, like before in Chapter 6. The government now
provides the main source of non-labour income through unemployment benefits and
social security transfers and thereby affects the outside option and reservation
wages for workers. The level of unemployment benefits per worker of skill S, 6s, or
alternatively the replacement rates, parameters ps in Equation (5.12), are considered
the final two policy variables in the model.
33' Note that this is the case only because the patent is the only type of capital. Corporate taxes will
have a different impact when physical capital is considered.
338 This expression is valid for models that have a life cycle. Models without a life cycle would
have I = (1 - o,, ) r i ^ + (1 - o\ ( n ^ .
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Table 7.1 (Continued): FORMAL SYNOPSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
The Government
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
Wage Bargaining
Equilibrium without Competition ; Equilibrium with Competition
R. + ^ = R'
Unemployment Benefits => 6 = (
Equilibrium
n,v, + n.v.
_ — " —
Balanced Budget
no closed form solution forg
The costs of the social security scheme are given in Cell D by:
(7.5)
where unemployment, us, can be interpreted as voluntary or involuntary and
Bj = PsWs°*w_s*~** should correspondingly be interpreted as the level of welfare
benefits or unemployment benefits, respectively. The benefit level was already
introduced in the model in Chapter 6, so this completes the introduction of the
government into the model. In Equation (7.5) one might also add an exogenous
transfer component, that can be calibrated to set total government expenditures to
the levels observed in Section 1.3. The relevant budget constraint in Cell £ is a
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balanced budget. Adding outlays and subtracting incomes the deficit of the
government is given by:
With r, to, t i , PH, PL, OH and OY as policy instruments the number of different policy
experiments, even under the balanced budget constraint, quickly multiplies.^ To
limit the number of experiments the following sections will focus on progression in
the tax system, unemployment benefit replacement rates and innovation subsidies.
These instruments are first evaluated in a positive sense. This implies that the
effect of these instruments on the identified target variables is considered. In this
analysis the direct and indirect effects are considered explicitly and differences in
policy between the US and EU can be shown to contribute to explaining labour
market trends and innovation specialisation patterns.
The positive analysis is easily extended into a normative evaluation. When the
effects of instruments on target variables are identified, the policy implications are
easily formulated. The normative analysis concludes that both the US and Europe
should seriously try to address their labour market problems, low relative wages and
high unemployment levels, respectively, as a trade-off between the two is unlikely to
emerge.
339 The balanced budget constraint implies one of the instruments is lost and must be set to balance
the budget. In the analyses that follow to was used for this purpose. This tax level parameter is neutral,
as labour is the only factor of production and must ultimately pay all taxes. By applying the same
income tax rule in manufacturing and R&D the tax level is fully and neutrally shifted onto labour. In
reality labour taxes are distortionary as there are more factors of production. A consumption tax is
probably a less biased revenue generator in reality and the role could also have been played by r. The
other parameters are less suitable candidates as they change relative prices in the model and provoke
innovation bias.
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7.3 A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY INTERACTIONS
In this section the aim is to analyse the interactions in the model. The model inTable 7.1 can be analysed graphically and numerically to identify the direct and
indirect channels through which policy instruments affect the outcomes of the model.
The key variables of interest, also constituting the main differences between the US
and EL) discussed in Chapter 1, are relative wages, unemployment levels and the
steady state growth rate. Relative wages rose in the US and remained stable in
Europe. Europe has the higher unemployment levels while the US has led the early
exploration and commercial exploitation of the ICT-revolution. Key policy instruments
that were shown to differ between the US and EU in Section 1.3, are the degree of
progression in the tax system, the level of unemployment benefits and the policy
stance on Research and Development. This section will investigate to what extent
these different policy stances may help explain the observed labour market trends.
First consider the impact of progression. As it is intended to reduce wage
inequality, one would expect the model to predict this. In addition, progression will
cause wage stability, as increases (decreases) in wage costs are partially
compensated by increases (decreases) in the average tax rate and do not fully
transmit to take-home wages. The impact of a progressive tax system can be
illustrated in the graph for the labour market, presented in Figure 7.1 on the opposite
page. With relative take-home wages on the vertical axis, the relative demand curve
will shift due to progression, as employers pay take-home wages plus taxes. Where
both take-home wages are equal, the relative gross wage costs must equal 1 as the
tax rule implies that both pay the same tax rate. Consequently, at that relative wage,
relative demand is equal to relative demand without progressive taxes. As the
relative take-home wage rises, so must relative wage costs and more than
proportionately so, hence relative demand falls. As one moves further away from 1,
this difference increases and the demand curve rotates counter-clockwise.
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Figure 7.1: THE IMPACT OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ON THE LABOUR MARKET
Figure 7.1 indicates that, in addition to causing the predicted relative wage
compression, progression also reduces relative employment.^ At the given relative
availability of labour this implies that low skilled unemployment falls relative to high
skilled unemployment.
As has been argued extensively in the chapters above, a shift in gross relative
labour costs will also cause technology to respond. Presenting the full figure and
putting gross relative labour costs on the vertical axis yields Figure 7.2 below. In that
figure the relative supply instead of the relative demand curve is rotated and
consequently the PM/4-curve also rotates around 1. Starting in equilibrium in points
-4, A', this puts the model off the steady state at points S, S'. As progression makes
low skilled labour artificially cheaper and more abundant at given relative labour
costs, the innovation sector will respond by reducing nn/ni.. This reduces relative
demand and eventually the economy settles in points such as C, C
3"° The same result can be obtained by putting gross relative wage costs on the vertical axis. Then the
relative supply curve must be rotated counter-clockwise around 1. This predicts an increase in gross
relative wage costs and a reduction in relative unemployment rates. When supply is less than perfectly
inelastic, the progression thus causes a relative wage and unemployment response. If it is inelastic,
the supply curve will not shift and the burden of the tax falls on labour alone. Relative gross wage
costs are unaffected while relative after tax wages are reduced.
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Figure 7.2: THE STEADY STATE IMPACT OF TAX PROGRESSION
The figure shows an increase in relative labour costs while relative employment and
unemployment rates drop.^i In Figure 7.1 the inward shift in relative demand can be
shown to reduce relative take-home wages by more than the initial effect of
progressive taxation. Due to the endogenous technology response, the income
redistributing effect of progression in the tax system is enhanced, although
progression itself limits the impact of relative demand shifts on relative take-home
The model thus predicts that a more progressive tax system causes relative
wages to be lower and more stable. Perhaps more surprisingly, the implications for
unemployment are also in favour of the low skilled. As Section 1.3 has shown that
Europe has the more progressive tax system, relative wage stability and relative
unemployment performance are consistent with this observation. Also the trend
towards reducing progression in the tax reforms of the 80s fits well within the general
picture. Such reforms would be expected to increase wage inequality, directly and
indirectly through technology responses. Consider shortly what the model would
3*i Note that the relative employment rate is defined as high over low, whereas the relative
unemployment rate was defied as low over high skilled rates.
* " As the demand curve is now flatter due to the counter-clockwise rotation.
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predict if the strong market size effect were in p l a c e d In that case the technology
response would be so strong that progression actually causes a reduction in relative
labour costs, causing an even stronger relative take-home wage reduction.
Progression in the tax system therefore seems a powerful policy instrument in
improving the overall labour market position, relative wage and unemployment, of
the low skilled. What about that other policy goal? How does progression affect long-
term growth? This cannot be derived from analysing the graphs above. As the model
has been fully calibrated in the chapters above, however, a numerical analysis is
easily conducted. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 7.3 on the next
page. ,. ^
To verify the predictions made above, panels >A and B show the steady state
relative wage and relative unemployment rates in function of the progression
parameter t i . The parameter to was recalibrated to maintain budget balance in the
steady stated"" The baseline values for policy instruments were set at t i =0.2, r= 1,
OH = O I = 1 and PH=PL=0.65. Hence in the baseline there are no consumption taxes, no
innovation subsidies and replacement rates are set at the values chosen in Chapter
6. The progression parameter implies that the average tax rate rises by 20% when
income doubles.^ All other parameters and exogenous variables were set or
recalibrated as described in Chapters 4 and 6.
Although Panels /A and 8 in Figure 7.3 do show that the market size effect
increases the effectiveness of progression, the size and difference in effects is
marginal. This is the case because relative employment levels, and therefore relative
marginal productivity and gross relative labour costs, change only marginally due to
increased progression in the calibrated model. With the parameters set at the values
3*3 imagine a similar shift in the relative supply and PMA-curve but combined with a concave upward
sloping RDA-curve.
3 " See also Footnote 339.
*>5 in the US in 1992 the average tax rate at 66% of APW was 25%. For 133% of APW at around 30%,
increasing the tax rate by 20% when the wage was doubled. Higher in the income distribution this
progression is less in the USA. For Europe comparable rates are found at low-income levels and
slightly higher ones at the higher levels. A notable exception is Germany, where average tax rates are
considerably higher for all income groups. Hence Europe is more progressive. See OECD (1995) and
Section 1.3.
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of Chapter 6, the supply curve is very steep to begin with and rotating it counter-
clockwise will shift the equilibrium only marginally.^
Figure 7.3: THE IMPACT OF INCREASING PROGRESSION
a** This issue was discussed at length in the previous chapter and the same caveats made there apply
when these results are concerned.
226
It can be verified in Panel B of Figure 7.3 that progression significantly reduces
relative unemployment rates. Panel C shows that the impact on overall
unemployment levels is also beneficial as the larger share of the population is still
low skilled. The impact on the growth rate, depicted in Panel 0 is small, in the order
of hundredths of percentage points. It is worth noting, however, that the non-
competition versions of the model show a positive impact, whereas the competition
versions predict a reduction in growth for the weak induced innovations model but a
relatively large increase under the strong market size effect. This is due to the
endogenous reallocation of high skilled labour. The combination of strong
diminishing returns and higher marginal tax rates drives skilled workers out of
innovation in the first case, whereas constant returns cause innovation to attract
workers from manufacturing in the second.^
It can be verified in the graphs that the impact of progression is positive in all
target variables for all model specifications except one in growth, where the negative
effect is very limited. Growth rates fall to 0.2995 when progression is increased to
0.8.3*8 progression is therefore a double-edged sword as it simultaneously improves
the relative unemployment and relative take-home wage position of low skilled. It
makes high skilled labour artificially scarcer by pushing up its price, but in doing so it
compensates for the artificial scarcity of low skilled workers caused by wage
bargaining.^ Its effectiveness is therefore enhanced through endogenous
innovation responses, but without seriously reducing growth. The latter result
emerges because higher progression does not disturb the allocation of high skilled
over R&D and manufacturing.^ Also the progression in taxes has been increased
3*' Recall that in manufacturing there are diminishing returns as well. The output elasticity was set at
0.8. between the 0.4 and 0.9 used in R&D to distinguish the weak and strong diminishing returns
version of the model.
"» Which implies that the average tax rate increases by 80% for a doubling of the take-home wage. To
achieve that in actual tax systems that would imply an even larger increase in the marginal rate. 0.8 is
chosen as the upper bound as it is the most progressive tax system for which the model can be solved
numerically. For the same reason the extreme case of a proportional tax system, with ti=0 has not
been included.
* " Note that low skilled unemployment is usually higher than high skilled unemployment. As the
bargaining parameters were calibrated to reflect this in the baseline, the unemployment benefit
system makes low skilled artificially more scarce than the high skilled.
MO in the competition versions of the model R&D will attract high skilled labour from manufacturing to
work on relatively profitable process development. In the non-competition versions the reduction in
overall unemployment also implies that R&D employment goes up.
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without affecting the total labour tax revenue, such that other policies are not
affected and the buck stops here. There seems to be no trade-off between equity and
growth, even when endogenous technology responses and financial constraints are
considered.^!
The second instrument to be evaluated is the level of unemployment benefits
and social security transfers. As was shown in Chapter 6, the manipulation of the
replacement rates directly affects the shape of the relative supply curve in Figures
7.1 and 7.2. The sensitivity analysis on parameter msoPs can be regarded as a first
analysis of labour market policy. By changing the upper and lower bound and the
slope of the curve, the unemployment benefit system has a direct impact on relative
wages and unemployment. As was also shown in Chapter 6, however, the impact on
relative labour costs is limited. Consequently there is little additional innovation
response and the level of benefits mainly affects the level of unemployment rates. As
Europe was shown to have the more generous unemployment benefits and social
security systems, this was already offered as the key explanation for the marked
difference in unemployment levels between the US and Europe.
Social security and unemployment benefits schemes, however, also involve
transfer payments from the government budget, which is an additional channel
through which the generosity of the benefits system may affect the economy. In
addition, the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6 evaluated the impact of changes in
benefit generosity for both skill types separately. For a given factor of proportionality
of 0.2, the implications of changing both replacement ratio's simultaneously is
illustrated in Figure 7.4 on the next page. As in Figure 7.3, Panel A shows the impact
on relative wages, Panel 8 that on relative unemployment. Panels C and D show the
effect on the unemployment level and growth. On the horizontal axis is the
replacement rate, which remains equal for both skill groups. The largest impact is
seen in Panel C where total unemployment rises quickly in all model specifications as
replacement rates are increased.
3" In the literature there is an ongoing debate on the relation between growth and equity. Aghion and
Howitt (1998) give an excellent overview in their Chapter 9. Indivisibilities in investment and
incentives are key arguments in support of the trade-off. Aghion and Howitt show that capital market
imperfections may reverse those arguments. To that debate this section adds the argument that
redistribution may cause favourable biases in labour demand.
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Figure 7.4: THE IMPACT OF INCREASING REPLACEMENT RATES
0.50 —| ?
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This drop in employment causes growth rates to drop, as less labour is now available
in R&D.352 As can be seen in Panels A and 8 the impact on the relative labour market
position of the low skilled depends on the value of y. With strong diminishing returns
to labour in R&D, the model predicts that the position of the low skilled improves,
whereas the market size effect will cause it to deteriorate. This is due to the rising tax
burden.^" At a given level of progression the wedge between relative take-home
wages and relative wage costs decreases, causing high skilled labour to become
artificially more abundant. Under the market size effect this causes relative wages to
increase, whereas under weak induced innovations the relative after tax wages will
fall. As relative unemployment responds strongly to relative wages, the same pattern
is observed h e r e . ^ The reductions in benefit levels, proposed in Chapter 6,
therefore also constitute a double-edged sword in the model: they increase both
growth and employment. However, there is a possible trade-off as costs may come in
terms of increased inequality. These costs depend on y and are not very likely to be
large, though.
The final policy to be considered here are R&D subsidies. In the model such
subsidies reduce the price of an innovation to producers, increasing the demand for
them. In the exogenous allocation model, however, the number of R&D workers is
fixed and innovative output cannot increase as long as unemployment levels are
unaffected. A general subsidy would only increase wages in the R&D sector. The tax
system therefore redistributes income from production to R&D workers, but because
the R&D sector was calibrated to be very small, the impact on the total tax burden is
very small and the no-competition models hardly show any change. General subsidies
only work in the endogenous allocation model. Figure 7.5 on the next page presents
the simulation results when the general level of subsidies is raised from 1 to 2 . ^
352 Even in the exogenous allocation version the supply of R&D resources is set to 1.2% of total
employment. Unemployment thus indirectly reduces the supply of R&D resources. The effect is
obviously stronger when competition for high skilled labour is assumed.
3" Recall from Chapter 6 that without the tax channel changes in replacement rates had a very limited
impact on relative wages.
3" Once more it is shown that under the assumptions made here these quantity responses do not
prevent large relative wage movements.
s^s implying that producers now only pay half of the costs of innovation and the R&D sector receives
twice the value of an innovation.
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Figure 7.5: THE IMPACT OF INCREASING INNOVATION SUBSIDIES
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In Panel D it can be verified that the subsidy is effective in stimulating overall growth.
It is most effective under the market size effect, as diminishing returns in R&D are
almost absent. The growth rate increases to a staggering 20% in that specification. If
diminishing returns are present, the subsidy increases growth to some 5% at most.
The impact on all other variables depends on the value of v.
For strong diminishing returns in R&D the unemployment level will rise, as do
relative wages and relative unemployment rates. The subsidy drives up returns in
R&D causing higher high skilled manufacturing wages. This reduces the demand in
manufacturing as innovation does not cause n« to rise fast enough. Unemployment
rises, particularly for the low skilled, as they bargain for higher wages when high
skilled wages increase. When constant returns characterise R&D, the situation is
different. Relative wages actually fall as the subsidy makes high skilled labour
scarcer to manufacturing. This sets the market size effect in motion and although
employment and wages now rise for both skill groups, they do for the low skilled in
particular. Consequently relative unemployment also falls. Hence the effectiveness of
this instrument totally depends on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D.
If it is high, then growth performance is only marginally improved at great costs to
inequality and unemployment and there is a trade-off to be made. If diminishing
returns are weak, however, growth performance, unemployment and relative wages
may all move in the right direction following an increase in innovation subsidies. Once
more y turns out to be crucial for the result.^
In Section 1.3 it was shown that direct government spending on R&D is higher
in the US than in Europe. Also a larger share of their expenditure is channelled
through tax exemptions and general R&D subsidies, whereas in Europe the bulk of
government R&D is in fact just that, government R&D. The high level of general R&D
subsidies would put the US to the right of Europe in the Figure 7.5. In Panel D this
implies higher growth rates and although US growth rates have been somewhat
higher over the 90s, this panel suggest that both should have strong diminishing
returns in R&D. In the other panels that would imply higher relative wages, higher
relative unemployment rates and marginally higher unemployment levels.
^6 More generally the knowledge spillover structure in the innovation functions, analysed in Chapter 4
is equally crucial but has not been varied here.
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These results are in line with the stylised facts when one considers that both
economies were assumed to have the same unemployment benefit schemes in this
simulation. As Figure 7.4 has shown, a more generous system will seriously affect the
overall unemployment level without affecting the other target variables very much.
Finally, the government also has the option to favour one type of innovation
g over the other. In Figure 7.6 the impact of varying 07/01 between 0.5 and 2 is
* illustrated.^? Panel D shows that, by shifting R&D resources towards product
5, innovation, the subsidies generate a slightly higher knowledge spillover and create
' higher steady state growth. This higher growth rate, however, comes at very large
costs in all models.
Relative wages, relative unemployment and the overall unemployment level
rise to very high levels, even though high skilled unemployment is all but eliminated.
The tax burden will not change much due to the subsidy itself, but indirect spillovers
through the budget are quite large. Taxing product innovation, on the other hand, is a
very powerful tool to reduce inequality, but severely reduces growth performance.
The US targets its government R&D primarily at the defence industry, whereas
European governments support the development and dissemination of basic
knowledge. As was argued in Section 1.3, this could be interpreted as relatively more
support for product innovation in the US. Hence the US should be placed to the right
of Europe in Figure 7.6 below. Now the direction of the predictions of the model does
not depend on the value of y. Once more higher relative wages, higher relative
unemployment rates and (marginally) higher growth rates are in line with the stylised
facts and the more generous unemployment benefit system in Europe overturns the
counterfactual prediction of higher unemployment levels in the US. The size of the
differences makes it unlikely that diminishing returns in R&D are absent.
In addition to offering further explanations for the trends in OECD labour
markets, the analysis also indicated how current policy should be changed to avoid
further deterioration or even improve the low skilled labour market perspective.
35? Given that o i= l in these experiments the policy is varied between taxing product innovation by
50% and subsidising it by 100%. The simulation results for the model with high values for y have been
presented up to 1.8 due to convergence problems.
233
Figure 7.6: THE IMPACT OF SHIFTING INNOVATION SUBSIDIES
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A first and very important lesson to be learnt from the analysis above, is that the
policy tools and aims are usually not linked one-on-one. Feedbacks through the
budget and the economy cause seemingly unrelated policy instruments to affect the
entire economic system in various directions, reinforcing and weakening each other.
This is the case in the very limited model presented in this thesis and is
probably the case in a more complex real world too. As the executive branch of most
Western democracies is very much segmented, policy makers are unaware or care
little about such policy spillovers. Tax authorities in the OECD have aimed to broaden
tax bases while cutting marginal rates. Their aim is to increase tax revenue while
reducing price distortions. Meanwhile they reduce progression and in addition to
causing after tax income inequality this causes relative demand to shift away from
the low skilled in the long run. At some other department many industrialised
countries have a task force that is trying to target innovative sectors in the economy
for subsidies to increase economic growth, unknowingly causing rising relative wages
and unemployment rates as new products enter the economy faster. At the
department of labour, finally, as part of its overall strategy to reduce unemployment,
benefit levels and entitlements become less generous "to make work pay'. While
reducing unemployment and enhancing growth, however, their policies may alleviate
or aggravate the plight of the low skilled as unanticipated technology responses shift
relative labour demand. This chapter has shown the obvious result that such tunnel
vision can cause policy accidents.
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7.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Having considered the policy instruments in isolation, the question is now, whatinstruments are most effective in achieving the aims of government when the
full interactions in the model are considered. Although it is in principle possible to
derive the optimal policy mix by specifying a government objective function and
maximising its value given the constraints in the model of Table 7.1, it is not possible
to analyse this graphically or analytically.^
For the numerically specified models analysed in simulations above, one
might derive the optimal policy mix by evaluating a numerically specified objective
function and conducting a grid search of the 4 dimensional policy spaced The
specification of the objective function makes the actual outcome completely
arbitrary, even if the calibrations in previous chapters do reflect the facts adequately.
What this exercise does show, however, is what policy instruments are important in
the fully interacting model.^o Without presenting the results in full, a few relevant
policy conclusions can be drawn.
Table 7.2 presents the results of the partial analyses to serve as a starting
point. First, and not surprisingly, the models that have been analysed are particularly
sensitive to innovation subsidies. By the assumed or calibrated small size of the R&D
sector, subsidies have little impact on the budget. As Figure 7.6 already indicated,
the relative subsidy level has a powerful impact on the relative rates of innovation. By
the assumed link to relative labour demand these policies are very effective in
changing relative wages, even under the assumption that total R&D resources are
exogenously given.
358 See Footnote 3 2 9 for a possible specif icat ion. With or without policy the model can only be solved
numerically and the fact that three policy instruments are being considered simultaneously implies
that graphical analysis fails. One cannot plot the value of the objective function against all 3
instruments simultaneously as graphical analysis is l imited to 3 dimensions.
359 Mathemat ica 3.0 was used to conduct this numerical search with brute force. A three dimensional
grid was defined and the value of the objective funct ion was computed for the entire grid. It is
conceded that this is a very crude and inefficient method and there are certainly more sophist icated
software packages and optimisation methods available. As this method fails to guarantee that the
obtained min imum is global, only general impressions are discussed below. The fine grid does
guarantee that a local min imum is found.
360 These policy implications were derived under the assumption that the government weighs all
factors in its objective funct ion equally.
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Table 7.2: IMPACT OF INSTRUMENTS ON OBJECTIVES
INSTRUMENTS
OBJECTIVES
u
• / +
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The general level of R&D subsidies, on the other hand, fails to attract additional
resources in that case and growth rates hardly respond to it. Under the competition
version of the model, however, the level of subsidies enhances growth and relative
growth rates are also much more sensitive to relative subsidies.^*
Relative wage reduction through technology policy is therefore costly in terms
of g rowth .^ This trade-off implies that relative subsidies in particular must be set
much higher to be optimal. Column one shows that the progression of taxes then
becomes important as a tool to reduce the relative after tax wage, both directly and
indirectly through endogenous technology responses.
As was also clear in the partial analysis, the benefit levels should be reduced
when the unemployment level is high. This will cause little relative wage pressure and
if the strong market size effect exists, the relative wage may actually fall. These
relative wage effects are easily compensated in the progression of the tax system or,
even more effectively it would seem, in technology policy. 3^ 3 Table 7.2 shows that
the channel from benefits to overall unemployment is relatively isolated from the rest
3" These results obviously follow from the assumptions of the model. In particular those that
constitute the technology part of the model. It should be noted that technology plays a key role in the
composition of relative labour demand by construction. In reality the skill distribution is not strictly
sorted and the sorting of high and low skilled over new and mature products is also far from perfect.
Moreover, the innovative process may itself be misspecified. as was mentioned in Chapter 6. All these
caveats are to be made when the policy conclusions are evaluated.
3^ Note that the model can only switch between zero and perfect substitutability of labour between
manufacturing and R&D. The intermediate cases would create a weaker trade-off.
363 This is not an argument for actually reducing benefit levels per se. A lot of real world policies fall
into this category. The outside option and insider power of workers needs to be limited to reduce their
wage claims. All policies that do this are relevant here. Reintegration of long-term unemployed, active
labour market policies, enhancing search effectiveness, avoiding poverty traps and stimulating labour
participation are a few examples of less controversial labour market reforms that would fall into this
category.
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of the model. This would suggest, as has been done in Chapter 6, that European
policy makers need not fear the equity implications of the fight against
unemployment, as long as they fight it on all fronts with equal zeal .^ The interaction
between technology and labour demand suggests to policy makers on both sides of
the Atlantic that R&D subsidies should not be aimed at the strengthening of current
trends, but should rather try to stabilise the natural cycles in technological
development. As the general purpose technologies of tomorrow emerge from the
laboratories, science and technology policy should be redirected towards developing
the previous one. As the frenzy of new products and services starts to quit down, the
government could switch back to more basic research, stimulating the development
of a new wave of innovations.
As trivially as such policies can be implemented in the model, so hard will it be
in practice.^ Given the uncertainties involved and the unavoidable policy lags, a
fine-tuned stabilisation policy is probably beyond the capabilities of any political
system. What policy makers should attempt instead is to avoid obvious
inconsistencies in their policies. Stimulating knowledge intensive production while at
the same time maintaining an egalitarian stance on income distribution, is having
your pie and eating it too. As technology will evolve in response to the availability of
skilled workers, there is no case for additional government support. Instead, that tax
money is better spent on programmes to stimulate the lower end of the labour
market and targeted R&D subsidies towards development.
In this chapter a host of policy experiments had to be left unattended. Shifting
the tax burden from labour to another tax base, which is often advocated in the
literature to stimulate employment, is ineffective in the model above, as both
consumption and labour taxes will ultimately be born by labour as it is the sole factor
of production. Adding capital or energy to the model could make such experiments
interesting and increases the relevance of financial constraints. In the experiments
above, the government financed its transfers essentially by increasing or decreasing
364 The implications of clamping down on low skilled replacement rates exclusively will obviously cause
their relative wages to fall.
^5 in practice the problem is of course to first identify high and low skilled complementary innovations
before they are made and then adequately time and dose the innovation subsidies. In numerical
simulations such problems disappear. One simply computes the required policies to stabilise wages
backwards for a given exogenous shock.
238
its tax burden neutrally. In that sense the analysis here is as crude as those
assuming lump-sum taxes. Policy experiments that shifted the burden from low to
high skilled labour have shown that such policy changes have serious implications in
the steady state as technology responds. These responses are to be expected in
richer models.
Similarly the open economy extension would allow for many more feedbacks
and leaks, that could affect the outcomes and consequently the implications for
policy. The analysis above, however, does suggest that these issues are a theoretical
possibility. Further research is required to formulate the hypotheses on policy
interactions more precisely. Then the empirical work can be done to establish their
practical relevance.
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CHAPTER 8:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This thesis has investigated the interaction between technical change and thelabour market. Its purpose was to explain key labour market trends in theOECD over the past few decades and to investigate the implications for policy
in general and science and technology policy in particular. As work progressed that
turned out to be quite an ambitious agenda. In the economic literature there are
many ways in which technology has been approached. As bulky as that literature may
be, it is dwarfed by the infinite number of contributions in which the interaction
between labour demand and labour supply has been analysed. Both strands of
literature then naturally also produced a huge amount of policy proposals. An attempt
to be complete would therefore have been futile from the outset.
Surprisingly, however, the link from technology to labour demand in general
and relative demand for unskilled labour in particular was left virtually unexplored in
the literature. The interaction with the labour market and the corresponding policy
analysis in light of that link has been all but absent. This thesis has established first
contact between these fields in economic research and concentrated on bringing
some of the mainstream ideas on technical change, labour markets and policy
together.
Part I started with a rather broad survey of the economics of technical change
in Chapter 2. The tools, concepts and ideas developed there were used in Chapter 3
to show how technical change can be modelled as an economic activity. Chapter 4
synthesised these ideas into a model in which endogenous innovation determines
the relative demand for high skilled labour. The main conclusion there was that the
interaction between technology and relative demand is largely determined by the
parameters of the innovation function. In plain English that means that returns to
scale and knowledge spillovers in R&D are not only crucial in determining the speed
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or rate of technical change, but also play a key role in determining its bias or
direction. Consequently these parameters are of crucial importance in explaining
labour demand trends over the past few decades.
Part II introduced labour market extensions to the model. Chapter 5 surveyed
the mainstream ideas on such issues as labour supply, unemployment and wage
formation. In Chapter 6 those ideas were introduced into the model of Chapter 4. The
interaction between demand and supply, perhaps surprisingly, hardly played a role in
the determination of relative wages. Technology was shown to be the key factor in
explaining relative wage behaviour, whereas unemployment levels could largely be
attributed to labour market institutions and wage rigidity, ^e
Part III analysed the obviously profound policy implications of these findings.
In Chapter 7 it was concluded that technology policy could have serious equity
implications. Also it concluded that there is no trade-off between high unemployment
levels and wage inequality, as many economists have suggested. Part of a strategy to
combat US wage inequality could be to shift public R&D funds to Development rather
than Research, such that new general purpose technologies age faster and products
move to their mature stage in the life cycle more quickly. That would make wages
more equal at virtually no costs to employment. Such policies would probably be
inadequate to solve the huge problems of low absolute wage levels for an underclass
of working poor, but current US policies do not indicate that this is a high priority
issue.
In Europe, on the other hand, restructuring social security and benefit systems
can bring down unemployment at little costs in terms of inequality. Reintroducing
progression into the tax and social contributions system can prevent what income
inequality might arise. The model in this thesis suggests that European ambitions in
science and technology are a much larger and stealthier threat to the relative
position of low skilled labour than a well-balanced reform of rigid labour markets.
366 it must be noted that education and shifts in the educational composition of the labour force have
not been considered in the model. The long run interaction between supply and demand was not part
of the analysis. The strong technology response to exogenous supply shocks does suggest a key role
for education as well. Only the demand side of Tinbergen's "race between tecrino/ogy ancf educat/on"
has been analysed here. The extension ranks high on the agenda for further research.
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
De arbeidsmarktpositie van laaggeschoolden in de geindustrialiseerdelanden (OECD) is de afgelopen decennia sterk verslechterd. Dezeverslechtering is in de empirische literatuur uitvoerig gedocumenteerd en
dit proefschrift voegt op dat terrein weinig toe. Een gestyleerd overzicht van de
resultaten, gepresenteerd in het eerste hoofdstuk, maakt duidelijk dat in Anglo-
Saxische landen - met name de Verenigde Staten - deze verslechtering vooral tot
uitdrukking komt in dalende relatieve lonen voor laaggeschoolden. Omdat in dezelfde
periode het aanbod van geschoolde arbeid in die landen is toegenomen, worden
deze loonverschuivingen toegeschreven aan een daling in de relatieve vraag.
Deze vraaguitval wordt in de empirische literatuur vaak aan technologische
verandering toegeschreven. De relatieve loon- en hoeveelheidsaanpassingen doen
zich namelijk tot op het laagste aggregatieniveau voor. Er is dus geen of nauwelijks
sprake van een verschuiving van werkgelegenheid naar scholingsintensieve sectoren
of bedrijfstakken, maar van een vraaguitval over de gehele linie binnen sectoren,
bedrijfstakken en industrieen. Dat betekent bijvoorbeeld dat de toegenomen
concurrentie uit lage lonen landen of veranderende consumentenpreferenties ten
aanzien van eindproducten geen verklaring kunnen bieden. Het feit dat de
vraaguitval vooral plaatsvindt in bedrijven die met nieuwe technologie werken, doet
tenslotte vermoeden dat de technologische ontwikkeling een centrale rol heeft
gespeeld.
Als de verschuiving van de relatieve vraag veroorzaakt wordt door
technologische verandering, dringt zich de vraag op waarom technologie zich juist in
die richting heeft ontwikkeld. Economen - met name de aanhangers van de
endogene groei theorie - stellen immers dat innovatie, en dus technologische
ontwikkeling, een economische activiteit is. Als schaarse middelen worden ingezet
om nieuwe technieken te ontwikkelen, zou je verwachten dat men zich concentreert
op kostenbesparing. Relatief goedkoper wordende productiefactoren, in dit geval
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laag geschoolde arbeid, zullen dan bij nieuwe technieken intensiever worden benut.
Dat is in tegenspraak met de stelling dat nieuwe technologie in de afgelopen twintig
jaar scholingsintensief is geweest.
Het is deze paradox die in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift centraal staat. Het
model, dat in dit deel wordt ontwikkeld, onderscheidt consumenten, producenten en
innovatoren. De laatsten genereren innovaties die de producenten in staat stellen
om nieuwe producten en diensten te leveren aan de consumenten. Vooropgesteld
dat consumenten deze nieuwe producten waarderen, hechten producenten dus
waarde aan de activiteiten van de innovatoren. Het model in deel I toont aan dat het
onder bepaalde restricties en veronderstellingen mogelijk is dat rationele
innovatoren, inspelend op de wensen van winst maximaliserende producenten, toch
(blijven) kiezen voor scholingsintensievere producten en processen. Om tot een
dergelijk model te komen geeft hoofdstuk 2 een overzicht van de (meest relevante)
economische literatuur over technologie ontwikkeling. De concepten en ideeen die
voortkomen uit deze literatuur zijn reeds naar wiskundige modellen vertaald.
Hoofdstuk 3 maakt deze vertaalslag inzichtelijk door enkele van de basis modellen
uit de literatuur te presenteren. Uit hun onderlinge samenhang en met enkele
aanpassingen in de interpretatie van variabelen en parameters wordt uit deze
modellen in hoofdstuk 4 een nieuw model geconstrueerd. De (numerieke) analyse
van dit nieuwe model levert twee onafhankelijke maar volstrekt complementaire
hypothesen ter verklaring van bovengeschetste paradox op.
De eerste hypothese werd al eerder geopperd door Acemoglu (1998), die stelt
dat een stijging in het aanbod van hooggeschoolden op korte termijn een daling in
het relatieve loon veroorzaakt. Maar als innovatie zich richt op de nu minder
schaarse factor hooggeschoolde arbeid, zullen op lange termijn de relatieve
looneffecten worden gecompenseerd en mogelijk zelfs doorschieten. Het voert te ver
om de exacte voorwaarden en veronderstellingen bij deze hypothese hier uitvoerigte
beschrijven, maar hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat deze hypothese alleen kan opgaan
wanneer aan redelijk strenge voorwaarden is voldaan. Als dat het geval is, zijn de
effecten van innovatie op de relatieve lonen in principe blijvend van aard.
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De tweede hypothese is nieuw in de literatuur, althans binnen deze context. De
hypothese gaat uit van de levenscyclus van producten en diensten, die in de eerste
fase van hun bestaan per definitie de inzet van hooggeschoolden vereisen. Te
denken valt aan ingenieurs, die frequent aanpassingen aan het ontwerp en
productieproces moeten maken, maar ook aan het doorgaans geschoolde personeel
dat verantwoordelijk is voor het veroveren van marktaandeel en het vergroten van de
afzetmarkt. Naarmate de productlevenscyclus vordert, daalt de scholingsintensiteit.
Dit wordt nog versterkt door een geleidelijke omschakeling van concurrentie op
kwaliteit naar concurrentie op (kost)prijs. Als een verjonging van het goederen- en
dienstenpakket ten grondslag ligt aan de relatieve loonveranderingen, is deze per
definitie van voorbijgaande aard, in tegenstelling tot het resultaat bij Acemoglu's
h y p o t h e s e . ' • • - . - • •••.-•• • ' ;
Hoewel hoofdstuk 4 met numerieke simulates aantoont dat het model de
feiten redelijk kan reproduceren, is een empirische toetsing van beide hypothesen
geen onderdeel van dit proefschrift. De bewijslast is dus nog niet rond. Deel I levert
desalniettemin enkele nieuwe aanknopingspunten voor het verdere onderzoek.
Een tweede vraag, die centraal staat in deel II, is de afwezigheid van vergelijkbare
relatieve loonverschuivingen in andere landen. Het lijkt immers redelijk te
veronderstellen dat de in Europa gebruikte productietechnieken niet wezenlijk van
die in de Verenigde Staten verschillen. Eenzelfde vraaguitval zou dus ook Europa
moeten treffen. Het relatieve werkgelegenheidsaandeel van laaggeschoolden is in de
hele OECD duidelijk gedaald, maar er is in Europa (het Verenigd Koninkrijk
uitgezonderd) nauwelijks sprake van relatieve loonverandering. De twee populairste
hypothesen ter verklaring van dit verschil blijken bij zorgvuldige toetsing het verschil
niette kunnen verklaren.
De eerste hypothese stelt dat aanbodverschuivingen in Europa hebben geleid
tot een evenwichtigere arbeidsmarkt met minder loonbewegingen. Maar hoewel er in
Europa inderdaad sprake is van een geleidelijker en gelijkmatiger groei in het
aandeel geschoolden in de beroepsbevolking, zijn de verschillen met de Verenigde
Staten niet dermate groot dat ze de opvallende stabiliteit in Europa kunnen
verklaren.
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Het (resterende) verschil wordt veelal toegeschreven aan verschillen in
arbeidsmarktinstituties. Neerwaartse reele loonrigiditeit zou de relatieve
loonstabiliteit in Europa bij een gelijke relatieve vraagverschuiving verklaren.
Wanneer door institutionele verschillen de relatieve aanbodcurve in Europa veel
vlakker verloopt is een kleine relatieve loonverschuiving immers voldoende om het
evenwicht op de arbeidsmarkt te herstellen. Dit zou betekenen dat in Europa de
relatieve werkloosheid en/of inactiviteit voor laaggeschoolden sterk zou zijn
toegenomen. Dit is echter niet het geval - of althans niet veel sterker dan in de
Verenigde Staten.
Dit brengt ons terug bij het model uit deel I. Uitgebreid met een standaard
arbeidsmarktmodel, waarbij ook werkloosheid en inactiviteit expliciet worden
meegenomen, kan worden aangetoond dat de relatieve loonstabiliteit in Europa ook
het gevolg kan zijn van een geleidelijker en minder grote verschuiving in de relatieve
vraag. Ook hier biedt de levenscyclushypothese een verklaring. Als Europa zelf
minder ontwikkelt en meer technologie importeert, voorspelt de
levenscyclushypothese dat de verschuiving in de relatieve vraag minder groot en
minder langdurig zal zijn, zelfs wanneer Europa op het eerste gezicht identieke
technologieen in huis haalt. Immers, de al wat oudere technieken zijn ook voor lager
geschoolden bruikbaar. Hiermee wordt de rol van instituties en aanbodfactoren niet
gebagatelliseerd, maar het model in deel II toont wel aan dat ook de vraagkant
mogelijk een rol heeft gespeeld.
Tenslotte wordt in deel III de overheid in de analyse betrokken. Zowel in positieve als
in normatieve zin heeft deze uitbreidingtoegevoegde waarde. In positieve zin dragen
de verschillen in inkomens- en belastingbeleid, arbeidsmarktbeleid en
technologiebeleid bij aan de verklaring van de internationale verschillen in loon- en
technologieontwikkeling. In normatieve zin hebben de beschreven interacties tussen
innovatie, arbeidsmarkt en overheid implicaties voor het beleid. De belangrijkste
conclusie van dit deel is dat overheden zich van deze interactie bewust moeten zijn.
In numerieke simulatie experimenten is aangetoond dat progressie in het
belastingstelsel binnen de restricties van het model, naast beoogde
herverdelingseffecten, ook gunstige effecten heeft op technologieontwikkeling.
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Progressieve belastingen verhogen de relatieve kosten en drukken daarmee de
relatieve vraag naar hooggeschoolden. Daar staat tegenover dat subsidies op
Research en Development, naast de beoogde effecten op innovatie, onverwachte
verdelingseffecten kunnen sorteren. Het streven naar een kennisintensieve
economie staat daarmee bijvoorbeeld op gespannen voet met een evenwichtige
inkomensverdeling en het duurzaam verhogen van de arbeidsparticipatie van
laaggeschoolden.
Tenslotte heeft ook het arbeidsmarktbeleid effect op de ontwikkeling van de
technologie en inkomensverdeling. Het model geeft bijvoorbeeld aan dat de
werkloosheidsniveaus voor hoog- en laaggeschoolden kunnen worden verlaagd
zonder technologische repercussies en daaraan verbonden verdelingsproblemen,
mits de relatieve terugvalpositie voor hoog- en laaggeschoolden gelijk blijft. Dit is
goed nieuws voor beleidsmakers. Europa kan de werkloosheid aanpakken zonder
Amerikaanse verdelingseffecten te vrezen, terwiji de VS de loonongelijkheid kunnen
aanpakken, zonder te eindigen met Europese werkloosheidscijfers. Al wat nodig is, is
een integrale benaderingvan de verschillende beleidsterreinen.
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Skill BiasedlTechnical Change
Its Origins, the Interaction
with the Labour Market and
Policy Implications
The labour market position of the low skilled is deteriorat-
ing throughout the OECD. In the empirical literature skill
biased technical change is frequently held responsible. This
thesis takes a more theoretical approach in linking technol-
ogy and the labour market.
First a link is made between endogenous technical change
and the demand for labour. Under the assumption that
labour markets clear, this analysis yields two possible and
mutually compatible explanations for the strong drop in
relative low skilled wages observed in the US over the last
two decades. When that assumption is relaxed and unem-
ployment is introduced, one can address the European situ-
ation. It is argued that the usual suspects, labour market
institutions and differences in relative supply, cannot account
for the observed relative wage stability in Europe. This analysis
suggests that technology dynamics and international
spillovers have a role to play.
Finally the implications for policy making are discussed when
technology policies, educational policies, tax and income
redistribution policies and labour market policies thus
become interrelated.
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